How Israel Stole the Bomb
September 11, 2016
Exclusive: When Israel launched a covert scheme
to steal material and secrets to build a nuclear
bomb, U.S. officials looked the other way and obstructed investigations,
as described in a book reviewed by James DiEugenio.
By James DiEugenio
In 1968, CIA Director Richard Helms was
presented with a disturbing National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) stating that Israel had obtained
atomic weapons, a dangerous development that
occurred earlier than the CIA had anticipated.
It was particularly dangerous because just the
year before, the Six Day War had marked the
beginning of open hostilities between the
Israelis and Arab nation states. To prevail,
Israel had launched preemptive air attacks
against Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq at the
start of the conflict. Considering that violent
backdrop, Helms immediately arranged a meeting
with President Lyndon Johnson to inform him of this troubling milestone.
CIA Director Richard Helms.
The man who had prepared the NIE and gave it to
Helms was the CIA’s chief science and technology
officer, Carl Duckett. After Helms met with
Johnson, the CIA Director told Duckett about the
President’s rather odd reaction. LBJ did not get
upset, and he did not order an investigation into
how it happened. Further, he did not tell Helms
to let both the Defense Department and State
Department know about it so they could establish
intelligence inquiries or consider sanctions.
Instead, Johnson did the opposite. He told
Helms to keep the news secret and specifically
told the Director not to let the secretaries of
State or Defense know about it.
Helms obeyed the orders of his Commander in
Chief, but he decided to talk to the FBI about
how this development had occurred earlier than
expected. Thus begins Roger Mattson’s Stealing
the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed
Israel, the riveting story of duplicity, betrayal, cover-ups and deceit.
As the book shows, the cover-ups and duplicity
did not just come from Israel and its agents in
America. The deceit also came from men inside the
American government who, for whatever reasons,
decided to cast a blind eye on what was really
happening under their jurisdiction, even after they had been alerted to it.
What Mattson reveals is no less than an atomic
heist – one that could have been prevented if men
in high positions had done their duty.
Highly Enriched Uranium
After Johnson told Helms not to tell State or
Defense, the CIA Director called Attorney General
Ramsey Clark, because what made this news even
more ominous — and a potential crime — was what
the CIA had discovered when it conducted a
chemical test around the Israeli nuclear reactor
at Dimona, in the Negev desert.
U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark with
President Lyndon Johnson in 1967. (U.S. Government photo)
Duckett had concluded that Israel had something
that they should not have possessed at that time:
HEU, or highly enriched uranium, which could only
be produced by one of the five major powers that already had nuclear weapons.
But the test had also revealed characteristics
that showed the material had originated in the
United States. (Mattson, p. 97) Specifically, the
HEU came from Portsmouth, Ohio and then was
further processed at a plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania.
The importance of this information was that the
HEU was processed to such a degree – well over 90
percent U 235 – that it was classified as weapons
grade uranium. The technical term for it is the
acronym SNM, or Special Nuclear Material, meaning
that it is fissile: it can easily be split with
neutrons. Although the Portsmouth plant is shut
down today, beginning in 1956 it did produce weapons-grade uranium.
It was in Apollo, Pennsylvania, that the trail
of the SNM and the crime of its diversion becomes
exceedingly suspect. The plant that did the
further processing of HEU, and the ultimate
shipping, was named Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation, or NUMEC, and there were a
number of reasons why suspicion had centered on
NUMEC even before Helms called Clark.
First, NUMEC had a rather unreliable record
when it came to keeping track of HEU and other
materials that had been given to it through the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The way the
system worked is that the particular company
would forward its business requests — from either
private or governmental agencies — to the AEC.
The AEC would then estimate how much nuclear
material NUMEC would need to fulfill the
contract. If a company was using up more material
than the AEC properly estimated, that company
would be fined quite a lot of money. If the
shortages persisted, the AEC and the FBI could then open up an investigation.
With CIA’s discoveries, the possibility
presented itself that a diversion of the nuclear
material could be taking place. Either someone
from the outside was stealing the material, or
someone on the inside was embezzling it.
As Mattson shows with charts, graphs and
testimony, NUMEC had an extraordinarily bad
record in this regard. The company was eventually
fined over $2 million for missing materials,
which, with inflation factored in, would be about
$15 million today. Mattson adduces that from 1959
to 1977, about 345 kilograms of HEU went missing
from NUMEC, which translates to well over 700 pounds. (ibid, p. 286)
Explaining the Deficits
In just one year, there was a loss of over 56
kilograms (or about 123 pounds). The company made
up all sorts of rationales as to why this much
HEU was missing, including losses during the
mechanical processing. But as the author points
out, there are two problems with this accounting.
