Found this article .. some interesting bits ..
http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/war_peace.html
Continuing the Inquiry
War and Peace
MORE THAN TWO YEARS before the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, the research staff of the Council
on Foreign Relations had started to envision a
venture that would dominate the life of the
institution for the demanding years ahead. With
the memory of the Inquiry in focus, they
conceived a role for the Council in the formulation of national policy.
On September 12, 1939, as Nazi Germany invaded
Poland, Armstrong and Mallory entrained to
Washington to meet with Assistant Secretary of
State George S. Messersmith. At that time the
Department of State could command few resources
for study, research, policy planning, and
initiative; on such matters, the career diplomats
on the eve of World War II were scarcely better
off than had been their predecessors when America
entered World War I. The men from the Council
proposed a discreet venture reminiscent of the
Inquiry: a program of independent analysis and
study that would guide American foreign policy in
the coming years of war and the challenging new world that would emerge after.
The project became known as the War and Peace
Studies. †The matter is strictly
confidential,†wrote Bowman, “because the
whole plan would be ’ditched’ if it became
generally known that the State Department is
working in collaboration with any outside
group.†The Rockefeller Foundation agreed to
fund the project, reluctantly at first, but, once
convinced of its relevance, with nearly $350,000.
Over the coming five years, almost 100 men
participated in the War and Peace Studies,
divided into four functional topic groups:
economic and financial, security and armaments,
territorial, and political. These groups met more
than 250 times, usually in New York, over dinner
and late into the night. They produced 682
memoranda for the State Department, which marked
them classified and circulated them among the
appropriate government departments.
The European war was only six months along when
the economic and financial group produced a
lengthy memo, †The Impact of War upon the
Foreign Trade of the United States.†This was
followed by a contingency blueprint in case the
British Isles fell to German occupation;
Churchill and his ministers would relocate to
Canada, the Council analysts concluded, where
Anglo-American cooperation in trade would only
intensify. In April 1940 and for nine months
following, with American entry into the war still
only hypothetical, the study group proposed a
more tolerant stance toward Japan, hoping thereby
to contain Tokyo’s expansionist designs on the
Pacific islands and the Asian mainland.
As the world edged yet again toward war,
Armstrong enlisted his Princeton friend Allen
Dulles (shown here at the right with the shah of
Iran and Council Director and J. P. Morgan
partner Russell C. Leffingwell) to ex U.S.
neutrality in the face of fascist aggression.
The views of the Council group on security and
armaments provoked less interest in Washington.
Shortly before Pearl Harbor, the group, led by
Allen Dulles, outlined the possible need for an
American occupation force in defeated Germany, a
project that attracted little attention. The
territorial group, chaired by Bowman, debated the
status of Chiang Kai-shek’s China, relative to
Japan and the Soviet Union. After a Japanese
defeat, the group concluded, China could be
opened to American exports and the United States
would have access to the raw materials of a vast virgin territory.
Bowman’s territorial group registered the one
immediate impact of the War and Peace Studies
upon evolving foreign policy. On March 17, 1940,
the Council submitted a memo, “The Strategic
Importance of Greenland,†advising that, since
the Danish outland was properly a part of the
Western Hemisphere, it should be covered by the
Monroe Doctrine. President Roosevelt promptly
invited Bowman for a discussion at the White
House, and one day after Nazi Germany occupied
Denmark in April, Roosevelt declared American
policy along the lines proposed by the Council
group, including the intent to establish military bases in Greenland.
The work of the fourth, political, group was
largely superseded by the State Department’s
own postwar policy planning staffs. Nonetheless,
the Council group’s members were active in the
1944 Dumbarton Oaks conference on world economic
arrangements and in the preparations for the 1945
San Francisco conference to establish the United Nations.
Once the United States entered the war, most of
the guiding spirits of the War and Peace Studies
accepted mobilization into government service, in
uniform, in the State Department, or in the
fledgling intelligence agency, the Office of
Strategic Services. Allen Dulles, for instance,
became a pivotal figure in the OSS from a
clandestine base in neutral Switzerland, where he
had an influential role in implementing the idea
he had presented to the Council for an American
occupation force in defeated Germany. His
brother, John Foster, remained at his New York
law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, throughout the
war, but he was active in assisting State
Department planning for the future United Nations.
The overall record of the Council’s War and
Peace Studies can only compare favorably with the
performance of its conceptual predecessor, the
Inquiry of World War I. Yet its practical
contribution to the U.S. war effort, and the
political planning for the era following, remains
unclear in the judgment of history.
A perennial problem for historians of government
is tracing the initiative for any particular
political decision within a government, to say
nothing of the more tangential outside
influences. Clearly, the Council’s War and
Peace Studies were not as important as Armstrong,
for one, chose to regard them in his own
retrospect. Yet even the most myopic of
diplomatic officials would have difficulty
sustaining the argument that American foreign
policy could have evolved as effectively without
the independent provocation of knowledgeable
outsiders. William P. Bundy, who straddled the
two worlds in the postwar era, as a Pentagon and
State Department official and later as
Armstrong’s successor at Foreign Affairs,
concluded, †It has been wisely said that no
contingency plans are ever adopted as written,
but that the exercise is often invaluable in
flagging the questions that must be faced. So it
was for this extraordinary exercise, I am sure.†1
Such were the effects of the upheavals of war
upon the habits of society. The primary function
of the Council on Foreign Relations during World
War II proceeded in rigid secrecy, remote from
the slightest awareness of most of the
Council’s 663 members, who were not themselves personally involved.
Notes:
1. William P. Bundy, The Council on Foreign
Relations and Foreign Affairs: Notes for a
History (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994), p. 22.
+44 (0)7786 952037
www.thisweek.org.uk
www.dialectradio.co.uk
Fear not therefore: for there is nothing covered
that shall not be revealed; and nothing hid that
shall not be made known. What I tell you in
darkness, that speak ye in the light and what ye
hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops. Matthew 10:26-27
www.actorsandartistsfor911truth.org
www.mediafor911truth.org
www.pilotsfor911truth.org
www.mp911truth.org
www.ae911truth.org
www.rl911truth.org
www.stj911.org
www.l911t.com
www.v911t.org
--
--
Please consider seriously the reason why these elite institutions are not discussed in the mainstream press despite the immense financial and political power they wield?
There are sick and evil occultists running the Western World. They are power mad lunatics like something from a kids cartoon with their fingers on the nuclear button! Armageddon is closer than you thought. Only God can save our souls from their clutches, at least that's my considered opinion - Tony
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"PEPIS" group. Please feel free to forward it to anyone who might be interested
particularly your political representatives, journalists and spiritual leaders/dudes.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/pepis?hl=en
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "PEPIS" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
