On 2015-03-04 11:06:33 -0500, Stephen Frost wrote: > * Andres Freund (and...@2ndquadrant.com) wrote: > > On 2015-03-04 10:52:30 -0500, Stephen Frost wrote: > > > The first is a "don't break anything" approach which would move the > > > needle between "network data sensitivity" and "on-disk data sensitivity" > > > a bit back in the direction of making the network data more sensitive. > > > > I think that's a really bad tradeoff for pg. There's pretty good reasons > > not to encrypt database connections. I don't think you really can > > compare routinely encrypted stuff like imap and submission with > > pg. Neither is it as harmful to end up with leaked hashes for database > > users as it is for a email provider's authentication database. > > I'm confused.. The paragraph you reply to here discusses an approach > which doesn't include encrypting the database connection.
An increase in "network data sensitivity" also increases the need for encryption. Greetings, Andres Freund -- Andres Freund http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
