From: "Iwanov Taihutu" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Fw: INITIATIVES BY THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT LEADING UP TO
PRESENT PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS IN INDONESIA - 1999
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2000 13:48:08 +0800
INITIATIVES BY THE SOEHARTO GOVERNMENT LEADING UP TO PRESENT
PERSECUTION OF
CHRISTIANS IN INDONESIA - 1999
by Roger L. Dixon, Ph.D.
posted at www.sunda.org
I. BACKGROUND - 1945-1966
Beginning with the Situbondo incident in October, 1996, more Christian
churches have been damaged, destroyed and burned than at any other time in
Indonesian history. In fact, Romo Dr. Frans Magnis Suseno, SJ writes "the
Indonesia Republic is the champion of the world in damaging and burning
places of worship" (Tahalele, 14). How did this situation come to be in a
country which had been exemplary as a pluralistic, tolerant society? The
answer lies in the machinations of the Soeharto Regime.
In the early days of the forming of the Republic, all religious groups
accepted the theoretical position that the five principles of the
Indonesian State (Pancasila) dictated religious tolerance. This implied
the right to freedom of thought, religious conscience, the right to change
one's religion or belief system, and the right to share that belief with
others. Despite the formation of a Ministry of Religious Affairs which
existed primarily to promote the Islamic religion, the government allowed
a wide range of religious freedom. Even in the chaotic days of the
struggle for independence from Holland, notable movements such as Darul
Islam in West Java and other provinces were consistently pursued by the
government forces until they were eliminated or controlled. Of course,
religious tolerance on the local level experienced problems but perfection
was lacking on all sides, Christian as well as Islamic.
II. SOEHARTO REGIME LAYS FOUNDATION FOR RESTRICTING CHRISTIAN
ACTIVITY
Inter-Religious Consultation - 1967
With the advent of the Soeharto government, certain subtle differences
began to emerge. Publicly, the generally accepted understanding of
religious tolerance was reiterated but time and again actions were taken
that eroded the freedoms of Christians. The first of these was an
Inter-Religious Consultation in November, 1967. "There was a strong
initiative from the Muslim side, supported by the Department of Religion,
to achieve agreement that no missionary activities should be undertaken
among those already having a (government recognized) religion..."
(Cooley, 1981:216). However, neither the Protestant nor the Roman Catholic
representatives would agree to such a restriction.
Mohammad Natsir wrote, "The only way national peace can be achieved is if
each religious group, besides guarding their own identity, respects the
identity of others" [Perdamaian Nasional hanya bisa dicapai kalau
masing-masing golongan agama, di samping memelihara identitas
masing-masing juga pandai menghormati identitas golongan lain.]
(1980:209). This opinion represented the position of most of the Muslim
leaders. By "identity," they were referring to all persons registered as
Muslim (every Indonesian citizen must state their religion on their
identity card), regardless of whether or not they understood or practiced
their faith.
Reason for the Governmental Change
The reason behind this new agitation to curtail Christian activity was the
turning of large numbers of Javanese people to Christianity in the
aftermath of the abortive Communist Coup in 1965. Within the short span of
a few years, several million Javanese had transferred from Islam to
Christianity. Although much of this change was nominal, it was the largest
turning of Muslims to Christianity in the history of the faith. At no
previous time had so many Muslims decided to leave that faith for another.
The Javanese phenomena traumatized Muslim leaders all over the world.
Middle Eastern Muslim countries began putting pressure on Soeharto to stop
this activity.
Djakarta Charter Used to Stir Feelings
In March 1968, the Muslim parties insisted on a return to the Djakarta
Charter, which included the stipulation that there was an "obligation of
practicing the law of Islam for the adherents of that religion." This
would provide a way for Muslim leaders to prevent Christian evangelism to
those of the Muslim faith. However, the Djakarta Charter had been rejected
under the Soekarno regime as inappropriate to a Pancasila society. The
Christians would not agree, as they argued that Article 29 (2) of the 1945
Constitution provides that "the State shall guarantee freedom to every
resident to adhere to his respective religion and to perform his religious
duties in conformity with that religion and that faith." For Christians
and others, freedom meant just that -- the right to make choices in the
area of religion.
