1. U.S. Shifts Focus from Taiwan to Indonesia 2. Central Axis Presents Moslem Third Force in Indonesian Presidential Elections ---------- Global Intelligence Update August 14, 1999 U.S. Shifts Focus from Taiwan to Indonesia Summary: Despite the continued tension over Taiwan's declaration of statehood and North Korea's threatened missile launch, the U.S. has apparently shifted its attention south to Indonesia. Reports out of Australia and Indonesia suggest Washington is monitoring and preparing contingency plans for trouble spots in Indonesia, while two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups are currently in the South China Sea near Indonesia. The trouble is, while the U.S. has a long-term strategic interest in Indonesian stability, the issue has immediate salience for Washington's main partner in addressing the situation - Australia. This salience asymmetry, especially on the East Timor situation, is generating friction between Washington and Canberra, exacerbating relations already strained by trade and foreign policy disputes. Analysis: Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Air Marshall Hanafie Asnan claimed August 9 that intensive foreign reconnaissance flights over Indonesian trouble spots, including Aceh, Ambon, and East Timor, have recently been increasing. According to an article in the August 10 issue of the Indonesian newspaper Suara Karya, Asnan told a conference in Jakarta that Indonesian Hawk 100 and 200 training jets had been unable to positively identify the illegal intruders due to the foreign aircraft's superior speed and avionics. According to Suara Karya, Asnan "did not deny" suggestions that the aircraft may have been carrier-based jets. Failing to deny a suggestion is far from validating that suggestion, and Ambon, Aceh, and East Timor are a bit widely distributed for aircraft from one single carrier to visit. But there is evidence to suggest that carrier-based aircraft are in a position to monitor Indonesian events. The USS Kitty Hawk battle group just concluded scheduled naval exercises in the South China Sea with Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand (which has recently acquired a jump jet carrier). Aircraft from the Kitty Hawk were available for reconnaissance should Washington have deemed it necessary. Additionally, the USS Constellation arrived in Singapore on August 10, reportedly to carry out training exercises with the Singapore Navy. As for the distribution of the reconnoitered areas, Asnan said nothing about the aircraft being of the same type, or of performing recon on the same day, nor did Suara Karya suggest all were carrier based. Speaking at the conclusion of the Kitty Hawk's exercises, battle group commander Rear Admiral Timothy Keating noted that there was no indication China planned to attack Taiwan, but vowed that China would "have the U.S. Navy to deal with" if it attempted aggression against Taiwan or any other target. "We are there in numbers, we're trained, we're ready, and we're very powerful," the Associated Press quoted Keating as saying. At the same time, Keating downplayed the Constellation's presence in the area, saying the carrier was bound for the Persian Gulf and had nothing to do with the Taiwan crisis. So what we have is this. First, the Indonesian military contends that foreign aircraft, which may or may not have been carrier based, have been increasing illicit reconnaissance overflights of Indonesia. Second, they made this claim at the same time two U.S. carrier battle groups are in the South China Sea. This may be a coincidence, but it is interesting that, despite tensions in North Korea and Taiwan not to mention Keating's rhetoric, the U.S. saw it fit to place two carrier battle groups off the coast of Indonesia however coincidentally or temporarily. Obviously, Washington does not seem to feel that Chinese military action is imminent. At the same time, it seems to indicate some degree of concern over another link in the archipelagic chain containing China - Indonesia. Indonesia is a key component of U.S. strategy. First, if the United States is now engaged in containing China, the chain of countries stretching from South Korea to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, through Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, to Thailand is critical. Given Indonesia's position astride vital sea lanes and between Australia and peninsular Southeast Asia, Indonesia is more critical to that chain than most. Indeed, since the U.S. has a strategic commitment to controlling the world's maritime choke points, the Straits of Malacca and Lombok can be closed from Indonesia. Therefore, what happens in Indonesia is of critical interest to the United States both in relation to China and in the broadest contexts of American strategy. The U.S. has tried to maintain a low profile on domestic Indonesian events in an attempt not to exacerbate the situation. At the same time, the U.S. is eager to ensure that Indonesia does not disintegrate. Besides knowing that it doesn't want Indonesia to collapse, and generally supporting East Timor's independence movement, Washington really does not have a coherent policy on Indonesia at present. Or, to be more precise, it has a desired outcome without any obvious means of ensuring that outcome. This generalized concern would warrant monitoring explosive areas like Aceh, Ambon, and East Timor. Apart from gathering information, it would signal the intensely maneuvering political factions inside Indonesia of U.S. interest and concern. At the same time, using carrier based aircraft for the reconnaissance mission would appear to be a particularly overt move, unless immediate, tactical information were required. So, if the Indonesian report is true and our inference that the flights originated from U.S. carriers in the region is also true, then it would appear that U.S. concern is mounting. Why would this be the case right now? The current political situation inside of Indonesia seems to indicate that Megawati, the populist daughter of former President Sukarno, whose party won a plurality in recent elections, has been outmaneuvered in the post-election coalition building. It is unlikely that she will win the Presidency, as Islamic parties have created a broad coalition that may actually benefit current President Habibie's drive to hold on to power. As the realization dawns on her followers, they may take to the streets, destabilizing the country. As Indonesia hovers on the knifes edge, the United States has undoubtedly been drawn into the maneuvering if only in an attempt to contain the situation. The reconnaissance flights might well have been some sort of signal of American interest to the various parties. If so, it was noted and broadcast by the current government, clearly a beneficiary of the signal. Then there is the question of East Timor and Australia, which has become a particularly complex tangle of late. The paradoxical U.S. position is that Indonesia must survive as a united state, but East Timor, seized by Indonesia from Portugal, must be given its independence. East Timor has been an ongoing nightmare, but one that appears to be drawing to a close as free elections approach. Now America's closest partner in monitoring and managing tensions in Indonesia is Australia, for which events in Indonesia have even greater immediacy than for the United States.. They must coordinate policies. This has proved difficult. For the U.S., Indonesia is a long-term issue of grand strategy, currently drawing mid-level attention and contingency planning. For Australia, Indonesia - and specifically East Timor - has been a matter of immediate and high level concern for several months. Australia has taken a leading role in managing the run-up to the East Timor ballot on independence, and will likely provide the nucleus of any UN peacekeeping force in the territory. Australia will also bear the brunt of any chaos in East Timor, and so is carefully and patiently working to manipulate a peaceful transition to whatever status East Timor adopts. The asymmetry of interest has apparently led to a misunderstanding between the two countries over U.S. intentions. The Melbourne Age reported on August 1 that Canberra had ordered Australian officials visiting U.S. Pacific military headquarters in Hawaii to reject a U.S. offer of a U.S. Marine "peacemaking" force, to be deployed in East Timor either before or after the independence referendum. It then reported on August 10 that the U.S. contingency plans included up to 15,000 Marines. First, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer rejected the story as nonsense. When the Age publicized a telegram from Australia's representatives at the contingency planning session, detailing the U.S. offer, Downer was forced to admit that the U.S. had discussed the plan with Australia - "hypothetically." The Pentagon issued a statement on August 11 denying it had made any such offer. What seems to have happened is that the U.S. military, as is its normal policy, did some contingency planning on East Timor, ranging from a few unarmed observers to 15,000 Marines. For the U.S., it was a hypothetical exercise. The Australian representatives, took the contingency plan as an offer. The alternative explanation is that the United States does have a contingency plan for Indonesia including about a division of Marines. It is doubtful that East Timor would justify such a commitment of forces. Indonesia as a whole might. It is possible that the Australian representative, focused on East Timor, confused a willingness to commit 15,000 Marines to Indonesia as a desire to commit them to East Timor. All of this is murky. However, this much seems to be emerging from the gloom. While the headlines are focused on China-Taiwan, the United States seems to be increasingly focused on Indonesia. There is clearly a contingency plan for deploying U.S. troops and this has clearly been discussed with Australia in sufficiently ambiguous terms as to come across as a desire to deploy troops rather than as the ability to do so. It is also clear that, at least temporarily, two U.S. carriers are in the region and that the Indonesians seem to think that they are flying reconnaissance missions over their territory. China may wind up seizing some small islands near its coast, like Quemoy. But the U.S. seems to be more worried, for the moment, about Indonesia. ----------- Global Intelligence Update August 12, 1999 Central Axis Presents Moslem Third Force in Indonesian Presidential Elections Summary: The final results of Indonesia's June 7 general election were once again thrown into confusion as the National Election Committee (PPI) failed again to come to a conclusion on the number of seats allowed to parties that participated in a vote- sharing agreement allowed under the national election rules. The question has arisen over the formation of a "central axis" of Indonesian Moslem parties, which together may account for more seats than either the Indonesian Democratic Struggle party (PDI- P) or the ruling Golkar Party in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR). Debate within this central axis over whom to support as the next president of Indonesia has changed the face of Indonesia's presidential race. The central axis now becomes either a major swing vote between Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P and B.J. Habibie's Golkar, or becomes a third alternative to the leading parties. Interestingly, in either case the equation seems to shift in favor of Habibie. Analysis: The Indonesian National Election Committee (PPI) failed to meet its self-imposed August 10 deadline for the completion of the distribution of seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) after being unable to resolve differences over how to allocate seats among parties that had signed a stembus akoord (Vote-sharing agreement). Within the 48 political parties that participated in the June 7 general elections, two groups have emerged that have made vote-sharing agreements. One is made up of Indonesian Democrats Alliance Party (PADI), the Love the Nation Democratic Party (PDKB) and the Unity in Diversity Party (PBI). The other agreement was made among Moslem parties, and the United Development Party (PPP), the Crescent and Star Party (PBB), the Justice Party (PK), the People's Awakening Party (PKU), the Nahdlatul Umat Party (PNU), the Indonesian United Islam Party 1905 (PSII-1905), the Moslem Peoples' Party (PUI) and the Masyumi Party. Questions about the distribution of votes among these parties has led to confusion, as there are varying interpretations of the election laws set up governing the vote-sharing accords. While these parties undeniably form a voting bloc based on their individually won seats, it is possible that these eight parties may claim as many as 40 additional seats over what they already have garnered individually. This would occur if the PPI allowed the parties to amalgamate their votes in districts where they came in second, third, or on down the list. In close vote counts, two plus three can frequently unseat one. In addition, these parties have joined with the National Mandate Party (PAN), and the National Awakening Party (PKB) to form the "central axis," a Moslem bloc to balance the tensions between Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P and Indonesian President B.J. Habibie's Golkar party. Prior to taking into account the sharing of votes among these parties, the preliminary seat allocation for the DPR gives 154 seats to PDI-P, 120 seats to Golkar, and 168 to the central axis. The formation of the central axis creates a new dimension to the presidential race in Indonesia. While there were just two main forces, Golkar and PDI-P, with the Moslem vote split as to which candidate to side with, there is now a major third force which can act either as a massive swing vote, or front its own alternative candidate. Rather than being a showdown between Habibie, who is seen as a representation of the old system of Indonesian politics, and Megawati, a nationalist reformer, there is now an important religious wildcard. The central axis, however, has yet to completely coalesce, or to decide its position for the presidential election. While Abdurrahman Wahid's PKB is a part of the central axis, it has also formed an alliance with Megawati's PDI-P, presenting it with split allegiances. While Wahid has continually supported Megawati for President, though admitting PKB may not accept her, he has also said he is willing to run for president of Indonesia. On August 8, Wahid responded positively to an earlier suggestion by political rival Amien Rais of PAN that Wahid would be a good candidate for the central axis to support. Wahid said, "I am willing to be the candidate for religious reasons," adding, "In political life we have to rely on the teachings of Islam. That's what I do." Wahid's acceptance of a run for the presidency has caused confusion within the PKB, which has been working with PDI-P. Local PKB leaders are trying to decide whether to back Megawati or Wahid. As well, within the central axis there are differing views. PPP Deputy Chairman Karmani said that Wahid's nomination was jeopardized by his continuing support of Megawati. And PKB's participation in the central axis was also questioned over its support of PDI-P. As the central axis works to bring itself together and focus its unified goals, it will be faced with three options. It may back Habibie, Megawati, or front a third candidate. Backing Habibie means being tied to the old regime of former Indonesian President Suharto. However, PBB General Chairman Yusril Ihza Mahendra has said, "We are in need of a predominant government, but, we also have to develop gradually a strong opposition." Yusril's position suggests an acceptance of the built-in stability of the Habibie-Golkar government as a necessary transitional step for Indonesia. Yusril has said that Golkar has already begun lobbying the Moslem parties for support, offering a coalition cabinet made up of representatives of several parties. Yusril said, "PDI-Struggle should start intensive lobbying like Golkar. I have never heard Mega[wati] making such an offer. What did