President Lyndon Johnson accompanies
President-elect Richard Nixon to his inauguration on Jan. 20, 1969.
First, no other plant in America reported
losses of this magnitude. The AEC concluded that
the losses at Apollo were more than double what
they were at any other comparably sized atomic plant in the U.S. (ibid, p. 65)
Secondly, even if one chalks up some of the
missing HEU to a processing loss, that still does
not account for the entire record of NUMEC.
Mattson figures that, even giving the company the
benefit of the doubt, it still leaves about 200
pounds of missing HEU. (ibid, p. 67) That’s
enough for about six atomic bombs, larger than the one used on Hiroshima.
As Mattson reports, what makes NUMEC an even
more intriguing suspect is the fact that the
company had some legitimate business transactions
with Israel, concerning the irradiation of
plants. And these legitimate packages were sent
at about the time the HEU went missing. Further,
the inventory records at NUMEC were extremely
sloppy and some appear to have been destroyed in
direct violation of the AEC code, meaning NUMEC
should have been cited, but wasn’t. (ibid, p. 75)
That brings us to the founders of the NUMEC
plant in Apollo, Pennsylvania, a small town of
approximately 1,600 people that lies about 30
miles northeast of Pittsburgh. In 1955, the
Apollo Steel Plant was purchased by David
Lowenthal. Two years later, Lowenthal and Zalman
Shapiro cooperated in forming NUMEC.
Shapiro, a very accomplished metallurgist who
lived next door to Lowenthal, had been employed
for a number of years at the nearby Bettis Atomic
Power Laboratory, which supported the AEC’s Office of Naval Reactors.
In May 1958, Lowenthal merged Apollo Steel with
the San Toy Mining Company in Maine. San Toy then
changed its name to Apollo Industries, with the
main operating officers of this new corporation
Morton Chatkin, Ivan Novick and Lowenthal. (ibid, p. 43)
The board comprised these three men plus
Shapiro, and later others. In the early 1960s,
the steel plant’s name was changed to Raychord
Steel, but with the decline of the steel
industry, Raychord became a subsidiary company to Apollo.
Ties to Zionist Groups
Novick, one of Apollo’s officers, later served
as national president of the Zionist Organization
of America, in which Chatkin, another officer,
also held a leadership role. The ZOA was a member
group of the American Zionist Council, which
later became the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee, which today is considered to be the
leading lobbying group for Israel and one of the
most powerful lobbying groups in Washington.
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin
Novick also later served as a personal liaison
between Ronald Reagan’s White House and the
administration of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
Lowenthal, who was born in Poland in 1921, came
to America in 1932 and served in the American
armed forces in World War II, eventually becoming
a citizen in 1945. After the war, he worked with
the Haganah, the Jewish paramilitary force inside
Palestine, on the Zionist mission to ferry Jews
into Palestine in 1947 on board the boat SS Exodus.
Since almost none of the passengers had legal
immigration certificates to enter Palestine, the
British Royal Navy, which ran the Palestinian
Mandate, seized the ship and deported its
passengers back to Europe. Lowenthal’s mission
was a practical failure, but a tremendous
propaganda success for the Zionist cause. The
event was novelized by author Leon Uris in the
number-one best-selling book Exodus, which was
published in 1958 and was made into a movie two
years later by director Otto Preminger, starring Paul Newman.
Lowenthal later served on board the ship Pan
York, which also attempted to evade the British
quarantine but was captured in Cyprus with the
crew arrested, including Lowenthal. He escaped
and fled to Palestine where he served with the
Haganah during the war that broke out there in
1948 after the British abandoned the mandate early. (ibid, p. 44)
Lowenthal ended up serving under the legendary
Meir Amit, the leading intelligence officer in
Israel during the 1960s. Lowenthal was also
personally acquainted with future prime ministers
David Ben Gurion and Golda Meir.
Shapiro, who had advanced degrees in chemistry
and metallurgy from Johns Hopkins, worked for
Westinghouse and the Navy on the nuclear reactor
that powered America’s first atomic submarine,
the Nautilus. Shapiro also helped develop the
fuel for the first commercial nuclear reactor,
the Shippingport Atomic Power Station in Pennsylvania.
Like Lowenthal, Novick and Chatkin, Shapiro
also was active in supporting Israeli causes,
although his activities had a slightly
educational tone. He was a member of the Technion
Society, which supported advances in Israeli
science and technology. Indeed, he became an
Honorary Life Member of the group.
