Mark,
I'm willing to help. But where is the point of entry?
Hausmann and Rigobón put out their non-peered
reviewed paper, the Wall St. Journal and others
continues to use it to smash Chavez by asserting
fraud, you wrote a response which got some
attention, but Hausmann and Rigobón are going
along their merry way, now responding to Carter
Center. In my judgment, the Carter Center is
really not up to this discussion -- Hausmann and
Rigobón throw in a highly complicated
econometric paper, expect their credentials to
carry weight and otherwise put the Carter Center on the defensive.
The main problem is that the econometric model
put on the agenda of serious research should be
applicable to any election, including the one
coming up here Nov. 2. But before ANYONE in the
political domain would want to use this type of
econometric work in a serious critique of a
political process -- including allegations of
fraud (which is a VERY serious allegation, not
to be taken after less than three-weeks work on
a entirely new 'model' -- Hausmann and Rigobón,
I submit, are quite quilty of this), the model
itself has to be very, very carefully examined.
I've done enough econometric work in my day to
know that Hausmann and Rigobón jumped in the hot
water without the proper scientific background
work. As one example: They develop a
model. Regardless of whether the model itself
is good or bad, the proper procedure is to apply
the model in a variety of samples, to learn from
the outcomes of that research and refine the
model accordingly. I'm saying this entirely
independently of whether the model itself is any
good. They didn't do this, and jumped into the
water with charges of fraud after 20 or less
days of research work and no peer-review that I
know of. Of course, peer-review is not godsend,
as there are reviewers and there are reviewers. But still...
Anyway, we can debate this ad infinitum on this
list, but how could we possibly affect the real
work of Venezuelan political discussion? By the
way, I'm glad Rigobón doesn't seem to take your
dialogue with him personally. But it was
Hausmann who is the ex-minister from a
government prior to Chavez; I believe he served
under Perez who hates Chavez with such a passion
as to border threatening Chavez's life (it would
be an arrestable offense in the U.S.).
Paul
***********************************************************************
Paul Zarembka, editor, RESEARCH IN POLITICAL ECONOMY at
******************** http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/PZarembka
>For those who like econometrics or statistics, here is a simple problem
>that is turning out to have significant political implications. It takes
>about 20 minutes to read and understand it. For those of you who teach
>econometrics or statistics, it makes an excellent problem for an
>introductory class -- an exciting real world example where the answer to a
>statistical question has real consequences.
>
>Perhaps more importantly, it would be good if some of you would be willing
>to weigh in on it. As of now, a paper by two economists (Hausmann and
>Rigobón,
><http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rhausma/new/blacks
wan03.pdf>http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rhausma/new/blackswan03.pdf
>) is being used to undermine the credibility of a very credible election
>result, by purporting to show econometric evidence of electronic fraud.
>Since this referendum was closely monitored and certified by the Carter
>Center and the Organization of American States, this paper has also called
>into question the credibility of the international monitoring process.
>
>The election in question is a recall referendum that took place on August
>15 in Venezuela, where the recall effort failed by a vote of 59 (NO) to 41
>(YES) percent. The opposition put forth exit polls, conducted by
>opposition activists and supervised by the well-known American polling
>firm Penn, Schoen, Berland & Associates, that showed the opposite result:
>that President Chávez was recalled by a margin of 59 percent (YES) to 41
>percent (NO). (These and other exit poll data were used by Hausmann and
>Rigobón in their analysis).
>
>The econometric model used by H & R is a bit complex (it is explained in
>the appendices to their paper), but the problem with their analysis is
>actually very simple. Here is a brief outline:
>
>In this referendum voters expressed their preference (yes or no) with a
>touch screen voting machine. The machine then printed out a paper ballot
>with the voter's choice, which voters deposited in a ballot box.
>
>Electronic fraud in this system is thus a difficult and risky enterprise:
>any rigging of the machines could be caught quite easily by comparison
>with the paper ballots at any polling center. In an audit after the vote,
>the National Electoral Council (CNE), together with the international
>observers from the Carter Center and OAS, drew a sample of 150 polling
>stations and compared the machine results to the paper ballots. The
>results matched almost perfectly -- with 0.1 percent difference -- a
>number that is statistically insignificant and easily explainable by the
>likelihood that some voters might have failed
to deposit their paper ballots.
