On Wed, Dec 26, 2018 at 01:45:00PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote: > I am not sure I buy the argument that this is a security hazard, but > there are other reasons to question the use of random() here, some of > which you stated yourself above. I wonder whether we should > establish a project policy to avoid use of random() for internal > purposes, ie try to get to a point where drandom() is the only > caller in the backend.
Agreed for all three points. > A quick grep says that there's a dozen or so callers, so this patch > certainly isn't the only offender ... but should we make an effort > to convert them all to use, say, pg_erand48()? I think all the > existing callers could happily share a process-wide random state, > so we could make a wrapper that's no harder to use than random(). Another possibility would be to extend a bit more the use of pg_strong_random(), though it is designed to really be used in cases like authentication where the random bytes are strong for cryptography. pg_erand48() would be a good step forward. -- Michael
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