Greetings, * Steven Pousty (steve.pou...@gmail.com) wrote: > If you consider the application developer or data scientist's perspective > it makes total sense. I don't like the pattern of appdevs always working as > the postgres user, it encourages bad patterns and can often blow up when > you move the application to production.
> Instead I think a good flow for an appdev or a data scientists to follow > when developing their function in Pl/Python or PL/R is: > 1) Make the langauge trusted on the appdevs or data scientist's instance of > Postgres. Most developers either work on a cluster on their laptop or in a > container. The way to give non-superusers access to things which are usually superuser-only is to set up a way to have that ability GRANT'd to them, either through privileges on a function, or through a new role to manage that access. In this case, it would seem likely that the right answer would be a new role along the lines of "pg_use_untrusted_language", which would then allow a user who has been GRANT'd that role to be able to create functions in untrusted languages. An interesting question might be if we'd allow such a role to create C language functions or not. Clearly, such a privilege could be used by someone to get superuser access themselves, but that's nothing new when it comes to such roles and I appreciate the angle you're taking here where you'd like the developer to be able to operate as a non-superuser in general while still being able to create such functions. > 2) Send the finished product to the DBA and security teams for review. > 3) If it passes review and testing then you can put it into production. > > The SQL I am talking about is this: > UPDATE pg_language SET lanpltrusted = true WHERE lanname LIKE 'plr'; > > There should also be a reminder to NOT do this in production. I can't agree with this part, it's just not a good idea for anyone to be issuing direct UPDATE calls against the catalogs. Thanks, Stephen
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