On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 10:26:54AM -0400, Robert Haas wrote:
> > specifically: Appendix C: Tweaks
> >
> > Quoting a couple of paragraphs from that appendix:
> >
> > """
> > In general, if there is information that is available and statically
> > associated with a plaintext, it is recommended to use that information
> > as a tweak for the plaintext. Ideally, the non-secret tweak associated
> > with a plaintext is associated only with that plaintext.
> >
> > Extensive tweaking means that fewer plaintexts are encrypted under any
> > given tweak. This corresponds, in the security model that is described
> > in [1], to fewer queries to the target instance of the encryption.
> > """
> >
> > The gist of this being- the more diverse the tweaking being used, the
> > better. That's where I was going with my "limit the risk" comment. If
> > we can make the tweak vary more for a given encryption invokation,
> > that's going to be better, pretty much by definition, and as explained
> > in publications by NIST.
>
> I mean I don't have anything against that appendix, but I think we
> need to understand - with confidence - what the expectations are
> specifically around XTS, and that appendix seems much more general
> than that.
Since there has not been activity on this thread for one month, I have
updated the Postgres TDE wiki to include the conclusions and discussions
from this thread:
https://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/Transparent_Data_Encryption
--
Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> https://momjian.us
EDB https://enterprisedb.com
If only the physical world exists, free will is an illusion.
