2009/10/19 Dave Page <dp...@pgadmin.org>: > On Mon, Oct 19, 2009 at 9:23 AM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.steh...@gmail.com> > wrote: >> 2009/10/19 Dave Page <dp...@pgadmin.org>: >>> On Mon, Oct 19, 2009 at 8:54 AM, Pavel Stehule <pavel.steh...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>>> I dislike write access to app name guc for user too. It's not safe. >>>> Maybe only super user can do it? >>> >>> That'll render it pretty useless, as most applications wouldn't then >>> be able to set/reset it when it makes sense to do so. >> >> But application can do it simply via connection string, no? Mostly >> applications has connection string in configuration, so I don't see >> problem there. And if I would to allow access, then I could to wrap >> setting to security definer function. > > It will prevent an application changing the value before running a > long operation which may warrant special identification. It will also > prevent applications changing the setting if you're running through a > pooler.
Then we have to divide this value to two independent values like application_name and application_state. > >> I see this as security hole. It allows special SQL injection. > > How so? > You change identity. If any application is vulnerable to SQL injection, then this value is nice goal. Pavel > > > -- > Dave Page > EnterpriseDB UK: http://www.enterprisedb.com > -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
