Although some of this is old news, it seems that
wasting taxpayers money like this (and also Iraqi
funds) would cause at least some to demand an
investigation and hold at least some people
responsible. Of course the investigation  would need
to stay at lower rungs of the ladder. What an
opportunity for the Democrats to expose connections,
but then perhaps they just want to replace them with
Democratic connections.


Iraq: follow the money
by Joy Gordon
 April 14, 2007

Le Monde Diplomatique
US agencies in Iraq claim that extraordinary sums have
been spent on reconstruction projects; that thousands
have been completed and that many more are under way.
But the cash (some of which was Iraq’s own) has gone
to shady contractors who have done a bad job or none
at all.







The video downloads showed scenes of soldiers donating
a generator to a health clinic or delivering shoes to
Iraqi children. The soldiers said: “We came over to
help the people of Iraq.” The people said: “Last year
Fallujah looked like a demolition zone. Now I can see
improvements everywhere. It is very beautiful in
Fallujah”. Or: “This is a great day for my village.
The coalition forces are doing great things here.”



The United States agency Usaid publishes Iraq
Reconstruction Weekly Update: Reporting Progress and
Good News, which presents reconstruction as a stream
of projects doing wonders to improve the lives of
admiring and grateful Iraqis. The US Defence
Department and the agencies involved seem to be
describing an alternative reality in their reports of
progress. A recent update boasted that the department
had spent $10.5bn so far for 3,500 projects, nearly
all of which had been started and 80% completed (1).



Independent auditors have repeatedly pointed out that
reports from these agencies are exaggerated or false.
The State Department reported that 64 water and
sanitation projects were complete and 185 were in
progress; the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
said the claims were hugely exaggerated. The State
Department could not even provide GAO auditors with a
list of the completed projects, making it impossible
to evaluate them (2). Again and again the agencies
have been criticised for their incompetence.



A project for the construction of 150 urgently needed
health clinics was a disaster. After two years and
$186m, only six were completed — and the agency
reduced the contractor’s obligation to providing only
20 public health centres, instead of 150 (3). When the
contractor delivered medical equipment, none of the US
government agencies involved inspected it or kept an
inventory. When the auditors looked at the goods, it
was obvious without even opening the crates that
nearly half were damaged or had other problems. The
equipment sat in a warehouse and there was no plan to
distribute it (4).



On the Baghdad Police College, which was a $72m
contract, the construction was so poor that the
auditor found: “The government’s quality assurance
programme was essentially non-existent in monitoring
the contractor’s performance” (5).



Worst-case scenario



The failure of reconstruction is underestimated as a
cause for the larger failure of the US in Iraq. When
the US toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, there was
optimism and appreciation in Iraq; the hope was that
the US occupation would be brief and Iraq would then
be left to run its own affairs. But the occupation
turned out to be the worst-case scenario.
Reconstruction was botched and it quickly became clear
that the US had no intention of leaving.



In summer 2003 the occupation authorities handed out
massive contracts to US corporations for construction
projects, but nothing actually materialised. There was
little electricity for fans in the summer heat, or to
operate water and sewage treatment plants, or provide
refrigeration for critical medicines. The humanitarian
situation deteriorated immediately. Without adequate
water treatment, there were epidemics of dysentery and
water-borne diseases.



The disappointment was all the worse because the
Iraqis believed that US, with its wealth and might,
could fix anything if it chose. Comparisons were made
with Saddam’s regime: after the massive bombing during
the first Gulf war in 1991 destroyed all Iraq’s
infrastructure (bridges, roads, electrical generators,
telecommunications, factories, oil refineries), the
Saddam regime instituted an emergency reconstruction
campaign. Using jerry-rigged contraptions or
cannibalising parts from one plant to get another one
operating, electricity was back on within weeks.



Every engineer in Iraq, including nuclear physicists,
was sent out to rebuild bridges. Within three months
the telephone system was reconstructed. Whereas, when
there was an electricity blackout in New York City in
2003, people over in Baghdad joked: “Let’s hope
they’re not waiting for the Americans to fix it.”



US officials refer to Saddam’s government as a
kleptocratic regime. But that description applies just
as much to the reconstruction under the US. The
initial reconstruction was done through the
Development Fund of Iraq, which included all income
from oil exports and leftover money from the Oil for
Food programme (6). It was entirely under the control
of the occupation authority, which used Iraqi money to
sign large contracts with US contractors and a few
companies which belonged to US allies. The authority
could also sign contracts extending beyond the
occupation, which any successor Iraqi government would
then be obliged to pay.



During the 14 months of the occupation, the DFI
contained a total of $21bn. At the end of those months
the US had spent $18bn and committed Iraq’s successor
government to pay billions more, much of it to US
companies.



Stories of the mismanagement of these funds are
legendary. On 29 June 2003 the US handed over control
of the fund to the interim Iraqi government. In the
two weeks before that, the US had airlifted $5bn in
shrink-wrapped packages of $100 bills to Iraq, and had
handed them out like candy. There were pictures of
contractors arriving carrying duffle bags to hold the
money; the US authorities not only didn’t count the
money before handing it over, they didn’t even weigh
it. $1.4bn was handed out, with no explanation or
records other than the entry “Transfer of Funds”. The
single largest amount that could not be accountedfor
was $8.8bn transferred from the US-run Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) to Iraqi ministries.



Hundreds of irregularities



All this has been documented by auditors, including
those from US agencies. The DFI was audited by outside
accountants KPMG and later Ernst & Young, hired by the
UN international advisory monitoring board. Its report
from December 2004 noted that there were “hundreds of
irregularities” in the CPA’s contracting process,
including missing contract information and payment for
contracts that had not been supervised.



A typical KPMG audit for 2004 found 37 cases involving
$185m of contracts where files could not be located;
there were 111 cases with no documentation for
services performed under the contracts (7). Another
audit found that the Halliburton subsidiary firm,
Kellogg, Brown & Root, had “significantly and
systematically” violated US federal contracting rules
by providing false information about its costs (8).
Despite this, KBR’s contracts were repeatedly expanded
and renewed.



As reconstruction projects were completed, stories
emerged of terrible incompetence and neglect. The US
awarded a contract to renovate Al-Hillah General
Hospital, south of Baghdad, to include the
installation of four new elevators. The project
officer signed a certificate of completion,
authorising full, immediate payment even though the
project was not completed. Three months later an
elevator crashed, killing three people. The contractor
had never installed new elevators, only badly
renovated the existing ones (9).



In another case, the contractor responsible for
construction at Al-Sumelat water plant had done such
incompetent work that the plant could not produce
drinkable water: the pipeline was installed in three
unusable segments, none of them connected to the main
(10). There have been dozens more incidents involving
shoddy work, goods that were never delivered or
equipment that never worked.



The US agencies have tried to justify the slowness of
reconstruction by referring to the poor condition of
Iraq at the time of the 2003 “liberation”: “US
projects have helped Iraq stabilise its oil production
and recover from decades of neglect under the previous
regime” (11). “Before April 2003 many of the country’s
water treatment plants were in serious disrepair, and
the wastewater treatment plants were either completely
inoperable or only partially operational” (12). “The
Iraqi healthcare system had not been funded or managed
in a sustainable, systematic manner for at least two
decades before liberation” (13).



But Iraq was in such poor condition not because of the
neglect by the regime but because the US and its
allies bombed its infrastructure in the 1991 war. Then
the US used its veto on the Security Council for 13
years to block Iraq from importing any equipment to
rebuild industry, agriculture, electricity production
or the other things necessary for the functioning of
an industrialised society.



The rationale behind the harsh economic sanctions was
that the Iraqi regime would lose its legitimacy; the
Iraqi people would see the state for the corrupt
regime it was. The hardship would cause such
desperation that the Iraqi people would rise up
against Saddam and overthrow the regime. It did not
happen under Saddam, but it is happening under the US
occupation.



The abject failure to provide electricity and water,
and to restart the economy, and the plundering by US
companies, have all contributed to the insurgency that
demands the departure of foreign troops.



Original text in English Joy Gordon is a professor of
philosophy at Fairfield University, Connecticut



(1) Iraq Reconstruction Report, Washington, 6 February
2007.

(2) Government Accountability Office report
GAO-05-876, Washington.

(3) Testimony of Stuart W Bowen Jr, Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction (Sigir), 28 September
2006.

(4) “Review of the medical equipment purchased for the
primary healthcare centres associated with Parsons
Global Services,” Sigir 06-025, 28 July 2006.

(5) Bowen testimony, 18 January 2007.

(6) The Oil for Food programme was started in 1995 by
UN Security Council resolution 986 and approved by
Iraq in 1996: Iraq could export $2bn of oil every six
months; this reached $5.2bn in 1998; 53% of the
proceeds were to buy food and medicine, the rest was
taken as reparation for victims of the 1991 Gulf war
and to finance the management of the programme. In
2004 politicians in the US accused the UN of
corruption in running the programme.

(7) “Development Fund for Iraq: Report of Factual
findings in connection with Disbursement for the
Period 1 January 2004 through 28 June 2004,” KPMG
Bahrain, September 2004.

(8) Representative Henry A Waxman, “New Information
about Halliburton contracts”, a report to Democratic
members of the House Government Reform Committee,
Washington, 10 March, 2004.

(9) Sigir report 05-023, “Management of RRRP contracts
in south-central Iraq”.

(10) Sigir report to US Congress, July 2005.

(11) Quarterly update to Congress—2207 report, October
2006.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Ibid.



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