On Tue, Sep 24, 2013 at 7:23 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > > In the case of email, meeting that goal with end-to-end encryption > mechanisms > like S/MIME or PGP is necessarily going to mean having a nonnegligable > amount > of email traffic encrypted. The minute that happens spammers are going to > join > the party in a big way precisely because of the ability this confers to get > past transport-side content inspection and filtering. >
Yes, I anticipated that problem. Though I am not sure what the solution is. I consider this to be part of the 'research' problem and didn't want to bias the paper describing the decomposition of the problem. One approach would be to only accept encrypted mail if it is signed by someone in my circle of trust or an adjacent circle. Which is one of the reasons I started looking again at a hybrid of Web o' Trust and CA managed trust. One option would be that a notary allows parties registered to notarize up to 10 key endorsements per week, pick a limit, the bad guys need thousands of disposable addresses every hour. Another would be to get an EV cert and use that to endorse EE certs as legit. Consumers are not going to want to spend that sort of money but it is probably the cheapest solution for an enterprise. > State of the art AS/AV vendors employ honeypots and other forms of > feedback to > rapidly generate rules, patterns, hashes, and other information, which is > then > rapidly distributed to filtering systems attached to vast numbers of > ingress > MTAs operated by their customers. Some of this filtering is done on the > basis > of IP addresses, envelope, or outer header information, but a lot of it > depends > on content analysis - analysis that will be blocked by encryption. > And you need malware blocking and quite a bit of other stuff which is why I suspect that some enterprises will not permit genuinely end-to-end encrypted email. In fact some are blocked by regulation. > Any halfway realistic plan to deploy end-to-end encryption at Internet > scale is > going to have deal with the totality of contemporary email services and > usage > in addition to solving the myriad problems surrounding key/certificate > distribution and management as well as UI issues. (As if the latter weren't > difficult enough.) > The key distribution and key endorsement infrastructure counts as 'research' for that reason. But we can certainly put together a system that is adequate for use within the security community and provides transparent security. That is kind of a no-brainer to deploy since the bad guys have always known that spying on security researchers is most likely to reveal important info. Mitnick was no genius, he just hacked the voicemail of the VMS security guru. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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