Prevent creating types in pg_temp from restricted code.

Commit 62aba76568 taught security-restricted operations to refuse
temporary table creation, since the calling session might not
expect untrusted objects to appear at the front of its search
path, but the same hazard exists for types.  This oversight
allowed code running within such an operation to create domains,
enum types, and range types in the session's temporary schema,
potentially leading to privilege escalations.  To fix, refuse to
create these types in a temporary schema within a
security-restricted operation, as we already do for tables.

The checks live in the command paths rather than in TypeCreate(),
which also creates the rowtypes of the transient relations that
REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW CONCURRENTLY and rewrites of temporary
tables legitimately place in pg_temp within a security-restricted
operation.  Composite types are already covered by the existing
check in DefineRelation(), and creating base or shell types
requires superuser.  Other object kinds are left alone, since
unqualified names never resolve to them in pg_temp.

Reported-by: Anthropic OSS program
Author: Anthropic OSS program
Co-authored-by: Nathan Bossart <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Greg Burd <[email protected]>
Security: CVE-2026-116316
Backpatch-through: 14

Branch
------
master

Details
-------
https://git.postgresql.org/pg/commitdiff/91ede1768834d07e0751dbc3efae9ece18f92f44
Author: Nathan Bossart <[email protected]>

Modified Files
--------------
src/backend/commands/typecmds.c          | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/test/regress/expected/privileges.out | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/test/regress/sql/privileges.sql      | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 67 insertions(+)

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