Ministry of Religious Affairs is the Regime's Main Tool
After 1968, the Ministry of Religious Affairs began a continuous program
to hamper Christian evangelism and the growth of the Christian Church in
every way possible. One of their main tools was withholding permits for
all kinds of religious activities. Churches had difficulty both locally
and regionally in securing permission to erect new church buildings. Even
permits to hold routine church synod meetings and consultations were hard
to obtain from the security forces (Cooley, 1981:215). Among the reasons
given for this was the active Muslim opposition to anything Christians
wanted to do. But this alleged opposition seemed to come only from a small
number of religious leaders.
In March, 1968, the Muslim leaders lost their bid to incorporate the
Djakarta Charter into a new basic State Policy. This was part of a
long-time effort to transform the Republic into a formally Islamic state
at some future time (v.d. Kroef, 1971:57). Although the problem was
presented as being one of religious differences, in fact it was a
deep-seated political issue, for it dealt with political power. Basically,
Islam is a socio-political organization, whereas Christianity is not. This
difference continues to be a source of misunderstanding between the two
religious groups because the natural tolerance of the multitudes does not
reflect the goals of the Muslim elite.
Regime Permits Islamic Reaction
One of the most difficult areas to assess is how much the Soeharto Regime
favored the reaction of Muslim leaders to Christian activity. There is
little doubt that the illegal actions of Muslims were rarely punished by
law. However, until 1996, their actions were not excessively threatening
to the lives of their victims. Relatively few were killed. Some high
profile incidents created a lot of attention. One such was the attack on a
church in urban Jakarta. "In April, 1969, some 500 Muslim youths attacked
and desecrated a recently built Protestant Church in the Slipi section of
western Djakarta. Muslims alleged that no permission had been given by the
Government for the building of the church (indeed the mayor's office was
specifically said to have opposed it), that Muslims outnumber Christians
nearly seventy to one in the area, and that there are five churches in
Slipi already, and that hence the building of yet an additional church was
clearly 'provocative.'" Within the same time frame, another church was
burned down in Djatibarang near Indramayu. The local Christians were
terrorized. Van der Kroef goes on to report, "Then, on 23 January 1970,
irate Muslims sacked and burned the Roman Catholic Tarakanita Elementary
School on the outskirts of Djakarta" (v.d. Kroef, 1971:236-237). A Muslim
faction had been incited to draw the line over Christian expansion into
what they perceived as their communities.
The Soeharto Regime's Struggle with Muslim Political Forces
While the Soeharto government was appeasing Muslim elite by suppressing
Christian activity, they were also struggling to counter rising Muslim
political power. The regime did not want the leaders of the Muslim
political organizations to have influence in decision making. One issue
was the revival of the Masjumi party, which had been banned by Soekarno
after they contributed to several regional rebellions in the fifties. In
1968, the new (then acting) president Soeharto also opposed Masjumi's
reinstatement and a new party was formed to cover Masjumi's people.
Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PMI) was the compromise organization resulting
from these discussions. This illustrated the reluctance of the Soeharto
Regime to put large political opportunity in the hands of Muslim religious
leaders. In 1970, R.E. Ward wrote, "The policy of the Soeharto Government
towards Masjumi and then the Partai Muslimin has been one of consistent
opposition..." (Ward, 1970:57). While this may have been true in the area
of political control, it was not true in the religious arena.
The Hidden Agenda
With the exception of a few insightful political observers, the government
successfully hid their agenda from the populace. Church leaders, in
general, were consistently fooled by the government's public opposition to
so-called "Muslim" goals. Behind the scenes, the Regime was carrying out
plans to choke off Christian growth in order to appease the elite. In
1970, the PMI again unsuccessfully urged the government to curtail the
propagation of the Christian faith in the following ways: "(1) prohibit
the construction of a Baptist hospital in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, and
declare every Christian missionary in the region persona non grata, (2)
regulate construction of houses of worship 'in proportion to the beliefs
professed by the majority of the local population,' and (3) stop the
inflow of all foreign Christian missionaries" (v.d. Kroef, 1971:237).
