Hannes: >>> If people want technologies like DNSSEC/DANE or RPKI to be deployed in >>> practice they are going to have to answer the difficult questions >>> about how cryptography is used to concentrate power over the Internet >>> infrastructure by a very narrow range of institutions, most of which >>> are ultimately under US govt. control. >> >> To this we can only say that if the U.S. attempted to exert that >> control, it would be widely noticed, and it would quickly lead to changes. > > Although I wasn't at the IAB at that time I recall that the RPKI decision for > having a single trust anchor was everything but easy. > > Here is the IAB statement from that time: > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf-announce/current/msg07028.html > > Maybe Marcelo, who was at the IAB at that time, can say something about the > discussions.
I was on the IAB when this statement was produced, and confidence in the cryptography had nothing to do with the discussion. The long standing plan for deployment of the RPKI global trust anchor keeps it separate from all of the things that have US Government entanglements. This decision was made a long time ago, and it remains the correct decision. IANA administers the pool of IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses, and AS numbers, and IANA assigns these resources to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) for further assignment within their regions. Thus, IANA is authoritative about the assignments made to RIRs, and RIRs are authoritative about assignments to the next level. For this reason, the IAB said: > 1. the RPKI should have a single authoritative trust anchor > > 2. this trust anchor should be aligned with the registry of the root > of the allocation hierarchy The reason for these is included in the statement. > The reasoning is of a technological nature and is as follows. A > single root for the certification hierarchy significantly reduces > the risk of two or more parties accidentally (or maliciously) > issuing conflicting certifications for the same address block, > because a single authoritative entity at the top-level of the > allocation hierarchy is authoritative for both (a) the allocation of > the address block and (b) the cryptographic certification of the > fact that it did indeed allocate that address block. > > Thus, the IAB strongly recommends a single root aligned with the > root of the address allocation hierarchy (now part of the IANA > function). Doing so will minimize unnecessary complexity in the > system, in particular virtually eliminating the possibility of > resource conflicts in the system, reducing substantially the > likelihood of errors as the allocation and certificate generation > can be done together by the same operator. Russ _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
