Re Lebanese Armed Forces and the Lebanese civil war: I believe Soula is correct (and well informed!) that significant *parts* of the Lebanese army dissolved into the fray early on - i.e. '75 (and this is also happening in Iraq). But later on in the war, I recall being struck at seeing that part of the Army that had NOT yet dissolved (Muslim, Christian and Druze soldiers) despite the officer corps being almost entirely Christian. After all, to hold even a part of the Army together for 10 years is a long time under the pressure of the civil war. Some of it was the benefit of a paycheck (which was only sporadic) but some of it was not. And, of course, this achievement was why Aoun was sucked into the Presidency in '87 from his post as Commander of the Armed Forces - - a shallow attempt to exploit the residual of respect across the lines, but it backfired.
Relevance for Iraq: I think the relevant point for Iraq is that the Baker strategy counts on being able to hold together a *part* of the Iraqi army (assuming they get paid) who will stay enough out of the civil war that they can later credibly restore "order" (under U.S. direction and alongside U.S. combat troops) when things are played out. This requires a tricky tightrope in the middle of a civil war, plus the Shias are already trying to maneuver so that units with Shia soldiers have Shia commanders (the officer corps in Iraq was largely Sunni). And for security the 50% of U.S. forces that remain indefinitely in Iraq will mostly have to be stationed separately (hence we hear talk of 5 to 10 super forts which also shows what a charade is this talk of them being "embedded"). [The Baker Report was co-drafted by Ed Djerejian (Director of the Baker Institute) who was in the U.S. Embassy in Beruit and Jordan as well as Ambassador to Syria, so he knows well the Lebanese precedent. Indeed it was precisely this sort of State Department "professionalism" that the U.S. elite feels was neglected by the neo-cons. But the limits of such "professionalism" should also be pointed out: Djerejian participated in both Council of Foreign Relations Reports that blithely urged on the Iraq adventure (one was written just *before* the war). One month after the invasion he predicted to the CFR that stabilization could be achieved in 2-3 months and the U.S. could be completely out in 2 years.] http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iraq_DayAfter_TF.pdf http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Iraq_yearafter.pdf http://www.cfr.org/publication/5880/former_us_envoy_sees_positive_results_in_syrian_ties_urges_us_to_pursue_israelpalestinian_accord_after_iraq.html?breadcrumb=default The Baker Group seems to have no such hopes for the keeping the paramilitary police outside the fray. Their main concern seems to be that it will help tip the balance in the civil war to the Shias - and the U.S. needs a stalemate. Using ostensible technical grounds the Report makes a special point that the police commando units (misleadingly called the Iraqi National Police) and the Border Police be transferred from the Shia controlled Interior Ministry to the control of Defense Ministry (whose civilian officials are Sunni controlled). No talk of "embedding" U.S. troops with them -- these units will be fighting the civil war. Paul Soula Avrimidis writes:
[This is, in fact, similar to the scenario that was played out in the first 10 years of the Lebanese Civil War - a core of the Lebanese Army remained intact (and mostly in their barracks) from 1975 until February 1984. The army remained largely neutral and despite the dominance of Christian officers, Muslim and Druze troops stayed in the Lebanese national army until the same month as the final the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines. A further blow to the Army's neutrality came in 1987 when its Christian Commander (General Aoun, who is today aligned with Hezbollah and Syria) accepted the Presidency of the country contrary to the National Pact. But the relevant point that remains in most people's mind is that of an army and a facade of a national government that remain for a long time outside a civil war. And the ultimate acceptance of the foreign Syrian control as a lesser of evils.]Just a slight correction of the above...by the end of 1975 the army split and a young muslim major called ahmad alkhtib was able to drag most of the army to the side of the lebanese national patriotic movement led By kamal Junblatt and the communist allied to the PLO then. This tipped the balace of forces against the right wing. In august 1975 the then president Franjieh along with the arab league called on syria to enter and prempt the victory of the progresive forces Syria moved and did a cleaning job turning what was not a sectraian war yet into a full fledged sectarian war. lebanon then was strategic to israel's security so syria's entry had had a nod from israel. see i think matters are a little more complex than they are in the near east. this is long story but you cannot say that the army was neutral or intact.
