Bruce Momjian wrote:
KaiGai Kohei wrote:
I've updated my patches, it contains a few bugfixes.
[1/6]
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-sepgsql-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
[2/6]
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-pg_dump-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
[3/6]
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-policy-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
[4/6]
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-docs-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
[5/6]
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-tests-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
[6/6]
http://sepgsql.googlecode.com/files/sepostgresql-row_acl-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
The comprehensive documentation for SE-PostgreSQL is here:
http://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/SEPostgreSQL (it is now under reworking.)
List of updates:
- Patches are rebased to the latest CVS HEAD.
- bugfix: permission checks are ignored for per statement trigger functions
- bugfix: per-statement trigger function ignored trusted function configuration
- bugfix: not a proper permission check on lo_export(xxx, '/dev/null')
Request for Comments:
- The 4th patch is actually needed? It can be replaced by wiki page.
- Do you think anything remained towards the final CommitFest?
- Do you have any reviewing comment? Most of patches are unchanged from
the previous vesion. If you can comment anything, I can fix them without
waiting for the final commit fest.
I just looked over the patch. This new version with row-level SQL
security has certainly reduced the SE-Linux-specific part, which is
good.
It was interesting how you implemented SQL-level column-level
permissions:
CREATE TABLE customer (
cid integer primary key,
cname varchar(32),
credit varchar(32) SECURITY_CONTEXT =
'system_u:object_r:sepgsql_secret_table_t'
);
I am unclear how that will behave with the column-level permissions
patch someone is working on. I am wondering if your approach is clearer
than the other patch because it gives a consistent right policy for rows
and columns.
The column-level permissions in SE-PostgreSQL works independently and
orthogonally from the upcoming column-level permissions by Stephen Frost.
When the SE-PostgreSQL is enabled, both of facilities have to allow the
client to access required columns.
In the above case, the "credit" column has "sepgsql_secret_table_t" type,
but rest of columns inherits the type of "customer" table which allows
non-administrative users to access in the default security policy.
If the given query contains the "credit" column, SE-PostgreSQL checks
privileges of client to access columns labeled as "sepgsql_secret_table_t",
then it raises an error to abort the current transaction if the security
policy does not allow it.
There is a possibility that column-level ACLs are set via newer GRANT/REVOKE
statement. In this case, the core PostgreSQL checks them, and raises an error
if violated.
I was wondering why you mention the NSA (U.S. National Security Agency)
in the patch?
+# NSA SELinux support
The original author of SELinux is NSA.
There is no more meanings than a caption of the option.
I'll fix it, if necessary.
The size of the patch is still larger but I don't see any way to reduce it:
1275 sepostgresql-docs-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
625 sepostgresql-pg_dump-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
829 sepostgresql-policy-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
1736 sepostgresql-row_acl-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
10847 sepostgresql-sepgsql-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
1567 sepostgresql-tests-8.4devel-3-r1168.patch
16879 total
I thought the "sepostgresql-docs" can be replaced by the pointing to the wiki
page, how do you think the idea?
Thanks,
--
KaiGai Kohei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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