8 minutes in to this Urquhart says that Prince
Bernhard was in on the planning of Market Garden
Conversations with History: Brian Urquhart
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfuJ4W-wqI4
Then the first Bilderberg meeting took place 10
years later in the Oosterbeek hotel the former SS Prince owned
The exact same location of the 1st Airborne HQ
during the doomed battle for Arnhem
There are also serious questions over why XXX
corps sherman tanks halted at 19:00 on the night
of 20th Setember with potentially a clear run to
Arnhem less than 30 minutes away.
A pistol was pulled by the americans who were
aware that just up the road the 1st airborne were
only just hanging on and desperately needed the tank firepower
Ths features in the film A Bridge Too Far dramatised in this clip
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qaij7QYa6k0
So we had an ex Nazi SS IG Farben intelligence
officer in the British War Office planning
department, courtesy King George VI (having been
refused intelligence job at Admiralty because
they didn't trust him) right in the middle of Market Garden planning.
He must have laughed his head of when he was on his own.
No wonder he chose the Bilderberg Hotel (which
was right in the middle of 1st Airborne drop zone
for his first Bilderberg meeting 10 years after
Market Garden and the year Germany got its
sovereignty back. There were several Germans
present at the ist Bilderberg meeting.
Dutch TV documentary about Bernhard
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvWdOqP7srY>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tvWdOqP7srY
Prince Bernhard zur Lippe Biesterfeld was a nazi
corporate spy, who ingratiated himself into to the Dutch royal family.
During the 1920s and 1930s, he was a member of
the NSDAP, the Jugensturm, the Reiter SS (that's
right, the SS), and became a corporate spy for
IG-Farben, the chemical giant which was to
become the industrial backbone of the nazi war machine.
It was in this capacity that he was stationed in
Holland in 1934. Three years later, he married Holland's future queen.
During the war, he became head of the Dutch
Princes Irene Brigade, which followed the allied
armies on it's march through Europe.
The prince's most infamous contributions may be
the betrayal of some 50 brave but doomed SOE
agents who were directly dropped into the
waiting hands of the Gestapo and Dutch
collaborators, during what the Germans called
the Englandspiel and the British called Operation Northpole.
His most murderous contribution would have been
the betrayal of Arnhem. During operation Market
Garden, US and British forces were to advance
quickly along a road through the southern and
eastern Netherlands, capturing all bridges along
the way, with the biggest price being the bridge
at Arnhem. Arnhem bridge was to be taken by
several paratroop brigades who were to be
parachuted near the target and take the bridge.
They had very little heavy weaponry, and until
the armored ground force had caught up with
them, extremely vulnerable to a counter-attack,
let alone counter attack by armored units.
Miraculously, the Germans decided to place 2
armored SS units in Arnhem, 'for recouperation'.
As a result, Operation Market Garden became a
failure. Over 2,000 British and Polish troops
were killed, many more captured and the rest
beat a hair raising retreat across the river.
The failure of Market Garden created the
breathing space Hitler needed to launch his
counter-offensive, which resulted in the Battle of the Bulge.
'The Betrayal Of Arnhem' has usually been
attributed to a Dutch double or triple agent
named Christiaan 'King Kong' Lindemans.
Lindemans however was in close contact with
Prins Bernhard, and who better to pass high
level intelligence on to him than Prins Bernhard
zur Lippe Biesterfeld, nazi and SS-er.
After the war, the prince remained active,
co-founded the Bilderberg Group, named after the
same hotel De Bilderberg in Oosterbeek. He also
co-founded the World Wildlife Fund, underlining
his love for nature and especially for shooting it.
Bernhard's 'old friend in Argentina' (favorite
rabbit hole for nazi war criminals), Jorge
Zorreguieta, agriculture minister in the cabinet
of Argentina's dictator Videla, supplied
Holland's future prinses Maxima. In the process
making the Dutch royal family look more like a
nazi rat line of German nazis, Spanish fascists and South American dictators.
31 years ago an autobiography appeared by the
Dutch communist Wim Klinkenberg, and recent
opened archives have proven him right. In fact a
war time message has become public, that shows
that even during WWII, the cabinet was aware of the Prince's nazi and SS past.
If you're not sick already, you should be.
I have the entire extract from Robert Kershaw's
book now - he was the first to take a proper look
at post war German accounts and translate them
into English - here it is - and it's pretty damning.
