Ini ada bacaan dari milis lain. Sempat hampir saya delete karena judulnya nggak menarik. Yang jelas, saya tidak mau tahu siapa-siapa yang memprovokasi. Semua toh masih hipotesis. Bisa saja militer, tetapi siapa yg bisa menduga kalau pihak LN yg membakar-bakar? Bagaimanapun, buat saya ada point-point yang sangat penting yaitu: - Memang terjadi suatu pembersihan terhadap muslim (atau yang disebut oleh si Hefner sebagai Ethnoreligious cleasing). Oya, ini Hefner bukan si pentolan Playboy itu...:) - Memang terdapat ide pembentukan negara tersendiri berdasarkan agama Kristen. - Laskar Jihad tidak mendapat respon dari masyarakat muslim sampai kondisi pembantaian yang demikian parah di ujung tahun 1999 sampai awal 2000. - Terdapat hardliner dari Islam DAN KRISTEN (nah, ini yg suka pada lupa deh). Saya tidak hendak memprovokasi, tetapi justru saya hanya meminta agar orang-orang Kristen sadar atas apa yang telah diperbuat oleh orang-orang Kristen di Maluku. Dengan tidak mau mengakui hal ini, maka kerja sama antar umat untuk penyelesaian Maluku tidak akan pernah terjadi. Kalau sudah sama-sama tahu duduk masalahnya kan mestinya bisa ikut menyelesaikan. Kalau si Hefner menyebut kasus di Jatim, maka saya merasa perlu untuk menyebut kasus di Sumut. Mereka memang sadar bahwa ada potensi konflik dan ada yg hendak memulai. Mereka bukannya bereaksi tetapi malah merapatkan barisan. Biar dibom tiga kali dan ada yg mati juga tidak berkembang seperti di Ambon. Alasan-alasan bahwa korban toh tidak di kalangan muslim saja tidak menunjukkan suatu itikad baik. Memangnya berapa dibanding berapa? Toh sebelum laskar jihad muncul tidak ada pengungsi dari Kristen. Kalangan Kristen selalu menutup diri dan membela diri dengan alasan-alasan itu. That's okay. Tapi jangan salahkan kalau kesadaran pada umat Islam yg selama ini baru bangkit akan makin terbangun. Si Hefner (walaupun sudah bagus) ternyata lupa untuk menuliskan kasus Poso dan Kasus Kalbar. Di sana juga terjadi kasus ethnoreligious cleansing. Untuk di Kalbar, kesadaran masyarakat muslim tidak terbangun karena tertutupi oleh sentimen pendatang dan penduduk asli (Madura vs. Dayak). Yang kasihan para pekerja keras dari Madura ini. Mereka diasosiasikan sebagai orang Jawa (yang memang selalu menjadi pihak tertuduh). Mereka dicincangpun tidak ada yang merasa kasihan. Sungguh suatu pikiran yang sangat hipokrit dari orang-orang yg konon penegak HAM itu. Kejadian yang sama terjadi kemudian di Timtim. Lagi-lagi terjadi ethnoreligious cleansing. Semua pendatang yang dicap sebagai orang Jawa dan Islam lalu dibersihkan. Pemeluk Kristen dan Katolik dengan sentimen sesama agama sibuk berkoar dengan korban di pihak Timtim tetapi tidak perduli dengan korban para pendatang itu. Lucunya, lagi-lagi terjadi kesalahan serupa dengan yg di Kalbar. Agitasi dengan memakai isu Jawa dan Non-Jawa dikeluarkan sebagai jurus. Hasilnya manjur. Dalam kenyataannya yang berduyun-duyun mengungsi bukanlah orang Jawa tetapi orang Bugis, Buton, dan Makasar, dan juga orang Sumatra Utara. Memang merekalah yang memegang peran sebagai mesin ekonomi. Kalau orang Jawa paling penjual bakso dan sebagian PNS. Kejadian di Ambon ternyata begitu lagi. Isu pendatang dan penduduk asli lalu timbul lagi. Lagi-lagi manjur. Hasilnya lagi-lagi pendatang dari Bugis, Buton, dan Makasar menjadi korban. Mereka menjadi kaum teraniaya dan terusir. Lucunya, lagi-lagi disamarkan sebagai ketidaksukaan atas orang Jawa. Nih, buat orang-orang yang kurang piknik.....:) Di kawasan Indonesia Timur, kaum pedagang kebanyakan dari wilayah Makasar dan Bugis. Memang mereka yang punya jiwa dagang. Ini mirip dengan kaum pedagang di kawasan Indonesia Barat yang kebanyakan dari Sumatra Barat (dan tentunya yang keturunan Cina yang paling menonjol). Ini juga buat orang yang kurang piknik lagi. Bahwa mungkin sudah kebiasaan manusia untuk bikin gampang. Sebagai contoh penggampangan yang kita bikin adalah kebiasaan di State of New York. Di luar state-nya mereka dikenal sebagai orang New Yorker. Kadang