He also was a Director of Hillel, an
international organization that tries to acquaint
Jewish students with each other on campuses and
organize student trips to Israel. Like Novick and
Chatkin, he was a member of the Zionist
Organization of America. Many years later, it was
discovered that Shapiro was on the Board of
Governors of the Israeli Intelligence Center,
which honors spies for Israel who clandestinely
advanced the interests of the state. (Mattson, p. 84)
Beyond the individual backgrounds of these four
men, there was also something else which should
have attracted the U.S. intelligence community’s
attention prior to Helms’s meeting with President
Johnson. While running NUMEC, both men – Shapiro
and Lowenthal – were taking trips to Israel and
had contacts with high officials of Israeli
intelligence as well as Israel’s version of the AEC.
Further, NUMEC had a guest worker, an Israeli
metallurgist, in its plant, as part of an
agreement NUMEC had with Israel to serve as a
training consultancy which resulted in the
formation of a joint company with Israel called
ISORAD that initially was to deal with
irradiation of citrus fruits through gamma rays.
But the FBI later discovered that NUMEC also had
contracts with Israel for the development of
plutonium oxide as fuel elements in nuclear reactors. (Mattson, pgs. 80-81)
Since Lowenthal had so many acquaintances in
high positions, he often visited Israel,
including a most curious instance at about the
time he purchased Apollo Steel in 1956. It was at
this time that Israel was making decisions about
foreign sourcing for nuclear materials and technology.
A year later, NUMEC was formed and Shapiro
immediately applied for a license from the AEC to
process uranium fuel in a building formerly
occupied by Apollo Steel. John Hadden, CIA
station chief in Tel Aviv, later noted the
unusual coincidence of these events on two continents. (ibid, p. 45)
But declassified FBI files reveal that the
visitations were not just one way, i.e. from
Apollo, Pennsylvania, to Israel. There were also
visits and meetings of Israeli officials who went to Apollo.
A photograph of a control room at Israel’s
Dimona nuclear weapons plant in the 1980s.
(Photograph taken by nuclear technician Mordechai
Vanunu, who was later kidnapped and imprisoned by
Israel as punishment for revealing its secret nuclear arsenal.)
At the time of those meetings, there were four
main branches of Israeli intelligence. The Shin
Bet corresponded with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; the Mossad with the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Aman roughly with the
Defense Intelligence Agency; and the LAKAM, which
was responsible for security at Dimona and for
procuring scientific and technological data from
Western sources. (Mattson, p. 108)
In the mid-1960s, France started scaling back
its support for the Dimona reactor, which was
supposedly a research facility. With France’s
pullback, LAKAM began seeking out and purchasing
parts and supplies from other sources to complete the project.
LAKAM’s job included concealing the reactor’s
true function – the development of a nuclear bomb
– from American inspections. (ibid) During an
American inspection in 1964, LAKAM even created a
“Potemkin village” control room to deceive the visitors.
Unlike American intelligence, Israel also had a
special operations unit that served all branches.
Established in 1957, it was run by Rafi Eitan and
his deputy, Avraham Bendor. (In the 1980s, Eitan
became notorious for the Jonathan Pollard spy
case, in which Pollard, a navy intelligence
employee, was paid tens of thousands of dollars
to spy for Israel in the United States with Eitan his ultimate control agent.)
Convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard in the
photo from his U.S. Naval Intelligence ID.
In September 1968, the AEC told the FBI that
they were giving permission to NUMEC for a visit
by four Israelis, including Eitan and Bendor.
However, in the application to the AEC, the
occupations of the two were disguised. Eitan was
said to be a chemist in the Defense Ministry;
Bendor supposedly worked for the electronics division. (ibid, p. 110)
The other two men were Avraham Hermoni, who was
billed as a Scientific Counselor in the Israeli
Embassy in Washington, and Dr. Ephraim Biegun,
described as working in the Division of
Electronics for Defense. Again, this was
misleading. Hermoni did, at times, work out of
Washington’s Israeli Embassy, but his prime and
most important function was overseeing and
planning Israel’s nuclear weapons program, which
he did from 1959-69. Biegun was actually head of
the technical division of the Mossad from 1960-70.
After the visit, NUMEC reported that the four
men were in Apollo to buy thermo-electrical
generator systems. (ibid, p. 119) Why Eitan and
Bendor had to be there for that purpose is not readily apparent.
