CGA-TSIG seems to be a trust on first use protocol for subsequently updating
records within DNS. It doesn't seem to address the problem of an arbitrary
client securely obtaining the IP/Public Key for an arbitrary host from DNS
without the possiblity of MITM. Perhaps you could explain further.
Karl Malbrain
________________________________
From: Hosnieh Rafiee <[email protected]>
To: 'Karl Malbrain' <[email protected]>
Cc: 'perpass' <[email protected]>; 'Stephen Farrell' <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 1:08 PM
Subject: Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
Not if you use another approach as well as a signature. This means that if the
two nodes know the IP address of each other, then nobody can play a role of
MITM if they are using CGA-TSIG
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig)as a means of DNS
authentication.
Hosnieh
From:[email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of
Karl Malbrain
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 9:38 PM
To: Hosnieh Rafiee
Cc: 'perpass'; 'Stephen Farrell'
Subject: Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
Yes, MITM can be prevented if you have a copy of the public certificate
obtained through exteriour means to check the signature over the data. If your
certificate is provided by MITM you naturally lose that signature protection.
From:Hosnieh Rafiee <[email protected]>
To: 'Karl Malbrain' <[email protected]>
Cc: 'perpass' <[email protected]>; 'Stephen Farrell' <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 2:08 PM
Subject: Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
MITM attack can be prevented by signing the data. Please check cga-tsig draft.
Hosnieh
From:[email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of
Karl Malbrain
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 10:31 PM
To: Stephen Farrell; perpass
Subject: Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
To obviate the harvesting of meta-data, we do need a secure interface to DNS.
MITM resistance (authentication) is also going to be required in DNS server
connections. Maybe well known certificates for DNS servers incorporated into
browser software
Given the reluctance of browser writers to implement DANE, we're going to need
something like encrypted QUIC available as a transport first.
Karl Malbrain
From:Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
To: perpass <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 1:43 AM
Subject: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
Hiya,
I've not seen mention of this so far here that I recall.
Even as we improve the security of loads of protocols, there
will still be issues with meta-data monitoring based on
DNS queries for example. This point was sort of raised on
the IETF list e.g. in [1].
DNSSEC doesn't provide any confidentiality. There are
proposals that do try do that.
Do we think this is worth looking at?
If so, anyone up for doing some work on that?
If so, how, or starting from what?
S.
[1] http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/current/msg82696.html
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