disebut orang Yankee (yg pada gilirannya juga buat orang northeastern ya? Malah sempat untuk semua yg ada di bagian atas termasuk yg di Illinois). Di dalam state sendiri, orang dari wilayah atas lalu disebut sebagai orang Up-state. Jelas bukan orang New Yorker, karena bukan orang New York City. Soal batasannya, tidak ada yg bisa memberikan. Sebagai contoh, orang Kingston jelas bukan dianggap sebagai orang Upstate oleh orang Syracuse atau Albany. Tetapi toh tetap dianggap bukan sebagai orang New Yorker oleh yang yg tinggal di NYC. Di Indonesia, oleh bangsa lain kita dianggap sebagai orang Melayu. Sekeras apapun saya bilang orang Indonesia dan bukan dari etnik Melayu tetap saja tidak digubris. Buat orang di tanah Jawa (yg Jawa tempat langsung ya), kalau ada yg datang dari Medan akan dibilang orang Sumatra. Biarpun setengah mati menerangkan dia orang Batak, nenek-nenek di sana tidak akan mengerti, dan akan mengasosiasikannya sebagai orang Sumatra. Sebaliknya, yang dari Ndiwek akan dibilang dari Jawa. Yang dari Banten dibilang dari Jawa. Yang dari Bandung dibilang dari Jawa. Biarpun sudah setengah mati bilang orang Sunda tetap saja diasosiasikan sebagai orang Jawa. Kejadian lanjutannya, biarpun anda orang Sumatra, orang di Irian akan bilang anda orang Jawa. Nggak percaya, silakan datang ke sana deh. Saya juga terheran-heran waktu berbincang dengan seorang PNS asal Timtim. Dia ngedumel bahwa di Dili terlalu banyak orang Jawa. Saya tadinya percaya saja, dengan asumsi memang faktanya 40-50% orang Indonesia adalah Jawa. Tetapi setelah dia menyebut seorang pejabat, saya bilang lho pak dia bukan orang Jawa. Jawabannya membuat saya terkejut yaitu bahwa orang di luar Timtim adalah orang Jawa. Nah, lho...:) Sorry, saya ngedumel karena ada semprul yg mengidentifikasikan diri sebagai orang NTT dan Kristen, dan mengatai-ngatai setiap orang sebagai Jawa Islam. Yusuf L Henuk ini sudah kondang di berbagai milis dan sudah ditendang ke sana ke mari. Kata teman sih pernah pula hadir di milis Permias bertahun silam. Teman ini subscribe Permias@ tahun 1992-1993 deh, jadi si Henuk juga mestinya hadir di tahun itu. Apa masih ada yg tahu? Panjang cerita, pokoknya sih semua ada karmanya. Ada sebab ada akibat. Kalau sesudah membunuhi lalu dilawan kemudian meminta bantuan luar negeri, tentu alis orang muslim kan pada naik kan? Apa-apaan bukannya ngajak baikan malah minta tolong negara lain. Mana ada unsur ingin bikin negara sendiri lagi.... Itu si Hefner kenapa nggak terang-terangan nulis RMS? Siapa lagi yg mau mendukung RMS? Apa bekas pendukung Timtim mau jadi pendukung RMS pula? Jeffey Anjasmara Catatan lagi buat yg kuper: - golongan kristen yg digunakan Suharto tahun 1970 adalah CSIS. Kalau dijahili terus-menerus lalu muncul tandingan macam bikinan Habibie ataupun KISDI ya jangan salahkan siapa-siapa. Siapa yg mulai duluan. Nah, si Wanandi tokoh CSIS yg telah memusuhi Islam belasan tahun malah dipakai lagi sama Gus Dur, kalau banyak yg sakit hati ya tahu rasa sendiri. - setelah diinjak-injak, muslim bangkit lalu dirangkul. Tahu enggak kalau Gus Dur pernah jadi anggota DPR di jaman ORBA? ----------------------------------------- The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition -- August 16, 2000 International Commentary Suharto's Malukan Legacy By Robert W. Hefner. Mr. Hefner teaches at Boston University. His most recent book is "Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia" (Princeton, 2000). Few issues have confounded the presidency of Indonesia's Abdurrahman Wahid more than the warfare raging between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia's "Spice Islands," or Malukus. Over the past two years the Malukus have witnessed destruction more severe than in East Timor in September 1999, with the loss of 4,000 lives and the creation of more than 300,000 refugees. Some observers see the conflict as proof that Indonesia's proud tradition of democratic Islam, so prominent in the campaign against the now disgraced former president