Carrol Cox wrote:
>
> Singer's concern with animal rights has a metaphysical origin. It is one
> of the innumerable manifestations of the lust for certainty that is
> deeply grounded in the thought of capitalist societies. He thought he
> could find ethical certainty by grounding "rights" in the capacity to
> feel pain. As I remember his articles in the NYRB this metaphysical lust
> was a far stronger element than any actual concern for the entities
> feeling pain. Fore example, he could indulge in long arguments about the
> relative rights of rats and of infants in the inner cities. It was all
> utterly separated from concrete condtions.
>
yes, the analysis may seem clinical, and perhaps in singer's case it is.
IIRC singer clearly writes that he does not believe in absolute
concepts of rights, given his brand of utilitarianism. insofar as you
have to analytically reason about these things, is it not important to
ground them in some small set of "axiomatic" notions?
singer's "animal liberation" lays out in excruciating detail, the
concrete conditions of the billions of animals that we mindlessly
slaughter each year. if you have read the book, would you not consider
that the supplement that you find missing?
--ravi