Megawati offer?" However, countering Yusril's mild statements on Golkar, PK President Nur Mahmudi Ismail said, "If Habibie will be elected, there will be a psychological impact. Golkar, which signifies the KKN (corruption, collusion, nepotism), has managed to attract support from the Islam parties. This would imply that millions of KKN practitioners will be growing a sense of security." While supporting Habibie may mean a continuation of the status quo in Indonesia, supporting Megawati -- a woman -- has been opposed by many Moslems as being against the teachings of Islam. While this view has been pronounced incorrect by several Moslem scholars in Indonesia, Moslem support for Megawati has also lagged over earlier accusations that she was not actually a Moslem. However, Megawati has received nearly 35 percent of the popular vote, and a Habibie win will likely trigger a social outcry leading to unrest. Megawati is also favored by the international community as a democratic reformer for Indonesia. The third possibility for the central axis is to front its own candidate. This suggestion has raised questions among axis members about the role of the axis. One faction feels that the central axis was formed to provide a stabilizing mediator in the heated race between Megawati and Habibie. The other faction feels that the central axis should instead provide an alternative to Habibie and Megawati, someone who could balance all of Indonesia's various groups. The suggestion of Wahid as a possibly axis candidate, then, fills this second role. Wahid has long been a supporter of a form of reconciliation government of elites from all parts of Indonesia's political and religious spectrum. Wahid has managed to have good relations simultaneously with Megawati, Habibie, the Moslems and Indonesian Armed Forces commander General Wiranto. A Wahid candidacy, however, raises a new problem, a three-way deadlock. The central axis holds 34 percent of the DPR, PDI-P has 31 percent and Golkar has 24 percent, with 8 percent going to the military. However, it is not in the DPR but in the Peoples' Constituent Assembly (MPR) that the presidential election is carried out. The MPR combines the 500 DPR members with an additional 200 regional and interest group appointees. The 700- member MPR is not bound by the general election to translate the popular vote into the choice of the next president. The central axis, PDI-P, and Golkar are all currently guaranteed less than 25 percent of the MPR seats. However, the appointment process to choose the additional 200 members will raise these figures. Although to what level is the question. Traditionally, Golkar has managed to maintain parliamentary control of the outlying and troubled regions of Indonesia, and many of the special interest groups gaining seats in the MPR are also closely tied to the old regime and Golkar. The outcome of the presidential election in the MPR, then, may well turn into a three-party race, pitting the old regime against the democratic opposition against the Moslems. Much is dependent upon the maintenance of the central axis, as well as its decision as to which candidate to back. While the central axis has the ability to support one of the two main candidates, it is unlikely that either Habibie or Megawati would bow to the axis and throw their support behind it. Despite Wahid's potential as a compromise presidential candidate for Indonesia, much rests on his health. Wahid, who is nearly blind, is currently in the United States for eye surgery and has often said that he will not take a political office if his eyesight does not improve. Other possible Moslem candidates, such as Amien Rais, are weaker potential candidates than Wahid. Despite his ties to the old regime, Habibie offers stability for a transitional government, as demonstrated by his ability to hold Indonesia together following the resignation of Suharto and the June elections. A Moslem backing of Habibie, and Golkar as well, could bring the military back into the alliance. The military has been wary of supporting Habibie's candidacy thus far, as it will be responsible for internal stability following the presidential election, and a Habibie win is likely to trigger social unrest. However, the moderating force of the Moslems could offer the stability necessary to keep the peace, allowing the support of Wiranto and the army. Habibie's offer of a coalition or reconciliation cabinet may also ease the transition, offering Golkar experience with Moslem and even opposition oversight from within. The central axis has significantly altered the playing field in the November presidential elections in the MPR. If it runs a candidate in opposition to Golkar and PDI-P, it may hand the election to Golkar by virtue of the additional 200 MPR seats open to Golkar manipulation. And when given the choice between backing Megawati or Habibie, the choice appears to be for Habibie. All this falls apart if the bloc splits up and divides support between Golkar and PDI-P. But if the central axis remains united, however unlikely it may have seemed in the past, it is becoming increasingly possible for a Habibie victory without a subsequent violent civil uprising. The final announcement of the distribution of seats in the DPR by the PPI will not only bring to rest questions about Indonesia's complicated election laws, but may also significantly impact the upcoming Presidential race.
