On Mon, Dec 27, 2010 at 16:33, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > Magnus Hagander <mag...@hagander.net> writes: >> On Mon, Dec 27, 2010 at 10:53, Magnus Hagander <mag...@hagander.net> wrote: >>> We could quite easily make a replication role *never* be able to >>> connect to a non-walsender backend. That would mean that if you set >>> your role to WITH REPLICATION, it can *only* be used for replication >>> and nothing else (well, you could still SET ROLE to it, but given that >>> it's not a superuser (anymore), that doesn't have any security >>> implications. > >> Actually, having implemented that and tested it, I realize that's a >> pretty bad idea. > > OK, so if we're not going to recommend that REPLICATION roles be > NOLOGIN, we're back to the original question: should the REPLICATION > bit give any other special privileges? I can see the point of allowing > such a user to issue pg_start_backup and pg_stop_backup.
Yes, those would definitely be useful. We are, basically, talking about where we'll relax the "only superuser" one, right? Since they are normal roles, the DBA can always GRANT permissions on *objects* to them, but there are superuser-only things taht you can't GRANT away... -- Magnus Hagander Me: http://www.hagander.net/ Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/ -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
