Middle East Economic Survey


VOL. XLIX

No 40

2-Oct-2006



IRAQ



The Geopolitics Of Oil



By Issam al-Chalabi

The following paper was presented by Issam al-Chalabi
at the 27th Oil & Money Conference held in London on
18-19 September 2006. Mr Chalabi is a former Iraqi
Minister of Oil and a  former President of the Iraq
National Oil Company.



Since the discovery of oil in Persia in the late 19th
century and in Iraq at the beginning of the 20th
century, oil has been a focal point in all major
events in the Middle East. The distribution of oil in
various parts of the region was a major factor in
defining the boundaries of the newly-established Arab
states in order to safeguard the interests of the
major world powers after the fall of the Ottoman
empire. There are numerous events, conflicts and even
wars in which oil was a central issue, if not the sole
issue. Moreover its importance has grown over the
years as the world’s dependence on Middle East oil has
increased. With two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves
and a third of its gas reserves, the Middle East, and
particularly the region surrounding the Arabian Gulf,
has become vital for the world and will remain so far
many years to come.



My presentation today will only relate to Iraq, a
country that has remained at the center of attention
for many years due to the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, followed by the
second Gulf War and the March 2003 downfall of Saddam
Husain and his regime at the hands of the invading
forces led by the US. Whether or not oil was the real
target of that invasion will surely remain a subject
of controversy for researchers and politicians for
decades to come. However, one of the architects of the
war, US Defense Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz, when
asked why the US did not attack North Korea after it
admitted to possessing weapons of mass destruction,
replied without hesitation: “Iraq floats on oil.”



The Iraq war has become more controversial as
virtually everything has turned sour: the political
process is deadlocked, security deteriorates year
after year and month after month and the economy is in
shambles, with unemployment reaching 51% and severe
shortages of fuel, electricity, water and every other
indicator. On top of that, the performance of the oil
industry has fallen short of the minimum expectations
both upstream and downstream.



The current status and future prospects of the Iraqi
oil industry have been discussed on many occasions, so
today I would like to deal only with the latest
developments that will shape the destiny of Iraq and
determine whether it will remain a unified country or
disintegrate one way or another. The interference,
interests and influence of outside forces,
particularly the US as the main player and regional
players such as Iran, will no doubt continue to play a
major role, but I would like to concentrate on
internal geopolitics and the conflicting agendas of
the main factions and groups.



When Iraq’s draft constitution was promulgated in
August last year, I said from this podium that “the
relevant articles on the oil and gas industries seem
to contain the seeds for conflicts and possible
fragmentation.” That was one of the main reasons for
threats to boycott the 15 October 2005 referendum,
threats which were only averted after strong lobbying
by the US administration and the insertion of Article
142, which cleared the way to amending the
constitution through the establishment of a
parliamentary committee within four months of
inauguration of the new parliament. It has been almost
eight months since that date, and the deputies are
still arguing about the definition of the starting
date.



This led to two major developments in the form of
attempts to establish controversial laws prior to any
possible amendments to the constitution. The first
relates to the insistence of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) on the full ownership, control,
development and operation of the oil industry, both
upstream and downstream, in accordance with its own
interpretation of the disputed articles on oil and
gas. As an example, Article 111 of the constitution
states that “oil and gas is the property of all the
Iraqi people in all the regions and provinces.”
However, the KRG says that such resources within
Kurdish areas are owned only by the people of
Kurdistan. It also says that the regional parliament
of Kurdistan is the sole legislative authority over
all petroleum operations in that region.



The KRG on 7 August published the draft of a proposed
petroleum act and followed it last week with a final
draft to be submitted for enactment. This move came as
a surprise to the central government, which was itself
preparing a draft hydrocarbon law for the whole
country in a ministerial committee headed by the
deputy PM, Barham Salih who happens to be a leading
Kurdish figure and representing the Kurdish parties in
the central government. Among other controversial
articles in the Kurdish legislation, it is stated that
it will apply to all “disputed territories,” meaning
the currently-producing Kirkuk, Mosul and other oil
fields as well as all other undeveloped fields. It
clearly states that no law, contract or license issued
by the central government can be applied without the
explicit agreement of the KRG.



The Iraqi Oil Minister Husain al-Shahristani said a
few weeks ago that there will be only one authority in
control of oil resources. Yet there has so far been no
official reaction to the latest Kurdish move, and it
remains unclear what will be the fate of the draft
hydrocarbon law that is supposed to be finalized and
submitted to the Iraqi parliament for legislation by
the end of the year. The KRG is continuing to sign
production-sharing agreements for blocks and
structures under its control, as with DNO of Norway,
Genel Energi of Turkey, PetOil of Turkey and Canada’s
Western Oil Sands and Heritage. In one of these
agreements profit oil will be shared on a 51-49% basis
and cost recovery oil could reach as high as 80-90%.



The second major development is politically motivated
but is also focused on the oil wealth in the southern
part of Iraq. The Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), one of the main groups in
the present government, last week submitted to
parliament a controversial draft law detailing the
mechanism for establishing regional governments
similar to that in the Kurdish region. However, this
was strongly opposed by other parties within the same
coalition as well as other groups outside it. This is
being looked upon by some observers as a possible sign
of national aspiration against the latest tide of
sectarian motivations.



A federal region in the southern part of Iraq could
encompass up to nine provinces, including three
oil-rich provinces - Basrah, Misan and Thi-Qar – which
contain oil fields with proven reserves of nearly 80bn
barrels, or over 70% of Iraq’s current proven
reserves. These include undeveloped super giant oil
fields such as West Qurna, Majnoon, Bin 'Umar,
Halfaya, Nasiriya, and Ratawi and nearly 30 other
fields.



Currently Iraq’s oil exports are limited to those from
the Basrah oilfields and some from Misan. These
generate all the oil revenue on which the central
government depends. The mishandling of oil and oil
products has been known for some time but only came to
light after the formation of the new government last
May. Reports of missing oil barrels, smuggling and
mishandling of funds have been made public through
various channels, including inter alia official
reports from the Inspector General of the Ministry of
Oil and the Audit Board formed by representatives of
the UN, IMF, World Bank and the Arab Fund. The report
of the Inspector General of the Ministry of Oil listed
seven illegal berthing facilities used for smuggling
of oil products that had cost Iraq nearly $1.5bn. The
Audit Board talks about hundreds of millions of
dollars misplaced or missing.



The current Iraqi National Security Advisor, Muaffaq
al-Ruba'i, said on 14 June that oil is at the heart of
much of the heavy fighting around Basrah. “These
oilfields are the richest in Iraq and constitute all
the current Iraqi exports,” he said. “If you don’t
understand what’s happening there, follow the dollar
sign. There is a 6,000 b/d difference between the
level of production for exports and the level of
actual exports. It goes into the pockets of warlords,
organized crime and political parties.” This figure
for missing barrels is in fact much lower than
estimates by other sources, but even at this level it
adds up to nearly $130mn over and above the $1.5bn for
smuggling and mishandling of imported oil products in
the official ministry report.



In conclusion, I would like to make a second reference
to my presentation a year ago at this conference,
which some participants thought was rather
pessimistic. The figures for production and exports
were as I predicted. For the first eight months of
2006, production was 2.090mn b/d compared to the 2mn
b/d I predicted, with exports averaging 1.506mn b/d
compared to 1.5mn b/d. As for the future, I do not
think that 3.5mn b/d will be attained before 2009-10
or that 6mn b/d will be reached before 2012 at best.

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