CIA officer John Hadden thought the real reason
for the visit was that Shapiro was divulging
top-secret technical information about plutonium
manufacture – and that he was aided in this by
the visiting Israeli scientist working at NUMEC.
The FBI later came to agree that this was most
likely the true reason for the visit. (ibid, p. 120)
Hermoni revisited Shapiro in November 1968, but
the capstone to the visits to Apollo came later
that month. As noted previously, France had cut
back on its support for Dimona in the mid-1960s,
halting the supply of uranium fuel in 1967.
In late November 1968, the Mossad arranged a
covert operation called Operation Plumbat, which
employed a front company in West Germany to
purchase 200 tons of uranium yellowcake from
Belgium. The transaction was approved by Euratom,
the European organization controlling such
transactions, but once the transport ship set
sail for the port of Genoa, Italy, it was
intercepted by another ship used by the Mossad.
When the original ship reached port, the hull was empty.
The timing of this operation, on the heels of
the mysterious visits by Israeli intelligence
agents to Apollo, seems to constitute powerful
circumstantial evidence of Israeli intentions.
Then, right after the completion of the Plumbat
mission, who arrived in Israel? None other than
Zalman Shapiro. The FBI discovered that in
November 1968, in addition to the personal
visits, Shapiro was in frequent phone contact
with a number of Israeli intelligence agents,
including Hermoni. (Mattson, p. 126)
A Longstanding Goal
Israel’s long trail of subterfuge and duplicity
was part of a longstanding goal. As early as
1948, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime
minister, stated that what Einstein, Teller and
Oppenheimer did for America, they could easily do
for Israel, since they were all Jews. In fact, he
offered Einstein Israeli citizenship, which the
great man declined. (ibid, p. 22) Ben-Gurion then
had two meetings with Oppenheimer and numerous ones with Teller.
David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister
Ultimately, Israel settled on David Bergmann, a
brilliant chemist whom Ben-Gurion appointed first
chief of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission in
1952. By 1955, Bergmann was essentially running
the day-to-day operations of Israel’s atomic program.
In a conversation with the American ambassador,
Bergmann said the Israeli science education
program was adequate in physics and chemistry but
weak in engineering and non-existent in
metallurgy. He also revealed that the design he
had laid out for a reactor was the same as the
one at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, an intriguing
clue because Shapiro was a metallurgist and had
worked on the Shippingport power station.
Indeed, Shapiro eventually met Bergmann and the
two became close friends and colleagues, serving
on the board of ISORAD, which was a joint venture
of NUMEC and the IAEC. Bergmann made his first
visit to America for IAEC in 1956, the year
before Lowenthal turned Apollo Steel into NUMEC.
There were two significant investigations of
Shapiro and NUMEC. The first was instigated by
Dick Helms’s call to Ramsey Clark in 1968 and the
discovery of the highly enriched uranium at
Dimona. (Mattson, p. 99) The second began in 1976
when Jim Conran, a whistleblower at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, voiced complaints about
the background and actions of Shapiro. Conran was
a security officer and his warnings eventually
got the attention of the White House. (ibid, p. 161)
During the first investigation, the FBI could
not find enough evidence to justify a violation
by Shapiro of the Foreign Agents Registration
Act, which mandates that any person in the U.S.
who is representing a foreign country’s interests
has to register with the Justice Department. But
the FBI did recommend cancelling Shapiro’s
security clearances, based on wiretaps that
revealed Shapiro in close contact with Israeli
intelligence officials and with members of the IAEC. (ibid, p. 138)
During these calls Shapiro reportedly said he
would help Israel in any way that he could. He
also expressed frustration with the new ownership
at NUMEC, which had been purchased by ARCO. But
his Israeli contacts said he was too valuable to
leave and encouraged him to stay there. (ibid, p. 139)
One of the most curious episodes that the FBI
surveillance revealed was a meeting between
Shapiro and a man named Jeruham Kafkafi, a
suspected Mossad officer working under diplomatic
cover. He had left Washington by air on the
morning of June 20, 1969, and met Shapiro at the
Pittsburgh airport for about an hour. He then
left and flew back to Washington.
As a result of that surveillance, Shapiro was
interviewed by the AEC in August 1969, with some
of Shapiro’s answers to questions rather dubious.
For instance, he said he did not know Hermoni was
in charge of the Israeli nuclear development
program and thought he was a university
professor. Shapiro said his discussions in
September and October 1968 with the Israeli
officers were about water contamination, saboteur
detection and military activities.
