On Tue, Dec 31, 2019 at 1:05 PM Masahiko Sawada <sawada.m...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 1, 2019 at 12:03 PM Michael Paquier <mich...@paquier.xyz>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Nov 01, 2019 at 09:38:37AM +0900, Moon, Insung wrote:
> > > Of course, I may not have written the excellent quality code
> > > correctly, so I will make an interim report if possible.
> >
> > The last patch has rotten, and does not apply anymore. A rebase would
> > be nice, so I am switching the patch as waiting on author, and moved
> > it to next CF.
> >
>
> We have discussed in off-list and weekly voice meeting for several
> months that the purpose of this feature and the target for PG13 and we
> concluded to step back and to focus on only internal key management
> system for PG13. Transparent data encryption support is now the target
> for PG14 or later. Key management system is an important
> infrastructure for TDE but it can work independent of TDE. The plan
> for PG13 we discussed is to introduce the internal key management
> system that has one encryption key for whole database cluster and make
> it have some interface to get encryption keys that are managed inside
> PostgreSQL database in order to integrate it with other components
> such as pgcrypto.
>
> Idea is to get something encrypted and decrypted without ever knowing
> the actual key that was used to encrypt it. The attached patch has two
> APIs to wrap and unwrap the secret by the encryption key stored inside
> database cluster. user generate a secret key locally and send it to
> PostgreSQL server to wrap it using by pg_kmgr_wrap() and save it
> somewhere. Then user can use the saved and wrapped secret key to
> encrypt and decrypt user data by something like:
>
> INSERT INTO tbl VALUES (pg_encrypt('user data', pg_kmgr_unwrap('xxxxx'));
>
> Where 'xxxxx' is the result of pg_kmgr_wrap function.
>
> I've attached the KMS patch. It requires openssl library. What the
> patch does is simple and is not changed much from the previous version
> patch that includes KMS and TDE; we generate one encryption key called
> master key for whole database cluster at initdb time, which is stored
> in pg_control and wrapped by key encryption key(KEK) derived from
> user-provided passphrase. When postmaster starts up it verifies the
> correctness of passphrase provided by user using hmac key which is
> also derived from user-provided passphrase. The server won't start if
> the passphrase is incorrect. Once the passphrase is verified the
> master key is loaded to the shared buffer and is active.
>
> I added two options to initdb: --cluster-passphrase-command and -e
> that takes a passphrase command and a cipher algorithm (currently only
> aes-128 and aes-256) respectively. The internal KMS is enabled by
> executing initdb with those options as follows:
>
> $ initdb -D data --cluster-passphrase-command="echo 'password'" -e aes-256
>
> I believe the internal KMS would be useful several use cases but I'd
> like to have discussion around the integration with pgcrypto because
> pgcrypto would be the first user of the KMS and pgcrypto can be more
> powerful with the KMS. I'll register this KMS patch to the next Commit
> Fest.
>
> It is already there "KMS - Internal key management system" (
https://commitfest.postgresql.org/26/2196/).
I really appreciate peoples (CC-ing) who participated in off-list
> discussion/meeting for many inputs, suggestions and reviewing codes.
>
> Regards,
>
>
> --
> Masahiko Sawada http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
> PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
>
--
Ibrar Ahmed