It Never Snows in September: The German View of
Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem September
1944:: Amazon.co.uk: Robert Kershaw: Books
Apologies for scanning errors.
http://www.arrse.co.uk/military-history-militaria/93721-17th-september-1944-operation-market-garden-6.html#post4109423
You do have to read right through to the end
though to see that the Kampfgruppen that some
previous posters have been saying would have
stopped the advance of XXX Corps from Driel at
19:00 on 20th Sep simply were not there.
By midnight the story was beginning to change as
equipment and men were ferried over but the tanks
had easily enough time to make it to Arnhem.
Shermans do 25mph without much trouble.
It bothers me that Lord Carrington was commanding that lead tank troop.
And got a medal, it seems, for not pulling out the stops to rescue our boys.
Instead of wanting to wait for his own assigned infantry
The 82nd would have gone with him if he was that scared.
If he'd had the courage to go off on his own he
would have won the war virtually!
For me this also turns the spotlight of the
question onto Horrocks, Adair and Browning.
It Never Snows in September
The German View of MARKET-GARDEN and the battle of Arnhem, September 1944
By Robert Kershaw
Pub: Ian Allan (1994)
By 2200 on 20 September in Oosterhout,
immediately north west of the Waal assault
boat-crossing site, SS-Captain Schwappacher's
remaining 21st Battery and his regimental
headquarters were desperately holding a
'hedgehog' outpost against the rising tide of
Allied reinforcements. Still holding positions in
all-round defence, the battery continued to
harass Nijmegen and the dyke road south of
Oosterhout with fire. Five houses on the eastern
side of the village were set ablaze to compensate
for a lack of illumination shells and to prevent
surprise attacks. 'At about midnight,'
Schwappacher reports, 'a radio message was sent
to General von Tettau, that the positions in
Oosterhout would be held to the last living man.'
After a short fire fight conducted on its
southern perimeter, Allied tanks broke into Lent
and eliminated the last resistance by remnants of
the 1st Company l0SS Engineer Battalion, and the
flotsam of reservists and others from the now
dispersed Kampfgruppe Henke. Harmel, the
commander of the Frundsberg, left Lent dismayed.
Despite all his efforts, both bridges were still
standing. Allied tanks were now mixed in amongst
the fleeing German survivors of the Nijmegen
garrison. All appeared lost. Closely monitoring
the advance, and seeking solutions to the
unsolvable, Harmel noticed that the Allies were
'moving more cautiously, hindered by their own
smoke; delays were slowing the advance'.10 He
drove on to Bemmel, where the command post of the
Kampfgruppe Reinhold - co-ordinating the defence
of Nijmegen - was now located, There may yet be a
chance to salvage something from this catastrophe.
To Schwappacher's relief in Oosterhout, 'the
enemy remained quiet all night'. After the war,
Harmel was to be more explicit: 'The English
drank too much tea. . !', in contrast to the
feverish activity that was to characterise German
attempts to formulate counter measures that
night. Both sides were exhausted. Nevertheless, as Harmel later remarked:
The four panzers who crossed the bridge made a
mistake when they stayed in Lent. If they had
carried on their advance, it would have been allover for US.'
Ironically it was nearly allover for another
beleaguered garrison defending another bridge 17
kilometres to the north. The Second Battalion the
Parachute Regiment, defending the Arnhem bridge, was in its death throes.
pp. 269-275 - CHAPTER XIX - The Missed Opportunity
Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of
staying in Lent? At this instant there were no
German armoured forces available to block Elst.
Heinz Harmel, Commander, 10SS Panzer Division
Plugging the gap. Betuwe, 'the Island' . . .