When asked why the Israelis could not have
talked to the Defense Department about those
topics, Shapiro had no answer. The interviewer
wrote in his summary that Shapiro was cool and
calm throughout except when the Kafkafi meeting
was brought up. At first, Shapiro said he could
not recall it, even though it happened just two
months earlier. He then said he did remember it,
claiming it was about an overdue invoice and a power supply resource. (p. 142)
The AEC investigators did not find the last
reply credible, since it did not seem to justify
an airline flight from Washington to Pittsburgh
and back. Shapiro adjusted his answer by saying
that there was some discussion of an investigator
whom he knew from America who was going to visit
Israel. He also added the figure of $32,000 as to
how much Israel owed NUMEC. As Mattson notes,
again, this explanation does not seem to justify
an air flight and an hour-long meeting with a clandestine Mossad officer.
Closing the Inquiry
The man who ultimately decided to close this
initial inquiry was Glenn Seaborg, head of the
AEC. Not only did he not see any civil or
criminal charges as being viable, but when
President Richard Nixon’s Attorney General John
Mitchell recommended revoking Shapiro’s security
clearances, Seaborg balked at that also.
Glenn Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Mattson clearly sees Seaborg as being a villain
in the piece. Late in the book, he explicitly
accuses him of running a cover-up. (see p. 297)
And, there is evidence to back up this charge. It
was later discovered, during the second inquiry,
that Seaborg had a close personal friendship with Shapiro. (ibid p. 268)
Earle Hightower, assistant director of
safeguards at AEC, explicitly stated that the
whole case regarding NUMEC was rigged because it
was known that Seaborg would not take action.
Little more than three years after Seaborg left
the AEC, it was dissolved in 1975 and was
replaced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in
part, because critics accused the AEC of an
insufficiently aggressive regulatory program.
The second, much longer, and more vigorous
inquiry into NUMEC and Shapiro came about at the
creation of the NRC when Jim Conran was tasked
with reviewing the record of how safeguards had
worked previously for the AEC so they could be
strengthened in the future. In that review
process, he came across the case of Shapiro and NUMEC.
When Conran asked to see more files on both, he
was denied access, causing him to go up the NRC
ladder to Chairman William Anders, who was
briefed by, among others, Carl Duckett of the
CIA. Since Anders was about to leave for a
diplomatic post, he took his concerns to James
Connor at President Gerald Ford’s White House.
In March 1976, the CIA’s Duckett addressed an
informal gathering of pilots and astronauts,
saying there was little doubt Israel had about 20
nuclear warheads. Although this was supposed to
be off the record, the information leaked. In
April 1976, Time reported that this claim was
accurate, except the newsmagazine put the size of
the arsenal at 13 bombs and added that the
warheads could be delivered by Phantom jets or Jericho missiles.
Duckett wrote a memo to CIA Director George
Bush in which he said he suspected that the
Israeli program was jumpstarted by a diversion of
enriched uranium from the NUMEC plant. (p. 165)
He attached various appendices to the memo to
show the results of previous inquiries into NUMEC
and explain why his belief was justified.
One of the appendices consisted of a paper by
John Hadden in which he expressed the suspicion
that NUMEC was actually a shell company the
Israeli government had set up for the express
purpose of diverting materials, technology and
information that Israel needed to speed up and
facilitate its longstanding quest for atomic weapons. (ibid, p. 166)
A New Investigation
Attorney General Edward Levi was then sent a
summary of the FBI’s previous investigation of
NUMEC. Levi alerted Ford that he thought NUMEC
was culpable for several crimes and, with Ford’s
permission, he wished to begin a criminal
inquiry. Since Ford’s close adviser James Connor
was also disturbed by these findings, the
President approved the investigation.
What followed was a tedious bureaucratic battle
between the CIA and FBI. The FBI felt it did not
have direct proof that a diversion had taken
place, while the CIA had the proof — the chemical
tests at Dimona — but was reluctant to reveal the
intelligence to the FBI. Also, the CIA did not
want to furnish the FBI with technical experts to
help educate the investigating agents so they
could effectively cross-examine important
witnesses. Thus, the FBI’s inquiry dragged on
through three presidents: Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.
But even with these obstructions, the FBI did
eventually find witnesses to a diversion from the
Apollo plant. It turned out that the FBI did not
do enough interviews of plant employees in its
initial inquiry because there were at least four
of them willing to talk. Those witnesses form the climax of Mattson’s book.
In 1980, one witness said that when he read
newspaper accounts about the losses of enriched
uranium at Apollo, he had to chuckle to himself.
