On Tue, 2023-02-28 at 11:28 -0800, Andres Freund wrote:
> I can only repeat myself in stating that SECURITY DEFINER solves none
> of the
> relevant issues. I included several examples of why it doesn't in the
> recent
> thread about "blocking SECURITY INVOKER". E.g. that default arguments
> of
> SECDEF functions are evaluated with the current user's privileges,
> not the
> function owner's privs:
>
> https://postgr.es/m/20230113032943.iyxdu7bnxe4cmbld%40awork3.anarazel.de
I was speaking a bit loosely, using "SECURITY DEFINER" to mean the
semantics of executing code as the one who wrote it. I didn't
specifically mean the function marker, because as you pointed out in
the other thread, that's not enough.
>From your email it looks like there is still a path forward:
"The proposal to not trust any expressions controlled by untrusted
users at least allows to prevent execution of code, even if it doesn't
provide a way to execute the code in a safe manner. Given that we
don't have the former, it seems foolish to shoot for the latter."
And later:
"I think the combination of
a) a setting that restricts evaluation of any non-trusted expressions,
independent of the origin
b) an easy way to execute arbitrary statements within
SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION"
My takeaway from that thread was that we need a mechanism to deal with
non-function code (e.g. default expressions) first; but once we have
that, it opens up the design space to better solutions or at least
mitigations. Is that right?
Regards,
Jeff Davis
