Bruce Momjian wrote:
Peter Eisentraut wrote:
KaiGai Kohei wrote:
I don't agree. What is the reason why? It has been unclear for me.
The PGACE security framework is designed to allow users to choose
an enhanced security mechanism from some of provided options.
(Currently, we have sepgsql and rowacl.)
It is quite natural that one is disabled when the other is enabled.
As a general rule, mutually exclusive features as compile-time option
should be avoided at all costs. Since most people use binary packages,
forcing the packager to make such a choice will always make a lot of
people unhappy, or alternatively cause one of the features to bitrot.
As a secondary rule, mutually exclusive features should be avoided at
all, without a compelling reason. I don't see such a reason here.
I think there is a reason to have SE-Linux be compile-time because there
is no way to know at run time if the OS has the SE-Linux libraries,
right? I assume this is similar to how we do LDAP.
Yes, the libselinux is a factor it to be a compile-time option.
But your larger point is that SQL-row-level security should always be
available, which I just posted about.
If so, it should be hardcoded on somewhere, no need to be implemented
as a guest of PGACE security framework. Its purpose is to implement
enhanced security mechanisms with minimum impact to core facilities.
If you intend to implement is as a hardcoded feature, I can agree.
Please wait for a few days, I'll try to implement it.
So, ignore the 6th patch during the days and make progress to review
the rest of patches.
Thanks,
--
KaiGai Kohei <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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