While none of these efforts were successful at that time, they would be by
the end of the 70's. The plot unfolded slowly.
A joint ministerial decree issued on September 13, 1969, by the Minister
of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs [Keputusan Bersama
Menteri Agama Dan Menteri Dalam Negeri No.01/BER/ Mdn-Mag/1969],
stipulated that a house of worship could only be built with the approval
of a regional administrator, such as a governor. Religious services at
homes were only allowed if the local religious leaders approved. This
position was based on the assumption that using a home for a house of
worship could incite social disturbances. While Muslims were allowed to
hold pengajian (Koranic recitations), people of other faiths were
dependent on the good graces of local religious (usually Muslim) leaders.
Very little evidence was ever offered to show that the average citizen
objected to Christians worshipping in their own homes.
Conversely, this decree guaranteed citizens' freedom to perform religious
duties. It said that regional administrators, such as governors, must
"guide and supervise so that acts of religious propagation...do not divide
different religious communities." ["Membimbing dan mengawasi agar
pelaksanaan penyebaran agama...Tidak menimbulkan perpecahan di antara umat
beragama...] According to Prof. Dr. Sahetapy, a professor of law at
Airlangga University, this Joint Ministerial Directive was "an example of
'colonialism.' At the very least, it discriminates against and
disestablishes the development of the Church" ["Keputusan Bersama Menteri
Dalam Negeri dan Menteri Agama (Keputusan Bersama Nomor
01/BER/mdn-mag/1969) [sic] merupakan suatu bentuk 'penjajahan',
setidak-tidaknya suatu diskriminasi dan stigmatisasi terhadap pertumbuhan
Gereja."] (Sahetapy, 1993:4). He goes on to say that it violates Paragraph
29 of the 1945 Constitution, the Temporary Constitution of 1950, and the
Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, all of
which explicitly promulgate human rights. [melanggar UUD 45 , Pasal 29;
UUDS 1950, & Konstitusi RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat) yg merencanakan
HAM secara explisit]
As late as 1997, this decree was still in effect and was still being
questioned by people of all faiths ("Legislator..." 8 July, 1997). In
effect, the decree laid the foundation for absolute control by the
government over all religious gatherings and the process of dissemination
of all religious propaganda. In the seventies, this decree was
strengthened by other similar decrees, which empowered local authorities
to override the right of their citizens to be involved in religious
dialogue.
The Closing Game
There were many moves in the process to erode the ability of the Christian
community both to perform the duties of their faith and to share it with
others. The door to door tactics of the new Mormon groups created much
agitation in some of the urban communities. These actions along with the
anti-government stand of Jehovah Witnesses was improperly linked to the
Christian Church. By 1974, it became apparent that political pressure was
building against the mass tracting being done throughout Java. Although
there was no significant response to the gospel by the Sundanese,
religious authorities knew that there was great response in Central and
East Java. The West Java military commander (Panglima Jawa Barat) invited
church leaders to discuss the interreligious tension that had been
reported to him. According to him, there were plans by some groups to kill
evangelists and destroy churches even though every village in West Java
(like all of Indonesia) was tightly controlled by the military. The
military commander "suggested" that the tracting stop even though there
were no laws forbidding it and the general public seemed unconcerned about
it. For awhile the evangelicals slowed the pace of their work.
Persecution A favorite tactic of the Ministry of Religious Affairs was to
let local authorities harass the Christians in remote places. Opposition
took the form of personal attacks on believers in the villages. Every
village group was subjected to various forms of coercion to force them to
withdraw from the Christian fellowship. Frequently, congregational leaders
were harassed by the local police and military as well as by community
officials. They were often called in for interrogation in which they were
forced to wait all through the day at the whim of a government official.
Even though it may not have been the overt plan of the government to
persecute the Christians, in fact, the Soeharto Regime covertly initiated,
supported, and carried out a program of continual and constant persecution
of villagers in Muslim areas who made a confession of faith in Jesus
Christ.
