On Tue, 25 Aug 2015, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
I posted a question to SAAG and would like to see where we are at on
consensus around a statement that keeps showing up in drafts.
If you could take a look at my message to SAAG (and the thread) and
chime in there, it would be helpful to know where we are at. I might
be in the rough, but I'm not so sure that I am...
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/saag/PXrRghfHM-OBj2Y2TniuKptpKCs
Actually, I agree with you. I do not like the use of "weaker algorithms"
for Opportunstic Security.
There is no valid reason to design anything that is "weaker" in strength
(eg keysize). I think what might have been meant is "unauthenticated"
versus "authenticated". And that also turns "weak" and "advanced"
attacker into "passive" and "active" attackers. I think that would be
more inline with the discussions we have had regarding opportunistic
security. I have never heard of a proposal from anyone that said "use
AES128 for opportunistc and AES256 for preconfigured security".
Paul
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