Why Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic Algorithms matter to us all

A number of folks have been asking me why the announcement by NIST of
finalists for Quantum-Resistant Cryptographic Algorithm standards
matters. Here it is in a non-technical nutshell. The cryptography that
protects most Internet connections from simple eavesdropping is
typically based on public key systems that depend on "hard to solve
without the keys" algorithms for their security. So, if you have the
keys, the algorithms are practical to quickly solve. If you don't have
the keys, they should take a long, long, long time by brute force --
too long to be practical.

But as parallel/cloud computing and ever faster computing have
evolved, what once looked like a very long time is looking shorter and
shorter. It is widely assumed that "quantum" computing will be so fast
as to render the existing algorithms useless by enabling "brute force"
attacks that once seemed completely impractical.

So, the idea of these new algorithms and standards is to replace the existing algorithms with new ones that (in theory and we assume in practice) can resist attacks even by ultra-fast quantum computers, and
keep our Internet communications reasonably secure.

These should all be pretty much "backstage" changes as far as most
Internet users are concerned -- your apps and such should keep working
the way they do now. But the evolution of these algorithms and standards
are crucial to our communications security that we all depend upon.

L

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--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein ([email protected]): https://www.vortex.com/lauren Lauren's Blog: https://lauren.vortex.com
Founder: Network Neutrality Squad: https://www.nnsquad.org
        PRIVACY Forum: https://www.vortex.com/privacy-info
Co-Founder: People For Internet Responsibility
Twitter: https://twitter.com/laurenweinstein
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
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