When asked why, he replied that in 1965 or 1966,
he was walking near the loading dock at Apollo
and saw people loading containers – the
dimensions that were used for HEU packets – into
equipment boxes. He noticed that the shipping
papers for the boxes revealed that the packages
were destined for Israel. This witness then
suggested some other workers at the plant who had
seen similar activity. (Ibid, p. 272)
One of these witnesses saw a flatbed truck
backed up into the loading dock area with Shapiro
pacing around the area while the driver was
loading “stove pipes” into a cabinet on the
truck. This struck the witness as odd because the
plant had regularly assigned workers for loading
duties during the day but this shipment was being
prepared in the evening. He explained that “stove
pipes” were cylindrical containers that the plant
used to pack enriched uranium inside. Each stove
pipe usually contained three or four packets of HEU.
When he glanced at the clipboard resting on a
package, he saw the destination was Israel. The
clipboard then was yanked away and an armed guard
escorted him off the dock. He also said it was
unusual to see Shapiro in this area of the plant,
and further, that Shapiro was very seldom there at night. (ibid, p. 275)
There were two other witnesses who told the FBI
about similar events. The FBI also interviewed an
NRC inspector named James Devlin, who told the
agents that, contrary to what Shapiro had said,
the security at the Apollo plant was below par
and that NUMEC did not employ a professional
security force. The company had one regular armed
guard and Devlin happened to know who he was,
since he was also a deputy for the township. The
only other guards were unarmed and non-uniformed. (ibid, pgs. 272-73)
By this time, the FBI did not want to continue
the investigation, believing that nothing would
come of it, although the Justice Department urged
the investigators on. But the FBI was correct
since, as Mattson notes more than once in his
book, the last president who really wanted to
stop Israel from becoming a nuclear power was
John F. Kennedy. (See pgs. 38-40, p. 256)
Richard Helms’s conversation with a
disinterested President Johnson underscores how
that attitude changed after Kennedy’s death. As
Mattson further notes, opposition to Israel’s
nuclear-weapons program was more or less negated
by President Richard Nixon’s meeting with Prime
Minister Golda Meir in 1969 when he agreed that
the U.S. would not make any public statements
revealing Israel’s nuclear arsenal nor demand
that it sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as
long as Israel did no testing and made no public threats.
Even that policy was probably violated in 1979
with the Vela Incident: a suspected Israeli
nuclear test done in the Indian Ocean.
Author Roger Mattson
Author Roger Mattson was part of the inquiry
about the illegal transfer of atomic secrets to
Israel, working in the NRC’s safeguards
department when Conran first voiced his fears
about a diversion at NUMEC. Thus, Mattson became
part of an internal review of the Shapiro case,
seeing firsthand how certain intelligence
agencies were, by accident or design, obstructing the investigation.
Mattson concludes his important book by stating
that this policy of casting a deliberate blind
eye towards a nuclear heist by Israel places the
U.S. in a compromised position when trying to
enforce a policy of non-proliferation on other
nations because of the obvious double standards.
To point out one paradox, the U.S. government
executed Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for
purportedly supplying nuclear secrets to the
Soviet Union with less evidence. Plus, the tinder
box of the Middle East is probably the last place
where America should have allowed atomic weapons to proliferate, but it did.
Because of that, the U.S. has little or no
moral authority on the issue today.
James DiEugenio is a researcher and writer on
the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
and other mysteries of that era. His most recent book is Reclaiming Parkland.
+44 (0)7786 952037
Twitter: @TonyGosling http://twitter.com/tonygosling
"Capitalism is institutionalised bribery."
"The maintenance of secrets acts like a psychic
poison which alienates the possessor from the community" Carl Jung
Fear not therefore: for there is nothing covered
that shall not be revealed; and nothing hid that
shall not be made known. What I tell you in
darkness, that speak ye in the light and what ye
hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops. Matthew 10:26-27
Die Pride and Envie; Flesh, take the poor's advice.
Covetousnesse be gon: Come, Truth and Love arise.
Patience take the Crown; throw Anger out of dores:
Cast out Hypocrisie and Lust, which follows whores:
Then England sit in rest; Thy sorrows will have end;
Thy Sons will live in peace, and each will be a friend.
Please consider seriously the reason why these elite institutions are not discussed in the mainstream press despite the immense financial and political power they wield?
There are sick and evil occultists running the Western World. They are power mad lunatics like something from a kids cartoon with their fingers on the nuclear button! Armageddon is closer than you thought. Only God can save our souls from their clutches, at least that's my considered opinion - Tony
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