One thing which I feel is missing is recommendations on the size of Diffie-Hellman parameters. It seems generally accepted that 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman is no longer secure, and yet that's what most folks are still using. How about something along the lines of "Diffie-Hellman parameters of at least 2048 bits SHOULD be chosen"?

--Patrick


On 9/8/13 1:25 AM, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
This is an early version of my proposal for a BCP-like document, to
inform the industry on what can be done with existing implementations,
while TLS 1.3 is still not ready.

I would appreciate your comments of course. Specifically,
I would like to fill in the Implementation Status table (Sec. 5) and
would be glad to receive solid information (dates, planned dates,
version numbers) from implementers.

Thanks,
     Yaron

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt
Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 15:46:38 -0700
From: [email protected]
To: Yaron Sheffer <[email protected]>


A new version of I-D, draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Yaron Sheffer and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename:     draft-sheffer-tls-bcp
Revision:     00
Title:         Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS
Creation date:     2013-09-08
Group:         Individual Submission
Number of pages: 8
URL: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt
Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp
Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00


Abstract:
    Over the last few years there have been several serious attacks on
    TLS, including attacks on its most commonly used ciphers and modes of
    operation.  This document offers recommendations on securely using
    the TLS and DTLS protocols, given existing standards and
    implementations.





Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
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