Impact of Petro Dollars
The oil crisis of 1973 appears to be the event which most enabled the
Soeharto Regime to carry out their anti-Christian program. It caused the
price of oil to rocket upward and all of the OPEC countries accumulated
enormous financial reserves. This, of course, included many Muslim
countries. They began pouring money into internal and external religious
propaganda all over the world. All Islamic countries were targeted for
projects which would raise the profile of Islam. Huge amounts of this
foreign money began to flow into Indonesia which had the largest Islamic
population of any country in the world. Mosques and prayer houses
(mushollah) were built, sound systems and other electronic equipment was
donated for use in these religious establishments, and myriad training
programs were initiated to produce a more capable religious leadership.
The Indonesian government's attitude toward an evenhanded application of
freedom of religion under the Pancasila experienced a drastic change. The
petro dollars gave the Islamic clique the leverage they needed to enact
directives that would close down open propagation of the Christian
religion.
Soeharto Regime Mounts Intense Public Campaign
In the early months of 1975, it became apparent that the groundwork laid
by the Regime was beginning to stymie the ministry. Following the arrest
in February of a Chinese man who was passing out tracts in Ciwedej, West
Java, an anonymous letter was circulated which stated that Christians
controlled enough government positions to cause serious damage to Islam's
agenda in Indonesia. Although the accusation was bizarre in its political
naivet_, reaction was immense and frightening. Most evangelism stopped in
West Java. Fear swept through the churches with almost every leader
calling for wisdom (kebijaksaan) in responding to the situation. By using
the word "wisdom", they meant for the evangelists and others to stop all
forms of evangelism. Although evangelism continued, storm clouds were
gathering that would break on their heads.
Political Attacks Accelerate
Probably the Christian organization most central to the public
distribution of tracts was Every Home Crusade (EHC). In August, 1976, one
of their evangelists was arrested in Majalaya, West Java, while passing
out tracts in front of a mosque. While all agreed that this was a foolish
move on his part, there was no violation of any law. The police kept him 4
days at the jail in Cibabat (Cimindi) on the west side of Bandung. Their
reason was to protect him from harm (diamankan) but it seemed obvious that
they simply wanted to teach the Christians a lesson. The government used
this to inflame the situation even further.
Different from the forms of tract distribution used by others, EHC had a
program of house to house canvassing similar to the unpopular model used
by Jehovah's Witnesses and the Mormons. In the early days, EHC canvassers
even put tracts in mailboxes. This style of tracting not only created
reaction from the communities but it also aroused considerable opposition
from some of the churches. During the final four months of 1976, EHC
distributed 35,000 tracts to 17,000 homes in West Java. In November, the
pastor of the Western Indonesia Protestant Church (GPIB) in Cimahi
reported EHC to the Department of Religion. This provided special
ammunition to those opposing overt Christian activity in West Java.
Even with no legal base, the head of the Protestant division of the West
Java Department of Religious Affairs [Kepala Bagian Kristen, Kanwil Agama]
issued a letter against tract distribution and told foreigners not to go
to villages. For the first time, fear affected the ranks of the Sundanese
evangelists. Rumors were circulated that evangelists would be killed.
Most of them kept a very low profile and the village congregations were
left to fend for themselves without support from their patrons in the
cities.
On top of this, political action on the national scene took a new turn.
Also, in December, 1976, the Attorney General of Indonesia banned
Jehovah's Witnesses from operating throughout the country (see: Jaksa
Agung). Since the Christian Church was not too happy about the activities
of Jehovah's Witnesses, no one was concerned about their rights under the
Pancasila to free exercise of religion. Many leaders forgot that the
government had effectively linked the Jehovah's Witnesses to the Christian
Church so that action against them was construed by the people as
restrictions on the Christians. The message to the public was negative
about the Christians.
III. THE CHRISTIAN VOICE IS THROTTLED
Soeharto Regime Prepares the Coup de Grace
The continual response of the Javanese Muslims to Christ threatened the
monolithic religious system in Java. Muslim leaders pressured the
government to take action against religious groups disseminating
propaganda to people of other religions. In addition, miscellaneous
anonymous letters and pamphlets were circulated in an attempt to
intimidate the Christians. All of this activity was fueled by the Islamic
fundamentalist revival originating from the Middle East. The Christian
evangelists, who had experienced so much freedom under the Soekarno Regime
were baffled by what was happening in the larger arena. Government leaders
kept saying they desired tolerance while promoting animosity between the
religious groups.
