Hi On Sat, 2 Jan 2021 at 15:59, Stephen Frost <sfr...@snowman.net> wrote:
> Greetings Dave! > > * Dave Page (dp...@pgadmin.org) wrote: > > On Sat, 2 Jan 2021 at 15:41, Stephen Frost <sfr...@snowman.net> wrote: > > > * Khushboo Vashi (khushboo.va...@enterprisedb.com) wrote: > > > > Please find the attached patch to support Kerberos Authentication in > > > > pgAdmin RM 5457. > > > > > > > > The patch introduces a new pluggable option for Kerberos > authentication, > > > > using SPNEGO to forward kerberos tickets through a browser which will > > > > bypass the login page entirely if the Kerberos Authentication > succeeds. > > > > > > I've taken a (very short) look at this as it's certainly something that > > > I'm interested in and glad to see work is being done on it. > > > > > > I notice that 'delegated_creds' is being set but it's unclear to me how > > > they're actually being used (if at all), which is a very important part > > > of Kerberos. > > > > > > What's commonly done with mod_auth_kerb/mod_auth_gss is that the > > > delegated credentials are stored on the filesystem in a temporary > > > directory and then an environment variable is set to signal to libpq / > > > the Kerberos libraries that the delegated credentials can be found in > > > the temporary file. I don't see any of that happening in this patch- > is > > > that already handled in some way? If not, what's the plan for making > > > that work? Also important is to make sure that this approach will work > > > for constrainted delegation implementations. > > > > Phase 1 of this project (which this patch aims to implement) is to handle > > Kerberos logins to pgAdmin when running in server mode (as we’ve already > > done for LDAP, except KRB authenticated users don’t see a login page of > > course). Phase 2 will add support for logging into the PostgreSQL > servers - > > I believe that is where we’ll need to handle delegated credentials, > correct? > > Yes, though I sure hope there isn't a plan to release just 'phase 1' > since that would imply that the user is still sending their password to > pgAdmin in some form that pgAdmin then turns around and impersonates the > user, basically completely against how Kerberos auth should be working > in this kind of a intermediate service arrangement. > > In other words, if just 'phase 1' is released, it'd probably be CVE > worthy right out of the gate... It wouldn’t impersonate the user at all, it would just work as it does now, requiring the user to supply a username/password for scram/md5/ldap etc, or a cert for SSL auth. Connection to a PostgreSQL server which required gss or sspi simply wouldn’t work (unless the service account under which the pgAdmin server is running has a valid ticket through other means). > -- -- Dave Page https://pgsnake.blogspot.com EDB Postgres https://www.enterprisedb.com
