From The role of the military in politics A CASE STUDY OF Iraq. M. Tarbush. Kegan Paul . 1982.
Page 143-144
But given events in Spain at the time, it was perhaps natural that a military take-over would be suspected of -having some links with Germany andjor Italy. Even harder to substantiate is the claim that, on the day of his assassination, Bakir Sidqi was
in fact on his way to Berlin, via Turkey, in response to an invitation that he had received from Hitler; and it was a leak of this information that had caused the British to plan his assassination.'�3Owing to the short life of the regime, we
shall never know the nature and degree of Bakir Sidqi's German sympathies and whether he intended to bring Iraq closer to Germany. Had there been any clear proof of it, it would have been of extreme importance to Britain.l�4 But since the,", suspicions were only vague, she was prepared to give him' the benefit of the doubt.The end of the coup
governmentJust
as the coming to power of the new government did, not alter the relationship between Iraq and Britain, so it did not make any changes in Iraqi political behaviour. It, soon became clear that the new, rulers of Iraq were not any different' from the old ones, that, each element in the government was pursuing its own interests, and that there were no strong bonds between them. Hikmat Sulaiman was widely respected for his intelligence, but some suspected that his -cynicism verged on weakness, The British Ambassador relates an encounter with him which, in addition to clearly showing the immense degree of British influence in Iraq, also reflects the weakness of the Prime Minister's character. The Ambassador informed the Foreign Office how he told Hikmat Suliaman'svery sharply that his manners were bad ... when ... the time came to tell him what was thought about it [the Government's desire to buy arms from-non-British sources] by all in London, I was in some difficulty because I had, as it `were, to hold him up with one hand -:
and hit him with the other:-:I hit him, nevertheless,-and the blow' was hard �because I took him by surprise. Hikmat was Very near resignation and we came to the verge of a complete break' when he dined-with me a few nights later and- I had to give him a jolt about the way the Ministry of Defence was behaving. .`. . When he called on me the next day, he told the Oriental Secretary that, if I meant to hit him again, he would walk out and not come back.
In fact, there was much debate as to whether Sulaiman had the strength or the desire to stand up' to Bak
r Sidqi, who like himself had a Turkish background, although his parents were domiciled in Kurdistan. It was generally accepted that lljkmat Sulaiman was horrified at the murder of Ja'far al-'Askari, both because it was a deplorable act and because it made it impnssihle for him to fulfil his intention of asking Nuri al-Sa' d, al-'Askari's brother-in law,`to join the new government."�6 He seems to have been a' negative character; indifferent to religion and pan-Arabism, ,and' contemptuous of the fanaticism and peculation of Yasin al-Hashimi and his colleagues.
107 There is perhaps something in Yasin al-Hashirn is comment that Hikmat Sulaiman was possessed of very few original ideas and had no capacity at all for accomplishing them once they had been formulated:'�$ Even people who saw him as 'rather a `strong' man, =: such as Shaikh Hafiz Wahba, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in London, were prepared to agree that the relationship between him and Bakir Sidqi was reminiscent of that between Reza Pahlevi and Sayyid Zia al-Din.'�9 In the early stages of the'coup government, comment on Hikmat Sulaiman varied from a claim that he was `pretty obviously . . . -' merely a stalking-horse for Bakir Sidgi'i'� to a suggestion that he was sailing with a composure and determination above the immediate post-coup problenis and min t yet gather enough strength to be dominant over Bal.ir Sidgi,i'"As
Ifor"Bakir Sidgi, no doubts as to the strength of his character existed,. But although he was respected, he was not loved. In the view of a mennher of the British Military Mission, IOq per cent of his ar'rny feared hi in, 75 per cent respected him, and 60 per cent loathed him.This' would seem
to be confirmed by the"lack of public demonstrationat his death.'
13 His undoubted ambition was thought to be quite possi- - bly for his country as much as for himself, and it was suggested that `for years signs had not been lacking that he had some deep game in mind'.i'a It was hotly disputed how much this led...........
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