Suharto, has lost momentum. But the violence actually reflects the lingering influence of Suharto's legacies, especially the old regime's exploitation of religious divisions and its cultivation of parapolitical vigilantes. Some have offered a different explanation for the violence. Drawing an analogy with the Soviet Union, where the end of authoritarian rule was also accompanied by ethnoreligious violence, these voices say it was inevitable that ethnoreligious tensions would explode once Suharto's repressive controls were lifted. But Suharto did not so much control religious divisions as shamelessly exploit them, often with disastrous consequences. During 1965-1966 he mobilized Muslim organizations in his campaign to crush the Communist Party. With the Communist threat gone, in the 1970s Suharto turned on his allies and mobilized Christians, Chinese and secular Muslims against his only remaining mass rival -- Muslim political parties. As the scale of Indonesia's Islamic resurgence became apparent in the late 1980s, Suharto changed tack, attempting to co-opt Muslim leaders. When, in the mid-1990s, the leadership of the largest organizations made clear they were more interested in democratic reform than presidential cronyism, Suharto responded by forging ties with Islamic hard-liners in groups like the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World (known by its acronym, KISDI). Islamist conservatives have never enjoyed much support in Indonesia, but Suharto guaranteed them a central role in the political intrigues plaguing Indonesia to this day. Suharto's divide-and-conquer tactics had a disastrous impact on regions like the Malukus. Taking his cue from Jakarta, in the 1980s the Malukan Christian governor showed a preference for Christians in government appointments and business contracts. This caused resentment among Muslims, whose numbers were swelling with the arrival of hardworking migrants from Sulawesi and Java. Once a majority-Christian province, by the early 1990s the Malukus' population was divided evenly between Muslims and Christians. When Suharto began his "Islamic turn" in the early 1990s, the province's Christian governor was replaced by a Muslim bureaucrat who turned the tables and discriminated against Christians. In 1996, these policies led to several minor clashes. Today's cycle of atrocities and ethnoreligious cleansing really began, however, only in November 1998. In pro-democracy circles in Jakarta and the Malukus, the timing and neat orchestration of the violence raised suspicions that Suhartoists were provoking "horizontal" conflict so as to silence calls for investigations into the old regime's human rights abuses. A similar provocation had been attempted in the Banyuwangi region of eastern Java a year earlier. There some 150 Javanese mystics (associated with Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri) and Muslim clerics (linked to Mr. Wahid's Nahdlatul Ulama, or Awakening of Religious Teachers) were kidnapped and murdered, in what inside observers regarded as a Suhartoist effort to drive a wedge between the Muslim and secular wings of the democracy movement. The courageous collaboration of Nahdlatul Ulama and Megawati supporters defused the crisis. The Malukus, however, had no comparable organizations able to bridge religious divides. Although eastern Java in 1997-1998 had held firm in the face of provocation, the Malukus in 1999 exploded. The democratic elections of June 1999 demonstrated that the great majority of Indonesian Muslims support a democratic and pluralist politics. Islamist hard-liners won less than 6% of the vote. Stung by their defeat, the hard-liners chose to make common cause with centrists and oppose Ms. Megawati's candidacy for the presidency, since she was a woman and regarded as too secularist. This coalition helped elect Mr. Wahid president in October 1999. However, unlike the centrists around Amien Rais, head of the National Mandate Party, Muslim hard-liners had no genuine interest in cooperating with Mr. Wahid; theirs was merely a tactical retreat. Mr. Wahid never hid his contempt for Islamist hard-liners. Confident he could deal them a decisive blow, he moved in his first weeks as president to open diplomatic relations with Israel, lift the ban on communism and launch human rights investigations of the military. With these measures he hoped to consolidate Indonesia's democracy and marginalize Islamist conservatives. Although right to assume Islamist hardliners had little support, Mr. Wahid forgot that the public needed to be prepared for the abrupt change of policy on Israel and communism. Worse yet, while skillfully neutralizing many old regime military commanders, his call for human rights probes made even mainstream officers uneasy. In his first weeks as president, then, Mr. Wahid unwittingly handed Islamist hardliners the issues they needed to rebound from their electoral defeat by forging an alliance with old regime military officers. These tensions came to a head in the Malukus. Alarmed by military involvement in the violence (on both Christian and Muslim sides), Mr. Wahid was reluctant to commit troops to the troubled province. The president emphasized the need for local residents to settle their own problems. A similar approach had worked in Banyuwangi a year earlier. In the face of horrifying acts of provocation, however, the policy in the Malukus was doomed. Hard-line Muslims had been calling for jihad, religious-sanctioned warfare, in the Malukus since February of 1999. The appeal fell on deaf ears until the violence escalated in late 1999 -- and after the campaign attracted funding from businessmen and military retirees with ties to Suharto and Islamist hard-liners. Although old regime figures dominate the jihad campaign's leadership, its rank-and-file is more diverse. Supporters include many decent, although conservative Muslim clerics and university students shocked by the brutality of the Malukus slaughter, much of which in late 1999 and early 2000 took an especially awful toll on innocent Muslims. This latter fact reminds us that it is unfair for Western observers to focus all their attention in the Malukus on the Muslim fighters and none on the Christian side. After all, the so-called "red" Christians (red symbolizing non-Muslim) have committed some of the worst violence. No doubt most of the Christian fighters are hapless civilians drawn into the killing by the storm consuming Malukus society. To judge by their public statements, however, a hardened minority among the Christian fighters have been fooled into believing that ethnoreligious cleansing and a "Christian" state are the answer to the crisis. This latter illusion reminds us that the Malukan conflict is not rooted in some alleged incompatibility of Islam and democracy. Extremists can be found on all sides and in the Muslim community where a pluralist tradition remains as strong as ever. But as Mr. Wahid's missteps show, the political challenge facing democrats of all faiths is also more formidable than most imagined; large segments of the old guard remain in place and oppose reform. A compromise candidate elected by a fractious coalition, Mr. Wahid lacked the political support and administrative skill to reform Indonesia's leviathan all alone. He also underestimated the skill of hard-liners of all faiths at exploiting the Malukan issue for their own ends. However, recent events have vindicated Mr. Wahid's central political conviction that the effort to bring constitutional transparency and the rule of law to Indonesian politics is the only way forward. Without reform and without an end to the Suhartoist legacy of parapolitical gangsterism the violence in the Malukus will continue. If it does, the great achievements of the Muslim and secular democrats who united to topple the Suharto dictatorship will become but a bittersweet memory. -- From The Asian Wall Street Journal ________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com
