Did you read Mark Weisbrot's article on the RCTV affair? It's here:
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/06/01/1607/ * * * I am finally reading Marta Harnecker's monumental "La izquierda en el umbral del siglo XXI," and -- as I read the reports of yesterday's march in Caracas -- I can't help but think of Marta's superb summary of the strategy of the right against the government of Unidad Popular in Chile. I'm posting a few paragraphs, drawing from the English translation made available here: http://www.rebelion.org/harnecker/030828century.pdf These paragraphs synthesize much political experience and wisdom: 104. The strategy of the Right was: 105. First, to divide the governing coalition, the Popular Unity Coalition. This was done by attempting to exploit supposed divisions between "Marxist" parties and "Democratic" ones. They also used an old anticommunist trick, trying to isolate Marxists from the rest of the Popular Unity Coalition, by accusing them of trying to "take over the whole government", and of "unyielding sectarian loyalty to Moscow", etc. 106. Second, maintain control over the mass media at all cost. At the time the opposition controlled 70% of the written press and 115 of the 150 radio stations that existed in the country, including the most powerful. 107. Third, the defense of private property. The Right used every legal mechanism and pressure tactic within reach to prevent the transition from private to social property: the clearest example of this was the Constitutional Reform project presented by the Christian Democrats in order to prevent the nationalization of many businesses. 108. Fourth, the creation of an anti-Popular Unity consciousness within the Armed Forces. To do this, they exploited every opportunity to present the country as being "in chaos", "in anarchy", or "ungovernable and in power vacuum". And, without a doubt, the central goal of their campaign was the denunciation of the existence of other armed groups outside the army.[101] 109. Fifth, agitating the middle class to act against the government: supporting the supervisors who boycotted copper mine production, mobilizing their professional colleagues, using the universities as testing groups for their strategies. 110. But the fundamental goal, and that which would later allow them to achieve others, was to provoke the economic failure of the Allende government. Almost immediately after Allende's electoral victory they began to implement their measures: capital flight, the contraband import of US dollars, the paralysis of certain industries, a freeze on raw material imports and industrial parts, etc. 111. The dominant classes not only blocked the government's every intent to modify the unjust tributary system through their parliamentary majority, but that, at the same time, they denied the budget resources to carry forward the new social agenda: including milk distribution, health care plans, housing, and other public works. Thus they blocked the Popular Unity Coalition's effort to improve workers' standard of living and, at the same time, spread fear among foreign investors and domestic businesses, leading to a stagnation of productivity. 112. This plan had the full support of multinational corporations and the Nixon administration, which besieged the Allende government by reducing credits, preventing the renegotiation of foreign debt, and by placing an embargo on goods of nationalized companies while spreading the image abroad that Chile was a bankrupt country, strangling it economically. 113. The Allende government, not wanting to compromise the negotiating capacity of the workers, had no other alternative than to increase the amount of money in circulation, knowing that this would result in steep inflation. At the same time, the US government embargo prevented them from importing enough food to keep up with the acquisitive capacity of the population. Food shortages steadily worsened. 114. In addition to these factors, the opposition's efforts caused the economic situation to deteriorate further through speculation, hording and the growth of the black market. Meanwhile, the opposition-controlled press unleashed a systematic campaign to show that the country lacked basic necessities and place this at the center of their attacks. 115. Thus, as the Allende government persisted, a truly counter-revolutionary situation was fermenting internally. The first symptoms were already evident when Fidel Castro visited Chile in November 1971. More and more social sectors of the right and their allies participated in demonstrations, protests, transportation strikes, copper strikes, demonstrations against the military. 116. As the oppositional forces continued to execute their strategy, the forces of the Popular Unity Coalition could not agree on what to do in response. 117. The situation worsened daily. Finally, Allende decided to address the situation by calling for a popular referendum. The presidential address was scheduled for 11 am on the 11th of September, 1973. Gunfire would silence the heroic Chilean leader Allende at that time instead. 118. The military coup was made possible by the success of a right-wing counteroffensive. While the right-wing forces grew in strength and contradictions among the forces of the left sharpened, an important part of the middle class- which had initially supported Allende- distanced themselves from his project, creating a fertile political and social terrain for the military coup. 119. I agree with Jorge Arrate, the Chilean socialist leader, that Allende's project was far to heterodox for the orthodox character of the Left at the time,[102] whose ideas did not correspond to the new challenges that the country was living. When Allende spoke about the democratic transition to socialism, sectors of the left painted on the walls: "Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat!" When Allende spoke about winning over sectors of the bourgeois for his project, a significant portion of the left identified the entire bourgeoisie as the enemy, basing everything on dependency theory, which sustained that national capitalist development was no longer possible. When the socialist president fought for unity, the most powerful parties- the socialist and communist- made their differences public. While Allende sought to consolidate economic advancements through the strategic nationalization of certain industries, keeping in mind the limits of his power, other sectors of the left wanted to nationalize even small businesses, demanding that Allende assume a more radical stance, as if all the power were in his hands. 120. On the other hand, the leadership of Popular Unity Coalition and President Allende himself understood quite well that the Chilean process could not succeed without the support of the armed forces. Accordingly they made a big effort to win them over to the popular cause. However, they trusted excessively in the constitutionalist loyalties of the Chilean armed forces and failed to work sufficiently for the creation of their own loyal force. 121. Yet there is something else that was only understood later on, following the last experiences of socialism: that this type of "peaceful" transition from capitalism to socialism- using the resources and the possibilities of power within a system of democratic representation- was not a viable path along which to carry out a socialist project as it had been attempted up until then in the world. Therefore, it was necessary to rethink what kind of socialism that they wanted to build by formulating a project better adapted to Chilean reality. This was what Allende seemed to understand intuitively when he used the folk metaphor of "socialism with red wine and Chilean bread", indicating the need for a socialist society that was democratic and rooted in popular national traditions. Notes: [101] This made any attempt to arm the people to defend the popular government much more difficult. [102] Jorge Arrate, La fuerza democrática de la idea socialista, Santiago de Chile, Ed. Del Ornitorrinco, November 1985, p. 175. [103] Tomás Moulián, "La Unidad Popular y el Futuro", Encuentro XXI magazine, no 3, 1st year, Santiago de Chile, 1995, p.25.
