* Andrew Dunstan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: > [bugtraq removed - I don't think this belongs there, at least at this stage]
Sure.
> /etc/shadow is supposedly only readable by root (or things that are
> setuid root). If you have root you already own the box. Yet we store
> passwords there hashed with random salt.
Right, exactly.
> My understanding is that Stephen would like a system where clear
> passwords are never stored. He's right in saying that our "encrypted"
> passwords are in effect cleartext, as a malicious client would only ever
> need to know the hashed pw to gain access, and not the original
> cleartext. Of course, adding random salt won't change that, and you are
> quite right in saying that the random salt would have to be sent as part
> of the challenge.
No, adding a random salt wouldn't change that, that's a direct flaw of
the 'md5' mechanism in pg_hba.conf. However, I can choose not to use
the 'md5' mechanism in pg_hba.conf and can use 'password' instead.
There's not currently an option to say "use a random salt instead of the
username as the salt" for those of us concerned both about people
sniffing the wire and compromising pg_shadow.
> There's a choice between protecting the password over the wire via a
> challenge/response system, and protecting it in storage. Postgres has
> quite reasonably chosen the former. Stephen says "Well, I can protect
> the wire comms via ssh or IPSEC, and I'd like storage protection too."
> That also seems reasonable, although I don't think the sky is really
> falling in.
Right.
> Lastly, I have seen Jan say several times (on IRC) that mission-critical
> DBs should not be exposed to untrusted networks, but always protected by
> appropriate middleware. I could not agree more.
I agree with this also, of course, but there's only so much one can
do and security in layers...
Stephen
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