On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 11:50:09AM +0530, Amit Kapila wrote: > > I looked at this but could not see how to easily pass the value of > > 'isTopLevel' down to the SELECT. All the other checks have isTopLevel > > passed down from the utility case statement. > > Yes, we cannot pass isTopLevel, but as isTopLevel is used to decide > whether we are in function (user defined) call, so if we can find > during statement execution (current case set_config execution) that > current statement is inside user function execution, then it can be > handled. > For example, one of the ways could be to use a mechanism similar to > setting of user id and sec context used by fmgr_security_definer() (by > calling function SetUserIdAndSecContext()), once userid and sec > context are set by fmgr_security_definer(), later we can use > InSecurityRestrictedOperation() anywhere to give error. > > For current case, what we can do is after analyze > (pg_analyze_and_rewrite), check if its not a builtin function (as we > can have functionid after analyze, so it can be checked > fmgr_isbuiltin(functionId)) and set variable to indicate that we are > in function call. > > Any better or simpler idea can also be used to identify isTopLevel > during function execution. > > Doing it only for detection of transaction chain in set_config path > might seem to be more work, but I think it can be used at other places > for detection of transaction chain as well.
I am also worried about over-engineering this. I will wait to see if anyone else would find top-level detection useful, and if not, I will just apply my version of that patch that does not handle set_config. -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + It's impossible for everything to be true. + -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