Karl-Heinz Kracht, the young tank gunner moving
with Knaust's armoured column, used a golden
opportunity to take photographs as his Mark III
panzer, grinding through its gears, began its
ascent to the high point of the Arnhem road
bridge. His lens began to take objective stock of
all around him. Silhouetted against the sky ahead
was the majestic span of the bridge's
superstructure. To the left and right, burnt-out
vehicles had been bulldozed or towed to the side
of the road, the debris of Graebner's failed
attack. As they passed the rudimentary barrier
erected by Frost's men, they observed curious SS
soldiers sifting through the tangled wreckage. On
the main span the wind, whistling through the
girders, brought some of the stench of burning
from the battle now raging in the west towards
Oosterbeek. Kracht took a shot of the ruined
church by the market place, whose towers were now
burnt out. With the 50mm tank barrel pointing
down the road toward Elden he took another
picture of the southern ramp of the bridge. This
showed the built-up area where Graebner had
formed up and rushed to the high point of the
bridge before coming under fire from the north
bank. There was no wreckage here. This had 'been
a blind spot. Coming towards Kracht's vehicle was
a simple horse-drawn cart, carrying refugees back
toward the wasted city centre. The focus of
German activity appeared now to be moving south
towards Nijmegen. Many of these villagers wanted
to be spared the horrors that had already
engulfed the citizens of Arnhem. In the far
distance, separated from the tanks, were marching
columns of infantry. Kracht later wrote:
'We were well aware of the significance of the
bridge because we had been informed of the pincer
movement planned by the British and American
forces, and of the attack to the north of the
Ruhr area. We crossed the bridge towards Nijmegen
on the day when it was evacuated, or a day later. I can't remember exactly.'
SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel, the commander of the
Frundsberg does remember, and with some alacrity.
Knaust's Kampfgruppe, 'reinforced with 8
"Panther" and assault guns, crossed the Arnhem
bridge shortly after midday [21 September]; he
was ordered by the 1 ass to quickly occupy Elst.'
Harmel had spent an anxious night. Knaust's
arrival offered a degree of relief to a problem
that had appeared for the moment insoluble.
Harmel wondered, even after the war, why the
tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with
such elan had not continued further. The Allies
had certainly missed an opportunity. They might
possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem
itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst
instead of staying in Lent?' he asked; 'at this
instant there were no German armoured forces
available to block Elst.'3 It was a lost chance:
'It gave us time to get Knaust down there. It was
ironic really, at the same time we lost the
Nijmegen bridge, we were just about over the
Arnhem bridge. The Allied infantry were too late supporting their tanks.'4
The capitulation of the bridges, so hard fought
and costly, was to prove a hollow victory for
both sides. Frost's obstinate resistance was
instrumental in forcing IISS Corps to depend upon
the Pannerden ferry to get its reinforcements to
the Waal. In the event the l0SS were unable to
reinforce sufficiently quickly to reverse the
outcome at Nijmegen. Likewise, the Allies were
unable to capitalise on their seizure of the Waal bridges.
Crucial in tipping the scales for both
engagements was the ferrying operation conducted
by the Frundsberg at Pannerden. SS¬ Captain
Brandt, the l0SS Engineer Battalion Commander,
achieved much in difficult circumstances. Badly
battered in Normandy, his force was weak in both
manpower and equipment. After sending his only
motorised ad hoc company to Nijmegen under
SS-2/Lieutenant Baumgaertel to assist in its
defence, he was left with a hastily reorganised
company under SS-Lieutenant Munski to assist
around Pannerden. Brandt recalls that 'much work
had to be done at the ferry sites as we only had
map references indicating the location of
existing sites'.5 Throughout the operation he
remembers they were harassed by Allied 'Jabo'
attacks and artillery fire. Utilising rafts and
commandeered motor boats the ferrying operation
painstakingly transported units that had
by¬passed Arnhem across the lower Rhine and
canal. By the evening of 18 September
Baumgaertel's engineers and the Kampfgruppe
Reinhold had crossed. During the night the
depleted l0SS Panzer Regiment was ferried over,
so that by 19 September four assault guns had
reached Nijmegen, and a further 16 Mark IV
panzers and SPs were available for operations on
the north bank of the Waal. The process continued
during daylight hours when the Kampfgruppe
'Hartung' – a Wehrmacht reservist battalion - and
one and a half battalions from the
SS-Panzer-grenadier Regiment 22, also got across.
Included among these were both forward command
posts of the l0SS and IISS Corps. Progress was
slow, marred by inadequate transport and repeated
air attacks. Units after assembly were faced with
a 15-kilometre march to Nijmegen, much of it
across exposed dyke roads. Consequently, few were
available for effective operations until late on
20 September. When the Nijmegen bridge was
captured, the one and a half battalions of
Panzer-grenadier Regiment 22 and the tanks were
either in the process of re-forming after the
river crossing, or still laboriously on the move
in well¬dispersed formations to avoid attracting air attacks.
