<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.html>
December 7, 2006
Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court
By LINDA GREENHOUSE

WASHINGTON, Dec. 6 — On the Supreme Court's color-coded master
calendar, which was distributed months before the term began on the
first Monday in October, Dec. 6 is marked in red to signify a day when
the justices are scheduled to be on the bench, hearing arguments.

The courtroom, however, was empty on Wednesday, and for a simple
reason: The court was out of cases. The question is, where have all
the cases gone?

Last year, during his Senate confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John
G. Roberts Jr. said he thought the court had room on its docket and
that it "could contribute more to the clarity and uniformity of the
law by taking more cases."

But that has not happened. The court has taken about 40 percent fewer
cases so far this term than last. It now faces noticeable gaps in its
calendar for late winter and early spring. The December shortfall is
the result of a pipeline empty of cases granted last term and carried
over to this one.

The number of cases the court decided with signed opinions last term,
69, was the lowest since 1953 and fewer than half the number the court
was deciding as recently as the mid-1980s. And aside from the school
integration and global warming cases the court heard last week, along
with the terrorism-related cases it has decided in the last few years,
relatively few of the cases it is deciding speak to the core of the
country's concerns.

The reasons for the decline all grow out of forces building for
decades. The federal government has been losing fewer cases in the
lower courts and so has less reason to appeal. As Congress enacts
fewer laws, the justices have fewer statutes to interpret. And
justices who think they might end up on the losing side of an
important case might vote not to take it.

In a divided court, in a divided country, the court's reduced role is
perhaps not surprising, nor is it necessarily a bad thing. "In the
post-Bush v. Gore era, the court may be concerned about taking the
wrong case and making an unpopular decision," said Frederick Schauer,
a professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, in
an interview.

Professor Schauer argued in a recent and much-discussed Harvard Law
Review article that the court's work "had only minimal direct
engagement with the central issues of the nation's public and policy
agenda." In an interview, he said, "I think they like being under the
radar."

In private conversations, the justices themselves insist that nothing
so profound is going on, but rather seem mystified at what they
perceive as a paucity of cases that meet the court's standard
criteria. The most important of those criteria is whether a case
raises a question that has produced conflicting decisions among the
lower federal courts.

But there are still plenty of lower-court conflicts that go
unresolved, said Thomas C. Goldstein, a Supreme Court practitioner and
close student of court statistics who wrote last week on the popular
Scotusblog that the justices were "on the cusp of the greatest
shortfall in filling the court's docket in recent memory, and likely
in its modern history."

"I don't think we're at the end of history and have fixed all the
problems," Mr. Goldstein said in an interview.

One theory is that the court is so closely divided that neither the
liberals nor the conservatives want to risk granting a case in which,
at the end of the day, they might not prevail. To grant a case takes
four votes, which can be a heartbreaking distance from the five votes
it takes to win. Scholars of the court call this risk-averse behavior
"defensive denial."

While such behavior may account for a portion of the shortfall, it can
hardly provide a global explanation, because only a relative handful
of the 8,000 appeals that reach the court each term are ideologically
charged.

Other, more neutral explanations provide likely pieces of the puzzle.

One is the decreasing number of appeals filed on behalf of the federal
government by the solicitor general's office. Over the decades, the
Supreme Court has granted cases filed by the solicitor general's
office at a high rate. In the mid-1980s, the office was filing more
than 50 petitions per term. But as the lower federal courts have
become more conservative and the government has lost fewer cases, the
number has plummeted, opening a substantial hole in the court's
docket.

As recently as the court's 2000 term, the solicitor general filed 24
petitions, of which 17 were granted. Last term, it filed 10, of which
the court granted 4. This term, the solicitor general has filed 13
petitions; the court has granted 5, denied 3 and is still considering
the rest.

Another explanation lies across the street from the Supreme Court, in Congress.

Over the years, about half the court's docket has been made up not of
constitutional cases, but of cases requiring the justices to interpret
federal statutes. Statutes from the 1970s, including major
environmental laws, antidiscrimination laws and Erisa, the
employee-benefits law, have been staples of the court's docket for
decades. But as Congress's willingness to pass new laws has waned, the
flow of statutory cases has begun to dry up.

Another possible explanation is the method by which the justices
screen the thousands of petitions. Eight of the justices, all except
Justice John Paul Stevens, pool their law clerks and have only one
clerk make the initial recommendation for each case.

The recommendation is not binding, of course. But there is a built-in
"institutional conservatism" in which law clerks are afraid to look
overly credulous and so are reluctant to recommend a grant, according
to Stephen M. Shapiro, a former deputy solicitor general who practices
law in Chicago with Mayer, Brown, Rowe and Maw.

"Perhaps the clerks have been trained to be naysayers for so long that
they don't know any other way," Mr. Shapiro said in an interview.

The sharpest drop in opinions came after William H. Rehnquist became
chief justice in 1986. He had made clear his belief that the court
under Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was taking too many cases, and
Congress assisted in 1988 by eliminating from the court's jurisdiction
a category of "mandatory" appeals to which the justices collectively
had long objected.

In the early 1990s, after the number of decisions dropped to 107 from
145 in the space of five terms, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to
reporters' questions by commenting wryly that the Supreme Court would
be the first institution of American government to fulfill Karl Marx's
prophecy of the withering away of the state.

He was kidding, of course. The late chief justice believed in a
muscular role for the court, and went on to show that he could
accomplish more with less.

The question now, on a docket dominated by cases that only a law
professor could love, is how much less.

"It's not obvious to me that the court should be doing more," said
Orin Kerr, a visiting professor at the University of Chicago Law
School who wrote on his blog that constitutional law scholars "are
kind of bored these days."

In an interview, Professor Kerr said that while it was easy to say
that the court should be doing something different, "no two people
would agree on how it should change."

--
Yoshie
<http://montages.blogspot.com/>
<http://mrzine.org>
<http://monthlyreview.org/>

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