* Jim Nasby (jim.na...@bluetreble.com) wrote: > On 3/4/15 2:56 PM, Stephen Frost wrote: > >>2) The per-session salt sent to the client is only 32-bits, meaning > >>>that it is possible to reply an observed MD5 hash in ~16k connection > >>>attempts. > >Yes, and we have no (PG-based) mechanism to prevent those connection > >attempts, which is a pretty horrible situation to be in. > > Is there some reason we don't just fix that? I'm thinking that this > is a special case where we could just modify the pg_auth tuple > in-place without bloating the catalog (we already do that somewhere > else). Is there something else that makes this difficult? Are we > afraid of an extra GUC to control it?
I'm all for it, though I would ask that we provide a way for superusers to delegate the ability to reset locked accounts to non-superusers. I'd want to think about it a bit more before settling on using pg_authid to track the data. In any case, I do think we need a way to disable this ability for certain roles and, furtherr, that we not track failed logins in cases where it's disabled (which might well be the default- I don't think we want to add this overhead for systems which have lots of recurring logins (think application users where they aren't doing pooling). Thanks! Stephen
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