Picking the Hatchet Man
With the installation of the Third Development Cabinet (Kabinet
Pembangunan III) in 1978, Soeharto began more emphatic moves to gain
Muslim support by curbing Christian freedom in publicly sharing their
faith. His first step was to elect a former army general to be the new
Minister of Religious Affairs. He was Haji Alamsyah Ratuprawiranegara and
he did the most serious damage to the Church in Indonesia of anyone before
him or since. In a moment of unguarded reminiscence in 1987, Alamsyah
revealed the true purpose of his appointment as the Minister of Religious
Affairs in 1978. Soeharto told him, "I am choosing you to convince the
Islamic community to accept the concept of Pancasila." [Saya angkat kamu
untuk meyakinkan ummat Islam, agar mau menerima Pancasila...]
Alamsyah related that he was very surprised at the appointment but he
understood what Soeharto wanted. "'What is your concept?' asked the
President. 'First of all, Islamic missionary work is the responsibility of
the Islamic community. So don't forbid it or try to censor their
communications,' explained Alamsyah while outlining steps he would take as
the Minister of Religious Affairs. 'With that they will stop being mad,'
he added."
["Apa dan bagaimana konsep kamu', sambung Presiden. 'Pertama pak, dakwah
adalah kewajiban umat Islam, karena itu jangan dilarang atau setiap
naskahnya harus diperiksa dulu,' jelas Alamsyah menerangkan
langkah-langkah yang akan diambilnya selaku Menteri Agama. 'Maka dengan
demikian, mereka akan berhenti marah,' sambungnya] (Presiden Jelaskan...,
1987).
In other words, to win the complete support of the Muslim elite to the
Soeharto Regime, the freedom of speech of the non-Muslims would be
sacrificed; particularly the freedom of speech of Christians.
The Infamous Directives
The key to the strategy to forcefully close down Christian evangelism
throughout Indonesia was the issuance of two directives. In August, 1978,
the Minister of Religion issued them. The first was Decision No. 70
[Keputusan Menteri Agama No. 70 Tahun 1978 Tentang Pedoman Penyiaran
Agama] which concerned "Guidelines for the Propagation of Religion" The
second was Decision No. 77 [Keputusan Menteri Agama No.77 Tahun 1978
Tentang Bantuan Luar Negeri Kepada Lembaga Keagamaan Di Indonesia] which
dealt with "Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions in Indonesia." They
were commonly referred to as SK 70 & SK 77.
SK 70 - Virtually Eliminated Public Evangelism
The first directive, SK 70, said that harmony among religious groups was a
high priority and the government was restricting religious propaganda.
Specifically, religious propaganda could not be aimed at a person of
another religion, especially through social services, literature
distribution, or personal visitation. Violators of these guidelines were
threatened with unspecified punishment. (It was unspecified because these
directives were not laws and had no basis in law by which punishment could
be attached. Never-the-less, practically everyone was traumatized by them
and was afraid to violate them because they knew action would be taken
outside of law as is common in Indonesia.)
SK 77 - Attacked the Financial Basis of Para-Church Groups
SK 77 concerned the relationships between religious groups and their
connection to the government in respect to foreign money and personnel
being used in religious activity. It specified that religious aid of any
kind originating outside Indonesia must be channeled through the Ministry
of Religious Affairs. Theoretically this applied to Islamic, Buddhist, and
Hindu religions as well but due to other special harassment of Christian
missionaries, this was felt by Christians to be particularly aimed at
them. In fact, these kinds of directives were almost never enforced in
relation to Islam. In addition, foreign religious personnel (Christian
missionaries) would be restricted. Programs using foreign workers had to
be structured to phase out foreigners within two years. Unspecified
punishment was indicated for violations (again unspecified because this
directive also had no basis in law). Walter Bonar Sidjabat, a Christian
leader, describes these directives as an act which "tarnished some noble
principles that were put forward by the founding fathers of the Republic
of Indonesia in the Pancasila" (1982:9). [For more on this in English see:
Cooley, 1981:217-220]
Christian Missionary Visas Restricted
Although the issue of foreign funds was never resolved, the government
took the initiative in arbitrarily restricting missionary visas. At first,
the government counted on normal attrition. But when the rate of
missionary loss was unacceptable, they began to accelerate the attrition
rate artificially. By August, 1979, over 100 missionaries had received 6
month visa extensions (instead of the usual 1 year) with the threat of no
further renewal. New missionary visas were curtailed sharply. This
tightening of restrictions on missionaries has continued in a consistent
though varied style until today. In this way, the Indonesian Church was
treated with contempt by the Indonesian government. They were denied the
right to invite the guests with whom they wanted to work and were given no
recourse to any appeal whereas Islamic groups were allowed their
constitutional rights.
