So, they are "committed" to the logic of self-interest as defined by game theory, but that is not considered one of the commitments that "binding commitments concerning behavior" refers to (?) ( and cooperative behavior is defined as being worse off ?)
I guess , if the above are accurate deductions, then the question arises , why wouldn't cooperative behavior make someone "better off" in some circumstances ? CB Gil Skillman : No--the reason each individual sticks with his or her equilibrium strategy is not because they have committed beforehand to doing so, but rather because they would be worse off by changing. Gil > I am only focussing on the logic of your statement below, not the overall >debate on game theory in general, but if "no participant would choose to >depart unilaterally " isn't that a "binding comitment concerning their >behavior " ? > >Charles > > >* From: Gil Skillman > >Oops amend the following passage in my response to Jim-- > > Further, it's hard to see what's so unreasonable about the basic concept >of Nash equilibrium, which is the idea that in a noncooperative strategic >setting--that is, a setting in which, for whatever reason, participants are >able to make binding commitments concerning their behavior--a necessary >condition for equilibrium is that no participant would choose to depart >unilaterally from the equilibrium outcome. As mentioned above, one can >generalize this basic idea to a situation in which information is imperfect >or incomplete, or strategic interactions are carried out over time. > > >that should read "participants are not able to make binding commitments >concerning their behavior." > >Sorry for the omission. > >Gil
