This Thursday at 4pm in the graduate common room in the Philosophy Faculty, Fredrik Nyseth will give a talk as follows:
*Title*: The Independence of Logic and Wittgenstein's 'Fundamental Thought' *Abstract:* Wittgenstein, Carnap and Ayer have claimed that the reason why logical truths are necessary and a priori is that they make no claim about the world. They are true in a way that requires no cooperation from the world (we may call this 'the independence thesis'). I take this to be a rejection of the view that logical truths owe their special status to substantial modal facts about reality (though, admittedly, this is contentious in Wittgenstein's case). More recently, Timothy Williamson (2007) and Theodore Sider (2011) have challenged the independence thesis, claiming that it is either false or trivial. I will suggest that while the claim that logic is independent of the world has sometimes been overstated, Wittgenstein's 'fundamental thought', that logical constants do not represent, could provide a response to the Williamson-Sider challenge. No reading is required in advance. All the best, Tim -- Tim Button, *The Limits of Realism*, Oxford University Press, 2013. Available at OUP UK <http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199672172.do>and OUP US <http://global.oup.com/academic/product/9780199672172> _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