The only forces on the 'Island', or Betuwe, able
to oppose a breakthrough were the survivors of
Graebner's Reconnaissance Battalion 9. This
decimated group was deployed with one weak
company on picket duty on the southern bank of
the lower Rhine, opposite Arnhem's western
suburbs and the bridge, and the remnants of
another in Elst. As the first Sherman tanks,
scattering escapees from the Nijmegen garrison,
surged into Lent, the road ahead was open. All
that stood in the way of XXX Corps and Arnhem
during much of the night of 20-21 September were a few security pickets.
Improvisation. . .
Arriving at Reinhold's command post in Bemmel
during the evening of 20 September, Harmel
frantically tried to retrieve the situation.
Those parts of Panzer-grenadier Regiment 22 and
the tanks that had already crossed the ferry were
ordered to counter¬attack immediately from the
east. But these elements of the reconstituted
Karnpfgruppe Reinhold lacked heavy weapons. Only
one light battery of field howitzers had been
brought across the ferry so far, and they were
positioned east of Flieren. The counter¬attack,
therefore, lacked punch. By darkness a
rudimentary line had been established one
kilometre north of Lent, and this gradually
thickened into linked outposts as more units,
including the Kampfgruppe 'Hartung', became
available to Reinhold. By first light German
blocking positions occupied the crossroads one
kilometre south-west of Ressen, south of the
village itself and south of Bemmel down to the Waal river.
Bittrich, the IISS Corps Commander, instructed
Harmel to counter-attack at first light on 21
September to forestall and spoil the anticipated
Allied thrust on Elst, and thence to Arnhem. 'All
the forces available from Pannerden,' ordered the
General, 'are to be collected and attack the
eastern flank of the enemy vanguards, overwhelm
them, and throw the enemy back over the Waal river.'7
SS-Captain Schwappacher's 21 Artillery Battery,
his regimental headquarters, and other collected
units, were still holding on to the 'hedgehog'
position around Oosterhout. Apart from imposing a
degree of caution upon any projected Allied
thrust to Arnhem, they provided an anchor to the
right of the thin screen raised by the
Kampfgruppe Reinhold to cover the approach to
Arnhem. Early on 21 September, Knaust arrived for
a preliminary reconnaissance and was briefed on
the Oosterhout situation by Schwappacher. New
battery positions were established south of Elst.
Many of Schwappacher's personnel, gun crews and
radio operators, currently manning trenches as
infantry, were needed there. At 1200 the SS
Artillery and Training Regiment V finally thinned
out as more of Knaust's Kampfgruppe arrived.
Flight was still in the minds of the soldiers.
Schwappacher mentions three Wehrmacht batteries
originally located north-east of Oosterhout
which, 'despite appeals from me to hold their
positions during the critical situation the day
before, had already withdrawn their positions
further back to the north-west'. The atmosphere
of unease and alarm prevailing since the bridges' loss remained.
Harmel's punch against the eastern flank of the
breakthrough was eventually assembled and
mounted. Thinly spread over a four kilometre
front, a force of about three battalions, divided
into three to four Kampfgruppen, supported by 16
Mark IV tanks, advanced westwards. Artillery
resources were sparse: a light battery east of
Flieren, and two more from the l0SS Artillery
Regiment firing from the east bank of the
Pannerden canal. These were desperate measures.
SS Panzer-grenadier Regiment 21's one and a half
battalions could not be included, because they
were delayed by the ferry crossing, and had only
got as far as Haalderen, one and a half
kilometres west of Bemmel. It was all that could
be scraped together in the time allowed by
General Bittrich. Even ferrying operations were
interrupted to assist in the attack, SS-Captain Brandt at Pannerden recalls:
Ja - and then there was a breakthrough somewhere,
and we were taken out. Even during actual loading
operations I had to take part in the defence of a
wooded area with my headquarters company, and any
other soldiers that could be found around, supported also by six tanks.'8
These scant resources were flung against an
ever-growing enemy lodgement. This, with the
impact of Allied artillery, conspired to water
down the decisive blow that Bittrich sought. His
appreciation was, as ever, correct, but his means
simply did not match the task. All that was
achieved was a westward adjustment of the line,
which did have the effect of imposing a
cautionary check on any thoughts of an Allied dash to Arnhem.
