On 8/11/07, Julio Huato <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > In his _Deep History_, David Laibman supplies an interesting synthesis > of the basic contradictions in the logic of capitalism in general. > The primary or primitive "critical tendencies" in the system are the > tendency towards higher productivity and technical change (both > induced by class struggle and competition). The former can lead to > either a higher real wage or a higher profit share. The latter to > either a higher profit share or a fall in the profit rate. ... > > In turn, the system now has three secondary "critical tendencies": (1) > an increasing real wage, (2) an increasing profit rate, and/or (3) a > declining profit rate.
why does the real wage increase? is it because of working class struggle? because of increasing needs (which is normal under capitalism) and thus the increasing cost of reproducing labor-power? or both? it should be mentioned that for capital, it's how wages increase _relative to labor productivity_, either raising or lowering the rate of surplus-value. This in turn determines which of #2 or #3 is chosen (all else equal). > Tendency (1) can lead to either a "crisis of > control" (too much power by the workers in the workplace due to their > improving working and living conditions) or a "incentive crisis." it seems to me that we should interpret #1 as being more than just rising wages. It should be class struggle by workers (perhaps trying to keep up with increasing needs). That struggle both (a) increases wages and (b) increases collective worker control over the work process. On the latter, the main historical trend in the US has been toward less collective worker control over the work process, so that workers are counteracting the trend. The inherent tendency is for capitalists to cut wages, so that (again) worker struggle can counteract that. The workers' success can depend on conditions beyond their control: US workers did pretty well during the 1950s and 1960s because the US was the industrial hegemon, because capital outflow was limited, and because of the Keynesian-stabilization role of the warfare-welfare state. (They enjoyed a "strong labor" economy.) > Tendency (2) can lead to either a "legitimation crisis" (public > disgust about the exhibition of lavish consumption by the parasites) > or a "demand/stagnation crisis" of the old "Keynesian" type. The latter is what I see as prevailing in a "weak labor" economy such as the US in the 1920s. (See my article at http://myweb.lmu.edu/jdevine/JD-1994-Depression.pdf. ) > Finally, > tendency (3) can feed into either a "demand/stagnation crisis" or > induce a "financial crisis." this seems the result of a "strong labor" economy such as the US in the 1960s, but financial crises can also result from a "weak labor" economy (as in the 1920s). > The consequences of the tendencies clash with each other while, more > importantly, progress in the consciousness, unity, and organization > capabilities of the working class shrink the wiggle room within which > the capitalists are able to displace crises from "site" to "site." To > this rock-and-hard-place scenarios, David refers as "barriers." One > barrier is precisely -- and I'll end with a long quote where David > makes this argument -- the tendency towards the ineffectiveness of > macro policy. > > I don't see anything teleological or mechanistic about David's schema. > His text may seem a bit too concise and even dry, but the role of > agency is duly incorporated and insistently noted. Here's the > relevant passage: > > "Cyclical crises must occur [...] due to the unavoidable need for > periodic restructuring of accumulation and class relations. [In the > previous paragraphs, David argues why this is so.] This, in turn, has > two basic elements. First, in order to function without systemic > crisis, capitalism needs to periodically rediscipline the working > class and reproduce the proletarian dependency on which the extraction > of surplus value rests. Second, it needs to shake out weak units of > capital and consolidate capitalist power in a form suitable for > continuing accumulation [...] > > "[...] cyclically recurring crisis, no matter how intense its effects, > can eventually be foreseen, and its critical impacts subjected to > institutional offset or containment. An analogy with drug addiction > is apparent: there is a progressive aspect, in which given doses of a > drug (or of cyclical crisis) become increasingly ineffective, making > stronger doses necessary. This, of course, follows Marx's insight > that what appears politically as the 'crisis' is actually the > resolution of the actual, underlying crisis: the emergence of > structural contradiction on the path of accumulation. Crises that are > resolved, or contained, or even significantly foreseen, do not do the > work they are 'designed' to accomplish (the quotation marks around > 'designed' warn, as usual, against a teleological reading of this > term; no actual intention is implied). There is a need for crises of > increasing severity, and, indeed, novelty, for the simple reason that > any given degree of severity or novelty, once experienced, necessarily > gives rise to class resistance and institutional responses, which then > nullify its 'creative-destructive' role. This is the core reason for > capitalism's inherently 'wild' character, and for its long-perceived > resistance to regulation. It also constitutes to core of truth in the > free-market ideological claim that policy to regulate capitalism, in > the classical Keynesian mode, cannot ultimately be effective. > Capitalists -- not, of course, 'rational individuals' -- do anticipate > and offset policy designed to influence their actions, and > increasingly so as internationalization of production and finance > place the decision-making units farther and farther beyond the reach > of national governments [...] > > "[...] cyclical crises must not only necessarily recur; they must > become progressively more severe, suggesting a long-term path of > intensifying crisis." (pp. 93-94) > > Please note that David's suggestion of a tendency towards intensifying > crisis (similar to so many passages in Marx) refers to a tendency and > not to a straight-line "deterministic" path. the globalization tendency all suggests that capitalism needs a world-wide state. This is of course part of the general tendency toward increasingly overt socialization of capitalism. > In another part of his book, David writes: > > "[...] none of the crises associated with confrontation between > critical tendency and barriers at any site is thought to be inevitable > or automatic in its impact. Nothing about either breakdown or social > transformation is implied. The incentive/control and legitimation > crises perhaps reveal this most clearly: these depend in obvious ways > upon the ability of the working class to perceive alternatives, and > therefore to organize realistically and politically to achieve radical > social goals. In an ideological atmosphere of TINA, no amount of > arbitrary workplace despotism or manipulation, and no degree of > outrageous and parasitic luxury consumption, necessarily emerge as > truly critical. It comes down, ultimately, to the question of how > much the working class will tolerate. right! > The same is true for the > proximate results of crisis at the more objective financial site: > stagnation and financial crisis result in unemployment, poverty, > social insecurity (failing medical and pension institutions), housing > crisis, etc., and the critical impact of all this again depends on the > extent to which the subaltern social classes have the capacity to > respond, politically and effectively." (p. 114) -- Jim Devine / "In every [stock-dealing] swindle every one knows that some time or other the crash must come, but every one hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbor, after he himself has caught the shower of gold and placed it in safety. Après moi le déluge! is the watchword of every capitalist ... " -- K. Marx