True Purpose of the Strategy
Within six months of issuing the directives, Alamsyah had moved against
the Christian's freedom to disseminate their religion. But nothing was
done to restrict the Muslims. This clearly indicates that the two
directives (SK 70 & 77) were never intended for the Muslim groups but only
for the non-Muslims. On October 21, 1978, The Indonesian Council of
Churches [Dewan Gereja Gereja di Indonesia] and the Indonesia Council of
Bishops [Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia] [sometimes translated as
General Council of the Roman Catholic Church in Indonesia] issued a joint
letter strongly opposing these directives and claiming that they violated
the basic constitution, the spirit of the Pancasila (5 principles of the
Indonesian State), and that there were no bases in law to enforce them.
However, Soeharto was publicly pushing the implementation of these two
directives (Lanjutkan Pelaksanaan..., 11 October, 1978) and, over time,
all of the church protests were ignored by the government because it had
already established a precedent of violating the constitution where the
Christian Church was concerned.
Consequences of Directives
Also in October, evangelism activity resulted in a number of situations
which angered Muslim leaders. There was a complaint about the packets of
Christian material being sent by the Living Word Publishing House [Kantor
Kalam Hidup] in Bandung. In August, they sent at least 60 packets
containing New Testaments, tracts and other Christian material through the
mail to Muslim leaders in Majalaya and other places near Bandung.
The Chairman of the Majalaya Ward, Bandung, Council of Muslim Ulamas
[Ketua Majelis Ulama Kecamatan Majalaya Bandung] sent a protest to the
headquarters of the Operation for Keeping Order [Opstib] in Jakarta, to
the West Java Provincial Government, and to the local military post
[Opstib Pusat di Jakarta, Pemda Jabar, & Koramil]. A member of parliament
said that the government was going to have to make the Directives 70 & 77
into law so that religious dissemination could be controlled better
(Pemuka-Pemuka Agama..., 1978).
Another issue was the advertising campaign in Jakarta by a group called
"I've Found It" ("Telah Kutemukan") which gained momentum in October,
1978. Flyers and posters were distributed publicly announcing only: "I've
Found It." But the Directives 70 & 77 had sensitized Muslim leaders to
complain about anything public that was Christian. Alamsyah, the minister
of Religious Affairs, announced that there was not anything in the
campaign that violated the two Directives but he was going to ask the
Jakarta Special District Officer [Laksusda Jaya (Pelaksana Khusus Daerah)]
to check it out (Memang Kegiatan..., 1978). Unconstitutional actions such
as these were commonly used to inflame the populace against Christians who
were, in fact, doing nothing wrong.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN POLICY
The Soeharto Regime Redefines the Church
In the early 80's, the government developed another diversion by which it
could gain greater power over all community activity throughout Indonesia.
It was the transformation of the state ideology, Pancasila, into a vehicle
of national control. This strategy was able not only to distract the
Church from its duties and activities but also to redefine its nature. A
small incident at a Jakarta election rally in 1982 provided the
opportunity. This was called the "Banteng Field Incident" ("Peristiwa
Lapangan Banteng").
Five months later in a state of the union address [Pidato Kenegaraan 16
Agustus, 1982], Soeharto said that political parties still using a
philosophical base other than the state ideology (Pancasila) needed to
make a change in order to insure domestic tranquillity and nation
building. Some leaders such as Deliar Noer thought this
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