It is quite possible that the Allies might have
been able to feed a battle group into Arnhem,
before the road was finally blocked again. During
the first night of 20-21 September there were
only security pickets reinforced by one or two
outposts in position. This situation continued
until Knaust finally arrived in force during the
afternoon of the 21st. For five hours between
1900 and midnight on the 20th the road was clear.
Nothing of substance could close it effectively
until Knaust began to drive south after midday on
the 21st. It was truly a missed opportunity.
Frost's forces were overwhelmed just as the window of opportunity closed again.
By 1600 Knaust's Kampfgruppe had reached Elst. He
proceeded to block the road effectively with the
armoured forces at his disposal. Liaison was
established with the advancing flanking movement
from the east. By the evening of 21 September the
German line ran from the southern edge of Elst,
held by the Kampfgruppe Knaust, via Aam north of
Ressen, fortified by Hartung's reservists. It
continued over the western edge of Bemmel,
defended by the few tanks of the l0SS Panzer
Regiment, then south to the Waal, manned by
Panzer-grenadier 22. A firm line was at last at
last emerging, able to block or, in the worst
case, threaten any further Allied advance
northwards to Arnhem. It was an amazing
achievement. Harmel summed up the driving factor:
'It was astounding to see what could be achieved by improvisation.'9
Allied superiority on the 'Island' meant very
little in these low¬-lying polder marshes,
criss-crossed with water-filled ditches and
waterways. Cover was also sparse. There were only
a few orchards and the villages. Harmel was able
to exploit his few tanks covering the exposed and
slightly raised dyke roads that traversed this
terrain. 'This had an impact,' he remembers; 'the
terrain between Nijmegen and Arnhem was the worst
possible for tanks - for both sides.'
'Improvisation' for the German soldier meant
march and counter-march in an atmosphere of
emergency and alarm. Soldiers in the line
appeared aware only of the basic situation: there
were British paratroopers in Arnhem, and
Americans coming up through Nijmegen trying to
link up with them. Enemy airborne soldiers in the
rear always unsettled the veterans. Their
recollections of this period are confused and
uncertain; a few village names can be remembered,
but little else other than the frantic nature of
the activity characterising these operations. A
breakthrough somewhere else always meant yet
another town or village to be by-passed in order
to reach their objective, often by night and with
little or no warning. Scant knowledge of the
overall situation generated unease.
Kampfgruppe Reinhold's reconstituted units
achieved little more than an advance in column,
until they were ordered to consolidate and dig in
on the line they had reached. Few units, apart
from the tanks and grenadiers providing the
vanguards, even made contact with the enemy.
Allied artillery tended to dictate the speed and extent of progress.
It Never Snows in September: The German View of
Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem September
1944:: Amazon.co.uk: Robert Kershaw: Books
--
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http://www.thisweek.org.uk/
http://www.911forum.org.uk/
"Capitalism is institutionalised bribery."
_________________
www.abolishwar.org.uk
<http://www.elementary.org.uk>www.elementary.org.uk
www.public-interest.co.uk
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<http://utangente.free.fr/2003/media2003.pdf>http://utangente.free.fr/2003/media2003.pdf
"The maintenance of secrets acts like a psychic
poison which alienates the possessor from the community" Carl Jung
<https://217.72.179.7/members/www.bilderberg.org/phpBB2/>https://217.72.179.7/members/www.bilderberg.org/phpBB2/
Fear not therefore: for there is nothing covered
that shall not be revealed; and nothing hid that
shall not be made known. What I tell you in
darkness, that speak ye in the light and what ye
hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops. Matthew 10:26-27
Die Pride and Envie; Flesh, take the poor's advice.
Covetousnesse be gon: Come, Truth and Love arise.
Patience take the Crown; throw Anger out of dores:
Cast out Hypocrisie and Lust, which follows whores:
Then England sit in rest; Thy sorrows will have end;
Thy Sons will live in peace, and each will be a friend.
http://tinyurl.com/6ct7zh6
--
Please consider seriously the reason why these elite institutions are not discussed in the mainstream press despite the immense financial and political power they wield?
There are sick and evil occultists running the Western World. They are power mad lunatics like something from a kids cartoon with their fingers on the nuclear button! Armageddon is closer than you thought. Only God can save our souls from their clutches, at least that's my considered opinion - Tony
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