Magnus Hagander wrote:
> I think I agree with the idea that we should match wildcards only at the
> beginning of the name *for now*, and then see what people actually
> request :-) I'm less sure about the single-pathname-component part, but
> the argument around backwards compatible is certainly a very valid one..
Here's one that (I think) does that. For every step, the code becomes
simpler - which I like when it comes to security code :)
//Magnus
*** a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
--- b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
***************
*** 55,60 ****
--- 55,61 ----
#endif
#ifdef USE_SSL
+
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#if (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
***************
*** 64,79 ****
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
- /* fnmatch() needed for client certificate checking */
- #ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH
- #include <fnmatch.h>
- #else
- #include "fnmatchstub.h"
- #endif
- #endif /* USE_SSL */
-
-
- #ifdef USE_SSL
#ifndef WIN32
#define USER_CERT_FILE ".postgresql/postgresql.crt"
--- 65,70 ----
***************
*** 443,448 **** verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
--- 434,481 ----
return ok;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Check if a wildcard certificate matches the server hostname.
+ *
+ * The rule for this is:
+ * 1. We only match the '*' character as wildcard
+ * 2. We match only wildcards at the start of the string
+ * 3. The '*' character does *not* match '.', meaning that we match only
+ * a single pathname component.
+ * 4. We don't support more than one '*' in a single pattern.
+ *
+ * This is roughly in line with RFC2818, but contrary to what most browsers
+ * appear to be implementing (point 3 being the difference)
+ *
+ * Matching is always cone case-insensitive, since DNS is case insensitive.
+ */
+ static int
+ wildcard_certificate_match(const char *pattern, const char *string)
+ {
+ /* If we don't start with a wildcard, it's not a match (rule 1 & 2) */
+ if (strlen(pattern) < 3 ||
+ pattern[0] != '*' ||
+ pattern[1] != '.')
+ return 0;
+
+ if (strlen(pattern) > strlen(string))
+ /* If pattern is longer than the string, we can never match */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pg_strcasecmp(pattern+1, string+strlen(string)-strlen(pattern)+1) != 0)
+ /* If string does not end in pattern (minus the wildcard), we don't match */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (strchr(string, '.') < string+strlen(string)-strlen(pattern))
+ /* If there is a dot left of where the pattern started to match, we don't match (rule 3) */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* String ended with pattern, and didn't have a dot before, so we match */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
/*
* Verify that common name resolves to peer.
*/
***************
*** 472,478 **** verify_peer_name_matches_certificate(PGconn *conn)
if (pg_strcasecmp(conn->peer_cn, conn->pghost) == 0)
/* Exact name match */
return true;
! else if (fnmatch(conn->peer_cn, conn->pghost, FNM_NOESCAPE/* | FNM_CASEFOLD*/) == 0)
/* Matched wildcard certificate */
return true;
else
--- 505,511 ----
if (pg_strcasecmp(conn->peer_cn, conn->pghost) == 0)
/* Exact name match */
return true;
! else if (wildcard_certificate_match(conn->peer_cn, conn->pghost))
/* Matched wildcard certificate */
return true;
else
--
Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list ([email protected])
To make changes to your subscription:
http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
