Re: [BUGS] PGPASSWORD

[postgresbugs]

Tom Lane wrote: postgresbugs <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Unless the utilities like psql and pg_dump are changed to accept a password as a command line option, I don't think PGPASSWORD should go away. It is too useful for those that know how to properly use and destroy environmental variables. ... which evidently does not include you. The point here is that if PGPASSWORD is passed down to psql as an environmental variable, it is visible as part of psql's environment for the entire run of psql. Whatever the calling script does later doesn't remove that window of vulnerability. No need for personal attacks. Just because you disagree is no reason to be arrogant. I don't want to get into an "urinating match" with you. And, yes I do understand that for the brief period the environmental variable could possibly be visible on some platforms, but even Windows has the local directive which makes the variable far more secure. In my case, prompting each time for the password is out of the question. There is no human to answer the prompt. There is no intention of removing PGPASSWORD, because it is safe and useful *on platforms that do not expose other processes' environment variables*. But it is deprecated and will remain so, because there are too many platforms where this is not true. I thought the word "deprecated"  means there is intent to remove it from use in the future. Again, the advantage is I can let users with no database login have controlled access to database data and utilities without them actually having a user name and password to the database. Without the ability to use PGPASSWORD, I have to expose the password in a .pgpass file for every user I want to allow access. I think that is far more insecure. If .pgpass is properly protected, I do not see why you think it is insecure. It's certainly a lot safer than environment variables. regards, tom lane The user that starts the program may not have any .pgpass file in their home directory. The program may even be started remotely. The password is encrypted and stored and decrypted by the binary and the passed to the script for execution of the standard Postgres utility. The script runs in a process that never opens a visible terminal or process that would be visible to anyone that might even be near the server. Regards, John Griffiths