Greetings Economists, On Oct 22, 2006, at 7:04 PM, Sandwichman wrote:
Yes, but the pure math is ultimately based on an analogy to the practical stuff. If it was not, why would we call them both "math">
Doyle; I would agree with they are the same things we call math. They are both cognition as well, and that's a kind of brain work. But you ask what I think is a profound question. Why do we call them both math? Underlying this question is how mathematicians look at a variety of math as 'language' like. In other words our basic way of saying what one is and what another cognitive work may be, is basically 'confused' in Wittgenstein's sense of the word confusion. I think this likely an important technical question to take up as we go along. I don't agree with Chomsky, but if Chomsky were right about an innate grammar, then that implies the brain work is of a specific type only found in us. What I do think right is that language is not math mental work. Doyle
