* Claudio Freire (klaussfre...@gmail.com) wrote: > On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 12:34 PM, Stephen Frost <sfr...@snowman.net> wrote: > > * Heikki Linnakangas (hlinn...@iki.fi) wrote: > >> On 07/07/2015 04:31 PM, Stephen Frost wrote: > >> >The alternative is to have monitoring tools which are running as > >> >superuser, which, in my view at least, is far worse. > >> > >> Or don't enable fpw_compression for tables where the information > >> leak is a problem. > > > > My hope would be that we would enable FPW compression by default for > > everyone as a nice optimization. Relegating it to a risky option which > > has to be tweaked on a per-table basis, but only for those tables where > > you don't mind the risk, makes a nice optimization nearly unusable for > > many environments. > > No, only tables that have RLS (or the equivalent, like in the case of > pg_authid), where the leak may be meaningful. > > The attack requires control over an adjacent (same page) row, but not > over the row being attacked. That's RLS.
Eh? I don't recall Heikki's attack requiring RLS and what about
column-level privilege cases where you have access to the row but not to
one of the columns?
Thanks,
Stephen
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