On Sep 11, 2013, at 11:56 AM, Karl Malbrain <[email protected]> wrote:
> The goal of the proposal is to enable the use of strong authentication for
> all TLS connections over the internet. The certificates as
> things-in-themselves don’t really matter, they are actually just a vehicle to
> post the public key of the user/server in a reliable public place. The
> security occurs when the challenges to prove private key ownership are
> cross-issued by each party. MITM would not have the private keys to answer
> either challenge.
>
> Note that this still doesn’t solve the problem of MITM obtaining the server’s
> private key. I’m still working on that one.
I might be misunderstanding, but it seems to me that your global directory
would allow a passive listener to fingerprint the client by sniffing in a
variety of places -- near the client, near the server, or near the directory.
If you assume an attacker interested in collecting metadata about the clients,
this would be suboptimal.
I may be missing something, but this sounds like it is just a global, central
certificate authority, albeit one that is not actually issuing the
certificates, but still assigning them GUIDs, which are by definition globally
unique.
Am I indeed missing something?
Jon
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