Greetings, all, * Stephen Frost (sfr...@snowman.net) wrote: > I still don't see that as a reason for tools to be suseptible to serious > issues if a funky user gets created and I'd be surprised if there > weren't other ways to get funky characters into the log file, but that's > all ultimately an independent issue from this. I'll add the comments as > discussed and discourage using the clean ascii function, but otherwise > keep things as-is in that regard.
Updated patch with lots of comments added around pg_clean_ascii() about why it exists, why we do the cleaning, and warnings to discourage people from using it without good cause. I've also done some additional testing with it and it seems to be working well. I'll poke at it a bit more tomorrow but if there aren't any other concerns, I'll commit it towards the end of the day. Thanks! Stephen
From 6429ee14322b963e2f429b1e696ace40c42815fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stephen Frost <sfr...@snowman.net> Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 15:59:50 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Add application_name to connection authorized msg The connection authorized message has quite a bit of useful information in it, but didn't include the application_name (when provided), so let's add that as it can be very useful. Note that at the point where we're emitting the connection authorized message, we haven't processed GUCs, so it's not possible to get this by using log_line_prefix (which pulls from the GUC). There's also something to be said for having this included in the connection authorized message and then not needing to repeat it for every line, as having it in log_line_prefix would do. The GUC cleans the application name to pure-ascii, so do that here too, but pull out the logic for cleaning up a string into its own function in common and re-use it from those places, and check_cluster_name which was doing the same thing. Author: Don Seiler <d...@seiler.us> Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAHJZqBB_Pxv8HRfoh%2BAB4KxSQQuPVvtYCzMg7woNR3r7dfmopw%40mail.gmail.com --- src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 16 +++++++++ src/backend/utils/init/postinit.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c | 17 ++------- src/common/string.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++ src/include/common/string.h | 1 + src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h | 7 ++++ 6 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c index 305ff36258..41de140ae0 100644 --- a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c +++ b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ #include "catalog/pg_control.h" #include "common/file_perm.h" #include "common/ip.h" +#include "common/string.h" #include "lib/ilist.h" #include "libpq/auth.h" #include "libpq/libpq.h" @@ -2096,6 +2097,21 @@ retry1: pstrdup(nameptr)); port->guc_options = lappend(port->guc_options, pstrdup(valptr)); + + /* + * Copy application_name to port if we come across it. This + * is done so we can log the application_name in the + * connection authorization message. Note that the GUC would + * be used but we haven't gone through GUC setup yet. + */ + if (strcmp(nameptr, "application_name") == 0) + { + char *tmp_app_name = pstrdup(valptr); + + pg_clean_ascii(tmp_app_name); + + port->application_name = tmp_app_name; + } } offset = valoffset + strlen(valptr) + 1; } diff --git a/src/backend/utils/init/postinit.c b/src/backend/utils/init/postinit.c index 5ef6315d20..4f1d2a0d28 100644 --- a/src/backend/utils/init/postinit.c +++ b/src/backend/utils/init/postinit.c @@ -249,34 +249,56 @@ PerformAuthentication(Port *port) #ifdef USE_SSL if (port->ssl_in_use) ereport(LOG, - (errmsg("replication connection authorized: user=%s SSL enabled (protocol=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d, compression=%s)", - port->user_name, - be_tls_get_version(port), - be_tls_get_cipher(port), - be_tls_get_cipher_bits(port), - be_tls_get_compression(port) ? _("on") : _("off")))); + (port->application_name != NULL + ? errmsg("replication connection authorized: user=%s application_name=%s SSL enabled (protocol=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d, compression=%s)", + port->user_name, + port->application_name, + be_tls_get_version(port), + be_tls_get_cipher(port), + be_tls_get_cipher_bits(port), + be_tls_get_compression(port) ? _("on") : _("off")) + : errmsg("replication connection authorized: user=%s SSL enabled (protocol=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d, compression=%s)", + port->user_name, + be_tls_get_version(port), + be_tls_get_cipher(port), + be_tls_get_cipher_bits(port), + be_tls_get_compression(port) ? _("on") : _("off")))); else #endif ereport(LOG, - (errmsg("replication connection authorized: user=%s", - port->user_name))); + (port->application_name != NULL + ? errmsg("replication connection authorized: user=%s application_name=%s", + port->user_name, + port->application_name) + : errmsg("replication connection authorized: user=%s", + port->user_name))); } else { #ifdef USE_SSL if (port->ssl_in_use) ereport(LOG, - (errmsg("connection authorized: user=%s database=%s SSL enabled (protocol=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d, compression=%s)", - port->user_name, port->database_name, - be_tls_get_version(port), - be_tls_get_cipher(port), - be_tls_get_cipher_bits(port), - be_tls_get_compression(port) ? _("on") : _("off")))); + (port->application_name != NULL + ? errmsg("connection authorized: user=%s database=%s application_name=%s SSL enabled (protocol=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d, compression=%s)", + port->user_name, port->database_name, port->application_name, + be_tls_get_version(port), + be_tls_get_cipher(port), + be_tls_get_cipher_bits(port), + be_tls_get_compression(port) ? _("on") : _("off")) + : errmsg("connection authorized: user=%s database=%s SSL enabled (protocol=%s, cipher=%s, bits=%d, compression=%s)", + port->user_name, port->database_name, + be_tls_get_version(port), + be_tls_get_cipher(port), + be_tls_get_cipher_bits(port), + be_tls_get_compression(port) ? _("on") : _("off")))); else #endif ereport(LOG, - (errmsg("connection authorized: user=%s database=%s", - port->user_name, port->database_name))); + (port->application_name != NULL + ? errmsg("connection authorized: user=%s database=%s application_name=%s", + port->user_name, port->database_name, port->application_name) + : errmsg("connection authorized: user=%s database=%s", + port->user_name, port->database_name))); } } diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c index e9f542cfed..f4c8ac0605 100644 --- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c +++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ #include "commands/vacuum.h" #include "commands/variable.h" #include "commands/trigger.h" +#include "common/string.h" #include "funcapi.h" #include "jit/jit.h" #include "libpq/auth.h" @@ -10754,13 +10755,7 @@ static bool check_application_name(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source) { /* Only allow clean ASCII chars in the application name */ - char *p; - - for (p = *newval; *p; p++) - { - if (*p < 32 || *p > 126) - *p = '?'; - } + pg_clean_ascii(*newval); return true; } @@ -10776,13 +10771,7 @@ static bool check_cluster_name(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source) { /* Only allow clean ASCII chars in the cluster name */ - char *p; - - for (p = *newval; *p; p++) - { - if (*p < 32 || *p > 126) - *p = '?'; - } + pg_clean_ascii(*newval); return true; } diff --git a/src/common/string.c b/src/common/string.c index 3260d37a84..499e81811a 100644 --- a/src/common/string.c +++ b/src/common/string.c @@ -56,3 +56,37 @@ strtoint(const char *pg_restrict str, char **pg_restrict endptr, int base) errno = ERANGE; return (int) val; } + + +/* + * pg_clean_ascii -- Replace any non-ASCII chars with a '?' char + * + * Modifies the string passed in which must be '\0'-terminated. + * + * This function exists specifically to deal with filtering out + * non-ASCII characters in a few places where the client can provide an almost + * arbitrary string (and it isn't checked to ensure it's a valid username or + * database name or similar) and we don't want to have control characters or other + * things ending up in the log file where server admins might end up with a + * messed up terminal when looking at them. + * + * In general, this function should NOT be used- instead, consider how to handle + * the string without needing to filter out the non-ASCII characters. + * + * Ultimately, we'd like to improve the situation to not require stripping out + * all non-ASCII but perform more intelligent filtering which would allow UTF or + * similar, but it's unclear exactly what we should allow, so stick to ASCII only + * for now. + */ +void +pg_clean_ascii(char *str) +{ + /* Only allow clean ASCII chars in the string */ + char *p; + + for (p = str; *p != '\0'; p++) + { + if (*p < 32 || *p > 126) + *p = '?'; + } +} diff --git a/src/include/common/string.h b/src/include/common/string.h index 78a450192e..7c3594557a 100644 --- a/src/include/common/string.h +++ b/src/include/common/string.h @@ -13,5 +13,6 @@ extern bool pg_str_endswith(const char *str, const char *end); extern int strtoint(const char *pg_restrict str, char **pg_restrict endptr, int base); +extern void pg_clean_ascii(char *str); #endif /* COMMON_STRING_H */ diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h index ef5528c897..eb8bba4ed8 100644 --- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h +++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h @@ -138,6 +138,13 @@ typedef struct Port char *cmdline_options; List *guc_options; + /* + * The startup packet application name, only used here for the "connection + * authorized" log message. We shouldn't use this post-startup, instead + * the GUC should be used as application can change it afterward. + */ + char *application_name; + /* * Information that needs to be held during the authentication cycle. */ -- 2.17.1
signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
