* Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
> Stephen Frost <sfr...@snowman.net> writes:
> > On Sunday, January 3, 2016, Tom Lane <t...@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> >> The fine manual says that when row_security is set to off, "queries fail
> >> which would otherwise apply at least one policy".  However, a look at
> >> check_enable_rls() says that that is a true statement only when the user
> >> is not table owner.  If the user *is* table owner, turning off
> >> row_security seems to amount to just silently disabling RLS, even for
> >> tables with FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY.
> >> 
> >> I am not sure if this is a documentation bug or a code bug, but it
> >> sure looks to be one or the other.
> > The original reason for changing how row_security works was to avoid a
> > change in behavior based on a GUC changing. As such, I'm thinking that has
> > to be a code bug, as otherwise it would be a behavior change due to a GUC
> > being changed in the FORCE RLS case for table owners.
> Well, I tried changing the code to act the way I gather it should, and
> it breaks a whole bunch of regression test cases.  See attached.

Right, I wrote the code that way originally thinking that it didn't make
sense to throw a permission denied error when it's the owner, but I
hadn't been thinking about, at that time, how we don't want the GUC to
result in a behavior change.

As we don't want to end up with the same behavior-change-due-to-GUC that
we had with the original row_security implementation, we should change
the code as your patch does and update the regression tests accordingly.
Perhaps the error code thrown could be tailored a bit when it's the
owner, to indicate that FORCE RLS has been set on the table, but I'm not
sure it's really a big deal either way.



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