Dear all, A reminder that tomorrow Serious Metaphysics will be meeting at 12pm to hear Yohan Joo presenting "Virtue, Luck and Knowledge" (abstract below).
Due to the Faculty job talks, we will be meeting for the next two weeks (Mon Feb 13, and Feb 20th) in the Philosophy Graduate Common Room, NOT the Board Room. For those of you from outside the department, the Common Room is located in the same hallway as the Board Room. Best, Emily Thomas _____________________________________________ Virtue, Luck and Knowledge Duncan Pritchard argues in his paper 'Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology'(2011) that his hybrid theory can accomodate our two distinct intuitions on knowledge: the anti-luck intuition and the ability intuition. I argue contrary. I present cases to show that Pritchard's theory is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge. The cases I present together iluminate the nature of epistemic luck, and imply that our knowledge is fundamentally subject to epistemic luck. If we know something, then it is because we are lucky. In addition, I argue that the safety condition as understood by Pritchard is far from well-established. _____________________________________________________ Sent by the CamPhilEvents mailing list. To unsubscribe or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents Posts are archived here: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive
