On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 01:00:50AM +0300, Álvaro Hernández Tortosa wrote: > I'm mostly convinced by the power of all the parameters that already > exist, given that you added both saslname and saslchannelbinding to the > already existing sslmode. That's great, and allows for very fine choosing of > the auth method. So it would be great if (non-libpq) driver implementations > would expose the same parameter names to the users. I will study this for > JDBC.
Coming in late here, but the way TLS prevents authentication downgrade attacks is for the sender to send a list of supported authentication methods, and a hash of the supported authentication methods with a random number and a secret shared with the other end, and send that. If the list doesn't match the hash, it means the list is invalid. The secret prevents attackers from faking connections. I think the problem is that we don't have a consistent secret shared between the client and the server. We have md5 and SCRAM, but that doesn't help because the secret it tied to the authentication methods. -- Bruce Momjian <br...@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com + As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. + + Ancient Roman grave inscription + -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription: http://www.postgresql.org/mailpref/pgsql-hackers