>
>But Hausmann and Rigobón came up with a theory of fraud that is consistent
>with a clean audit. To take their hypothetical example (p.28-30): suppose
>there are 3,000 voting centers where the machines are rigged, and the CNE
>randomly selects the remaining 1,580 centers to be clean. The electoral
>authorities then fix the program that randomly selects a sample of 150
>centers for auditing, so that the sample is selected from only the 1,580
>clean centers. The electronic results from these centers would then match
>the paper ballots, and the audited sample
would show the election to be clean.
>
>The problem with this theory is that under these assumptions, the audited
>sample is actually a random sample of the universe of (pre-vote,
>pre-fraud) polling stations. It therefore provides statistical evidence,
>which Hausmann and Rigobón ignored, of the overall referendum result. And
>the sample came in very close to the official result: 41.6 of the audited
>sample voted YES, to recall the President. A relatively simple statistical
>test shows that:
>
>-- The chances of getting an audited sample, under Hausmann and Rigobón's
>assumptions of how it was selected, of 41.6 percent YES, if the true
>(non-fraudulent) vote were 59 percent YES, are less than one in 28 billion
>trillion.
>
>-- Even if the true vote had the recall barely succeeding with only 50.1
>percent YES, the chances of getting an audited sample of 41.6 percent YES
>are less than one in a million.
>
>That should be the end of the story. However, after the Carter Center
>responded (see
><http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1834.pdf
>http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1834.pdf
>) to Hausmann and Rigobón, they responded with a new theory of the fraud
>(see
><http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rhausma/new/Carter
Response.pdf>http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rhausma/new/CarterResponse.pdf
>pages 2-3), in which the audited sample might have been not randomly
>selected but deliberately selected to be non-representative. In other
>words, it could have been chosen to be very pro-government, so that the
>41.6 percent YES vote in the sample would match the overall (fraudulent)
>result.
>
>However, this would mean that a very pro-government sample was selected
>for the audit. But there is no evidence of this; and in fact, in our paper
>we looked at the election results from 2000 and found that the people in
>the audited areas voted the same as the rest of the country in the 2000
>election. In that 2000 election, Chávez received 61.8 percent of the
>major-candidate vote in the areas audited for the 2004 referendum, as
>opposed to 61.4 percent for the country. This is well within the margin of
>sampling error.
>
>So there is no evidence of electronic fraud and no more reason to question
>the results of this election than there is to question that Ronald Reagan
>beat Walter Mondale in 1984, by the same margin.
>
>All of this is explained in our brief paper:
><http://www.cepr.net/publications/fraud_venezu_
conspiracy.pdf>http://www.cepr.net/publications/fraud_venezu_conspiracy.pdf
>.
>
>I want to add that this is not a personal or political dispute with
>Hausmann and Rigobón. In fact, Professor Rigobón has responded to me by
>e-mail and our correspondence has been useful, interesting, and friendly.
>And we continue to take them at their word that they are not simply trying
>to undermine the credibility of the electoral process, but indeed believe
>that an electronic fraud may have taken place, and that their paper
>provides statistical evidence of such fraud. Nonetheless I am very sure
>that they are completely wrong.
>
>The problem is that, since their paper is a bit complicated, almost no one
>has read it and understood it. (Although it has had considerable influence
>in the U.S., international, and Latin American press, and of course also
>in Venezuela). However it is not necessary to go through all of their
>derivations. Some of you may take the time to read it, as we have, and to
>figure out how they might have gotten their result in the absence of
>electronic fraud. However, their theory of the fraud -- outlined above --
>is explained on page 28-30 (see
><http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rhausma/new/blacks
wan03.pdf>http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~rhausma/new/blackswan03.pdf
>); that, combined with the statistical evidence noted above and presented
>in our paper, is sufficient to make an informed decision on whether these
>allegations of electronic fraud should be taken seriously. Anyone with a
>basic knowledge of statistics can easily understand everything here.
>
>If anyone in interested in looking at this issue, please contact me by
>e-mail or at the numbers below. The Carter Center will probably be
>reviewing these allegations again, and the controversy will continue, so
>anyone who is willing to take a little time to understand the very basic
>statistical analysis here may be very helpful.
>
>Please feel free to forward this to anyone you know who might be
>interested, especially statisticians.
>
>Thanks in advance,
>
>Mark
>
>
>
>Name: Mark Weisbrot
>E-mail: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Co-Director
>Center for Economic and Policy Research
>1621 Connecticut Ave NW, Suite 500
>Washington, DC 20009-1052
>Phone (202) 293-5380 x228
>Fax (202) 588-1356
>(202) 333-6141 (home)
>(202) 746-7264 (cell)
>www.cepr.net
