On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 08:15:27PM +0000, Alastair Turner wrote: > Hi Bruce > > In ckey_passphrase.sh.sample > > + > +echo "$PASS" | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1 > + > > Under the threat model discussed, a copy of the keyfile could be > attacked offline. So getting from passphrase to DEKs should be as > resource intensive as possible to slow down brute-force attempts. > Instead of just a SHA hash, this should be at least a PBKDF2 (PKCS#5)
I am satisfied with the security of SHA256. > On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 15:40, Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> wrote: > > > > Here is an updated patch. Are people happy with the Makefile, its > > location in the source tree, and the install directory name? I used the > > directory name 'auth_commands' because I thought 'auth' was too easily > > misinterpreted. I put the scripts in /src/backend/utils/auth_commands. > > > > What's implemented in these patches is an internal keystore, wrapped > with a key derived from a passphrase. I'd think that the scripts > directory should reflect what they interact with, so > 'keystore_commands' or 'local_keystore_command' sounds more specific > and therefore better than 'auth_commands'. The point is that some commands are used for keystore and some for SSL certificate passphrase entry, hence "auth". -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> https://momjian.us EnterpriseDB https://enterprisedb.com The usefulness of a cup is in its emptiness, Bruce Lee
