> -----Original Message----- > From: Stephen Farrell [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 12:09 > To: Karl Malbrain > Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] > Subject: Re: [perpass] New Version Notification for draft-cooper-ietf-privacy- > requirements-00.txt > > > > On 09/20/2013 07:50 PM, Karl Malbrain wrote: > > "Note that this is contingent on practicality - if some personal data > > really has to be sent in clear for a protocol to be able to operate, > > and even opportunistic encryption is not possible, then a > > standards- track protocol that does not define how to protect that > > data will be consistent with this BCP. The IETF will have to decide > > in such cases whether standardizing that protocol benefits the > > Internet or not." > > > > > > 1. Is the value of a personal public key considered "personal data"? > > In TLS client authentication, these keys are requested. > > I doubt there's any data-protection regulator views on that (TLS client-auth > being so rare on the public Internet) but basically, I'd say yeah, its an > identifier > that generally won't change for extended periods. That's one of the > motivations > for doing TLS 1.3 - to hide such handshake data for example. >
Apart from the desirability of encrypting the personal public key when it is sent (e.g. OE), is association with a person on a server of a hash of the public key for subsequent authentication purposes covered by this BCP? > > 2. Under the goal of MITM resistance, how can opportunistic encryption > > provide security without authentication? I think that an > > authentication layer on top of opportunistic encryption is required. > > I disagree. "Security" is not a binary state of affairs. > Opportunistic encryption without authentication can provide some value, esp in > this context where it forces a more active and presumably expensive and more > likely detected attack if you want to pervasively monitor everyone. I think that a security evaluation should be broken down into individual attributes, each of which can be evaluated yes/no. Resistance to MITM attack for example. Resistance to passive surveillance is another attribute. Karl Malbrain _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
