Julio Huato wrote:
Economic theory, as it's evolved in the last few decades, with the
limitations inherent to this, is *a branch of applied math*. Simple
as that. It's a set of statements of the "if X, then Y" type. That
determines both its power and its limitations. But those limitations
are those shared with all other mathematical theories. A term like
"altruistic preferences" refers simply to a postulate of this kind:
u_i = u(c_1, ..., c_i, ..., c_n)
That's all. Now please tell me, where is the utilitarian ethics
embedded there, since you have ample room to determine the content of
each of the c's, the form of u(.), and the content of u_i?
As I said, this conception of "preferences" assumes that, to the
extent required by the argument, the identities of the related
entities (the "variables") remain unchanged with changes in their
relations. This is explained in the Whitehead passage. Where this
isn't true, i.e. where relations are "internal" in a relevant way,
the hypothesis "breaks down." This is true independent of how
abstract you make the "variables."
Marx, Whitehead and Keynes claim the assumption breaks down in
psychics and ethics. Whether or not this claim is true, you can't
use any psychology or ethics ("utilitarian" or otherwise) embodying
the hypothesis to represent the psychological and ethical foundations
adopted by them. These foundations embody an ontological idea of
"internal relations" that's inconsistent with it.
It may be true of course that, in contrast to you and your fellow
game theorists, Whitehead and Keynes were ignorant of the
implications of an ontology of internal relations for mathematical
reasoning. Rather than just asserting this, however, you need to
demonstrate it, i.e. demonstrate that their claims about the
implications of internal relations for axiomatic deductive reasoning
in general and for any form of reasoning employing the logical idea
of a "variable" in particular are mistaken.
You should also show how the ethical and psychological claims of Marx
and Keynes can be accurately represented with game theory, e.g. how
can this be done for Marx's idea of how we would produce if "we had
carried out production as human beings" or for Keynes's account of
the psychology of liquidity preference.
Ted
